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Abstract. Negligent misstatement isn’t about the creation or recognition of a
new right to information per se. Instead, the law of misstatements allows us better
to enjoy our existing rights and to make better decisions with respect to them.
Currently, the dominant manifestation of liability for negligent misstatements is
predicated on an assumption of responsibility by the defendant (whether actual or
implied). Those skeptical of the rights-based thesis are, perhaps not surprisingly,
similarly skeptical of the assumption of responsibility model. As such, this model
has become something of a shibboleth in misstatement theory between rights-based
theorists and others. This thesis crosses party lines. While adhering to corrective
justice, it denies that an assumption of responsibility by the defendant is the touch-
stone of liability for negligent misstatements. Indeed, there is nothing particularly
distinct about misstatement liability as against normal liability in negligence pred-
icated on proximity and foreseeability of harm. Further, this thesis argues that
corrective justice is not only consistent with such a reading of the law, but neces-
sitates it. Recognising a right means paying heed to its congeners. If we are to
take rights seriously, then we must eschew reasoning—such as the assumption of
responsibility thesis—that at once submerges real, extant rights while at the same
time promoting a ‘right’ that is diffuse, ill-defined, and with little basis in law.
c©Nicholas Wellesley Hoggard 2019.
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Introduction
Negligent misstatement liability is poorly understood—not for wantof trying, but certainly for want of consensus. The dominant manifestationof liability seems to be predicated on an assumption of responsibility by
the defendant (whether actual or implied). A quasi-contractual relationship such as
this suits the rights-based thesis. Those skeptical of the rights-based thesis are, per-
haps not surprisingly, similarly skeptical of the assumption of responsibility model.
As such, this model has become something of a shibboleth in misstatement theory.
This thesis crosses party lines. The argument presented herein is that it is not only
possible to be both a rights-based theorist and skeptical of assumption-based mod-
els, but entirely necessary if we are to accord respect to rights and also to avoid
multiplication of hypotheses.
Negligent misstatement isn’t about the recognition of a new right to information
per se. We possess a range of rights—rights to body, property, holdings of wealth
etc—and our ability properly to exercise such rights often depends upon being prop-
erly informed or advised. Our rights are vulnerable to deprivation and loss when
others make misstatements to us because, for example, we enter into inadvisable
transactions as a result of them. The law of misstatements allows us better to enjoy
our existing rights and to make better decisions with respect to them. This thesis
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will consider this proposition in relation to a range of situations from medical advice
to the effect of misstatements upon subsequent transactions.
1. A right to information?
It is an observation at once trifling and fundamental that we rely daily on information,
information we are often unable to question, and information provided not necessar-
ily to us directly but also to the public at large. This information takes manifold
forms: weather forecasts, travel information, news (and, indeed, fake news), finan-
cial information, directions, road signs, allergy advice, etc. Statements such as these
dominate our lives.
Much of this information is provided without obligation on the part of the
provider, inasmuch as he or she is under no obligation to the receiver to provide
the information. If I approach you in the street and ask for directions to the nearest
purveyor of groceries, then—no matter how lost I am and no matter the extent of my
need for asparagus—you infringe no right of mine nor curb any obligation of yours in
failing to provide that information. That I rely on you does not, ipso facto, generate
any obligation on your part, nor right on mine.
If, on the other hand, you do choose to provide directions, I find no further
entitlement to accurate information simply because I am not in a position to question
it. Short of hearing your advice and cross-checking it with another hapless stranger—
an exercise potentially as futile as it is mildly bizarre—I genuinely rely upon the
accuracy of the information because I know no better. The same is true of the
weather forecast. My own ability to foretell the weather is limited by a distinct
paucity of data, inter alia, so if you (assuming your new role as weather forecaster)
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tell me that it is going to rain next week, I am in no position to question it. Even if
other weather forecasters appear to disagree, my criticism of your forecast is limited
solely to some probabilistic estimate—the majority of other informed people seem to
think you are wrong—and is not informed by any expertise on my part.
The temptation would be to argue that my genuine reliance should generate some
obligation on your part, this being the counter-point to an alternative formulation:
if I were able to check with relative ease information provided to me—if I asked for
directions but am also able to access a map on my mobile phone, say—then it would
seem strange to burden the generous passer-by with any kind of legal obligation.
However, it does not follow as a matter of logical necessity that my inability to check
the information should therefore generate an obligation on your part; the existence
of thing A may provide a good reason for not doing action B, but the absence of A
does not necessarily provide a reason for definitely doing B. Were it the month of
June, I might note that it would be a bad time to eat oysters, and so choose not to.
However, were it not June (or May, July, or August), I do not then become subject
to an imperative to eat oysters at every other time of year; a reason may be sufficient
on its own to mandate or prohibit action, but merely being a sufficient reason does
not allow us to suppose that it is the only reason, or a necessary reason. The crude
examples above are just a couple of the manifold instances where such liability is
clearly not generated, despite my reliance on accurate information.
Indeed, there is a non-trivial (though, as we shall see, problematic) argument
to be made that my reliance on you is a very good reason not to burden you with
legal liability: the law should encourage you to do me a voluntary favour, and not
saddle you with the consequences of failing to do so, or failing to do so well. On its
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own, however, this reason is clearly insufficient to negative a finding of liability: that
non-negligent action may carry with it some benefit is no reason to ignore the effects
of negligent action. Surgery to correct chronic back-pain is clearly of benefit, but
less so if the result of negligent surgery is death or paralysis. It would be no defence
for the negligent surgeon to argue that there was benefit in posse such that his or
her negligence should be ignored.
The reason that we struggle when considering situations such as this—the reason
that we struggle to define why someone is liable for the provision of misleading
information—is that we are casting about for a right to be informed or a duty to
inform. This thesis argues that no such duty or right exists, save indirectly as a
product of prior rights (such as the right to bodily integrity, or to dispose of your
property as you wish, etc).
The thesis will advocate in favour of corrective justice; private law, at its core,
is concerned with one person’s entitlement to demand of another a remedy for in-
terference with a right, whether in the form of damages for loss, adjustment of gain,
refrainment from interference with that right, etc.
However, this thesis departs from the rights-based school of thought in refuting
the assumption of responsibility argument. This amounts to a multiplication of
hypotheses: it is neither necessary nor helpful in explaining the existence of liability
for misstatements. We should permit only the minimum number of concepts to
explain legal phenomena, and shun duplication and poor reasoning.
It is worth considering the academic and judicial context of some of these argu-
ments.
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2. A muddled orthodoxy
The various analytic approaches to liability in tort law are manifold, varying from re-
alist approaches by tort scholars such as Jane Stapleton—who would argue in support
of tort law’s purposive welfare function,1 embracing both principle and policy—to
more formalist approaches by scholars such as Ernest Weinrib,2 whose concern lies
in the careful exposition of the structure of tort law.
Tort law is not alone in this regard; contract law, for example, can be analysed
as an instrument of economic exchange, as a manifestation of interpersonal justice,
as a logical part of the broader map of the law of obligations, and so on.
However, this thesis proposes an alternative analysis of our understanding of duty
and rights in the law of negligence, and the approach taken is—not unthinkingly—
formalist, in that the methodology and analysis is directed towards achieving a co-
herent understanding of the law. Coherence is ‘a necessary condition that both the
law and theories about it must satisfy in order to qualify as such’;3 it may be that
there are other possible coherent systems of law, but it is hoped that, by founding the
analysis on our current and well-reasoned understanding of the most basic elements
of negligence (e.g. that claims are founded on loss), there is more to be said in favour
of this analysis than mere coherence.
1See J Stapleton, ‘Duty of Care Factors: A Selection from the Judicial Menus’ in Peter Cane and
Jane Stapleton (eds), The Law of Obligations: Essays in Celebration of John Fleming (Oxford,
Clarendon Press 1998) 59, and see also J Stapleton, ‘The Golden Thread at the Heart of Tort Law:
Protecting the Vulnerable’ (2003) 24 Aust Bar Rev 135, 135–137.
2Note Weinrib’s famous dictum, ‘thue purpose of private law is to be private law’, in E Weinrib,
The Idea of Private Law (Harvard University Press 1995) 5.
3R Stevens, ‘The Conflict of Rights’, in A Robertson and H W Tang (eds), The Goals of Private
Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2009) 141.
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Two examples demonstrate well the lack of coherence affecting the law of negligent
misstatement, though this is not to suggest they are unique in this regard. It is worth
considering them to some extent, in order that the importance of clear taxonomy is
clearly demonstrated.
The first is economic loss. Students of the common law—and, indeed, of the
civil—will know well of courts’ reluctance to recognise claims for losses which are
purely economic. They will know of it, but experience suggests that understand-
ing is rare. The trite mantra that you cannot claim for pure economic loss causes
considerable confusion because, of course, you can claim for purely economic losses.
Consider contracts: the breach of the primary duty of performance (or, indeed, the
right to performance) generates a remedial relation to provide the claimant ‘with the
value of the performance to which he was entitled under the primary relation’.4 No
court would strike out a claim on the basis that the expectation interest contingent
upon due performance was purely financial in nature. Similarly, in the case of mis-
taken payments, or enrichments sine causa, the purely financial nature of the claim
would be no bar to the right to restitution. Even in the realm of tort law, economic
loss is recoverable in public (and perhaps even private5) nuisance, albeit that this
must be predicated on a restriction of the claimant’s reasonable enjoyment of their
land.
No doubt the student would here offer some rejoinder, that of course the bar only
applies to negligence claims. Even if this were actually the case (which, given that
one can recover purely economic losses flowing from negligent misstatements, it is
4P Jaffey, ‘Damages and the Protection of Contractual Reliance’ in D Saidov and R Cunnington
(eds), Contract Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2008)
140.
5SCM (United Kingdom) Ltd v WJ Whittall & Son Ltd [1970] 2 All ER 417, 430 (CA).
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not), it doesn’t elucidate our problem in any real sense. Given the law’s willingness to
allow recovery in almost any other instance, one sensibly entertains a suspicion that
the bar does not exist purely—if at all—because the losses are economic in nature,
but rather because the loss is not founded on any identifiable right; put simply, the
rule does not speak for itself. This point will be elaborated as one of the core themes
of the thesis.
One of the problems with dealing with negligent misstatement and economic
loss is due to the language of negligence over the past century, which has been
duty-focussed. Lord Atkin, despite much mastery in his judgment in Donoghue v
Stevenson,6 set us on a doomed path. In his speech, he noted
The liability for negligence[. . .]is no doubt based upon a general public
sentiment of wrongdoing for which the offender must pay. But acts or
omissions which any moral code would censure cannot in a practical
world be treated so as to give a right to every person injured by them
to demand relief. In this way rules of law arise which limit the range of
complainants and the extent of their remedy. The rule that you are to
love your neighbour becomes in law you must not injure your neighbour;
and the lawyer’s question “Who is my neighbour?” receives a restricted
reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which
you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour.
Who then in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be persons who
are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably
to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing
my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.7
6[1932] SC 31 (HL).
7ibid at 44.
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The quotation is lengthy, but deliberately so; the focus is consistently on the
defendant, and the question as to whom they owed a duty of care. ‘Who is my
neighbour?’ translates without any loss of meaning to ‘to whom do I owe an obliga-
tion?’, but it is a stretch in this context to suggest that it translates with as much
ease to ‘who has a right that I must not infringe?’. In fact, in Lord Atkin’s view the
right to relief is born almost entirely of this breach of a duty of care. This thesis will
show how this cannot be the case. The doomed path consists in trying to isolate
an element that establishes the defendant’s liability in the abstract and beyond the
causation of harm (infringement of right).
Similarly, the continual reversion to defendant-focused liability in the form of
‘assumption of responsibility’, as most recently articulated in Chandler v Cape plc,8
is leading the law into unusual and alien territory, and almost certainly as an un-
intended consequence. For example, Lord Steyn in Williams v Natural Life Health
Foods9 advocated what Professor Barker has termed the ‘strong’ version of the as-
sumption of responsibility approach.10 The assumption, so the argument went, need
not have been explicit, but certainly there must have been an implication that the de-
fendant agreed to be responsible; such an analysis would appeal to those who would
view tort (erroneously, it is submitted) as quasi-contractual, as articulated by Lord
Devlin.11 However, an agreement to incorporate liability—explicit or otherwise—
is clearly a marked departure from the precepts of tort, a subject which ‘is most
typically concerned with unilateral decisions to act that cause harm to others and
8[2012] EWCA Civ 525.
9[1998] 1 WLR 829 (HL).
10K Barker, ‘Wielding Occam’s Razor: Pruning Strategies for Economic Loss’ (2006) 26 OJLS 290.
11See also McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59, 76 (Lord Slynn).
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obligations are typically imposed as between strangers.’12 The analysis is further
stretched when one considers the many situations in which ‘the services or advice
provided[. . .]were in no sense voluntary’13, but provided with a disclaimer of respon-
sibility (as in Smith v Eric S Bush14) or under statutory obligation (as in Ministry
of Housing and Local Government v Sharp15), for example. Such an interpretation
seems almost to be unworkably restrictive, and so easily circumvented.
Discarding the language of implied subjective assumption, and rightly so, oth-
ers have argued for a far weaker interpretation—an objective interpretation—such
as that favoured by the House of Lords in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates16 and,
subsequently, in Spring v Guardian Assurance plc.17 The difficulty in applying the
traditional Hedley Byrne18 formulation of liability stems from the fact that the deal-
ings were in no sense direct; the defendant ex-employers were required to produce a
reference about the claimant, though—unlike in Hedley Byrne —not to the claimant.
However, under the objective interpretation, the question of whether the claimant
was the intended recipient or not rather misses the point: the claimant still relied
on the reference, and the fact that such reliance required no act or volition on his
part arguably lends even greater weight to a finding of liability.19 Indeed, surely this
is the point: the extent of the claimant’s volition is inversely proportional to the
12C Witting, ‘Justifying Liability to Third Parties for Negligent Misstatements’ (2000) 20 OJLS 4,
642.
13Barker (n 10).
14[1990] 1 AC 831 (HL).
15[1970] 2 QB 223.
16[1994] UKHL 5.
17[1995] 2 AC 296 (HL).
18Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 (HL).
19See Witting (n 12), in which Professor Witting states that where ‘few[. . .]decisions or acts of
volition intervene in the sequence of events leading to the damage’, this will evidence a close causal
connection.
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foreseeability of his relying on the defendant’s statement. How the reliance mani-
fests itself—directly or through a third party—is thus of secondary import to the
question of whether there is reliance at all. The language of assumption is therefore
entirely misleading as describing any relevant test, as ultimately it is a question of
law.20 Rather, many have argued that it is enough for the purposes of any test that a
person has undertaken a task in the knowledge that some other person ‘is generally
reliant upon him for protection against harm’.21
This seems to be a reasonable enough formulation, though its inherent breadth
and ambiguity haunt it still. Consideration of the law relating to third party liability
in general will show this to be true. What if one holds, as Lords Goff and Browne-
Wilkinson did in White v Jones,22 that reliance (which requires the claimant to have
altered their position in some way in reliance on the defendant) need not strictly
apply to all cases, but only to misstatements because damage does not necessarily
flow therefrom, and that a broader test for third party liability is one of depen-
dence?23 Well, then there is no real logical difference between the former scenario
and the scenario where a solicitor, who negligently failed to alter a will such that
the intended beneficiaries failed to inherit, is thus liable to the beneficiaries (despite
the contractual relationship being with the testator). This was the case in White v
Jones, and it bears further analysis.
20See Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc [2007] 1 AC 181 (HL).
21K Barker (n 10). It is also worth noting here the models of negligence liability identified in K
Barker, ‘Unreliable Assumptions in the Modern Law of Negligence’ (1993) 109 LQR 461, which vary
from the strong—assumptions of responsiblity based on promise—to weakest versions whereby the
assumption of responsibility is born of the mere decision to act. Barker is apt to warn against
‘assumption of responsibility‘ as a ‘conceptual veil’ rather than a term offering concrete guidance
or clarification (483).
22[1995] 2 AC 207 (HL).
23White (n22) 275.
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Under the strong assumption of responsibility test, it is clear that the solicitor—
being in contractual relations with the testator and not with the beneficiaries—could
not have assumed responsibility towards the beneficiaries. Indeed, the objective test
is on no firmer ground given that the beneficiaries, being ignorant of the will, could
not have relied on it in the traditional sense of having altered their position. However,
the aforementioned conclusion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson—that dependence rather
than reliance can be applicable for cases beyond negligent misstatement—might seem
wholly reasonable; as with the discussion relating to Spring above, the material fact
is that the beneficiaries’ interests could be harmed by the actions of the defendant
and such harm was not dependent in any way on the volition of the beneficiaries.
As per Lord Browne-Wilkinson, ‘[t]he solicitor who accepts instructions to draw a
will knows that the future economic welfare of the intended beneficiary is dependent
upon his careful execution of the task.’24 It is clear, not least from the speech of
Lord Goff, that their Lordships were keen to provide a remedy where otherwise the
beneficiaries would have no claim.25 Nonetheless, however understandable such a
motivation be, such a broad determinant of liability casts the net far too wide.
We see the acute problem of the White v Jones reasoning in other cases. What
is different, then, between that situation and the situation in Dean v Allin & Watts26
in which it was held that the defendant solicitor acting for a counter-party (the
borrowers) in an arm’s-length transaction owed a duty of care to the claimant (a
lender)? On the facts, it was clear that the solicitor knew his failure to act (in this
case, to create an effective security interest in a property) would be of detriment to
24ibid.
25White (n 22) 259.
26[2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 249 (CA).
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the claimant, and that the claimant was both dependent and reliant on the security
being effective. The absurdity of this situation is made most clear when one considers
that it would be difficult indeed to argue that the counter-party’s solicitor owed the
claimant a duty of care, but that the counter-party himself did not owe a similar
duty of care.
The language used across the whole subject of negligence has become at once com-
plicated and vague, persistent and inconsistent. This thesis, developing the recent—
and highly persuasive—arguments of Professor Weinrib in Corrective Justice,27 will
attempt to reconstruct our theoretical understanding of negligence by looking again
at its most basic building blocks: rights and duties. It will propose, in a departure
from traditional negligence jurisprudence, that the focus on a right to information or
on an abstract duty to inform is incorrect, and so too—as a corollary of such—must
be the assumption of responsibility thesis.
3. The course of the argument
How, then, will the argument against the assumption of responsibility thesis be
presented? The overall thesis is presented in two parts: the first concerns underly-
ing theories of tort law and negligence; the second concerns negligent misstatement
specifically, and the locus of liability. Turning, then, to each chapter in turn.
3.1. Chapter 1: Competing Normative Foundations. This thesis advo-
cates a corrective justice approach to tort law. The purpose of this chapter is to
emphasise the normative basis of corrective justice. If we are to take rights seriously,
and if we are to treat parties as equal before the law, then infringements of rights
27E Weinrib, Corrective Justice (OUP 2012).
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demand correction. An action that benefits A at the expense of B’s rights neces-
sitates rectification, otherwise there is no sense in which A and B are equal before
the law. The problem with goal-oriented approaches is that there is an inevitable
requirement that the claim be regarded as an opportunity to advance some unrelated
or minimally-related social goal. Distributive justice is a stark example of this; if we
submerge rights beneath a general distributive intent, then our rights will only be
respected in an arbitrary, ad hoc fashion. The right informs the claim, it delineates
the parties’ relation, and thus it should have primacy in the remedy.
3.2. Chapter 2: The Remedial Relationship. This chapter considers the
legal nexus between the parties: why they are legally related, and how that necessi-
tates specific remedial action. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first,
‘What are we correcting?’, focuses in more detail on the nature of rights. It argues
that the rights which generate a subsequent claim are prior rights in the sense that
they are not mere claim rights that exist in a reflexive relationship with duty. My
right not to be caused physical harm, for example, is not a product of your duty not
to injure me. Indeed, whatever your duty is can only be informed by the prior exis-
tence of rights. Whatever moral regard we may have for certain risk-taking, a claim
only exists at the point that rights are infringed, and not because of risk-taking in
the abstract. These rights can, of course, be waived to certain extents28: reasonably
foreseeable and/or reasonable behaviour does not infringe our rights necessarily; by
placing ourselves in situation where we are at foreseeable risk of reasonably inflicted
harm, we have consented to injury relative to that right.
28I use the term ‘waived’ here because it most aptly describes the effect on the right. By this, I do
not mean to invoke the specific notion of waiver as it relates to waiver by contract or deed. Rather,
it is a more general notion of forgoing applying to the underlying right.
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Recognising that we live in a capricious, chaotic world—where the manifold in-
teractions of humans, and of humans and nature, will produce consequences that are
both entirely unforeseen and unforeseeable—we must accept that we waive our rights
to some extent, that we cannot claim against a defendant merely because he or she
was the last in a fateful chain of blameless causation. We do not need proactively
to act in order to become subject to the changes and chances of the world, though
by volunteering to undertake an activity we will tacitly waive our right with respect
to would-be infringements that we ought reasonably to foresee as inherent in that
activity—assuming that all others are acting reasonably—and also to those risks and
harms that no one could have foreseen. Our rights can thus only be unlawfully29 in-
fringed by one acting unreasonably, whereby an imperfect but otherwise reasonable
status quo is disrupted.
The second section considers the relationship between right and remedy. It ar-
gues, developing Weinrib’s writings on the juridical sequence, that the remedy is the
continuation of the right, and that awards that do anything other than offer remedy
(or prevention of further infringement) are, put bluntly, entirely arbitrary.
In the third section, we consider the final element of the juridical sequence: the
doer of the harm. It is very important to note that, just as the right was not a
reflex of duty, the duty is not a reflex of right. In defining duty and breach thereof,
we morally particularise the defendant amongst the manifold elements of the chain
of causation. So the defendant must have been a cause of the injury, but such an
observation is meaningless without more. Statements to the effect of ‘you have a
duty not to infringe my right’—so, for example, saying ‘you have a duty not to kill
29That is without lawful excuse, which would include lawful arrest, detention under the Mental
Health Act 1983, stop and search under PACE 1984, etc.
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me’—are entirely meaningless, for they presuppose a morally blameworthy action
such that you can be regarded as having exercised some blameworthy agency in
causing my downfall.
Having identified the wrong, the chapter turns in its final section towards contract
and unjust enrichment. The purpose of this chapter is twofold: (i) to argue that the
remedy as articulated in the preceding sections is not at odds with private law in
general—the remedies act minimally to return the parties to the equitable status quo;
and (ii) to highlight the importance of intention/consent in framing the discussion
about rights. This will be of especial importance when considering Hedley Byrne
liability in the fourth chapter.
3.3. Chapter 3: Delineating Negligent Misstatement. Having discussed
rights at some length, we need to be aware of the taxonomic difference between
negligence and rights, and specifically we need to have an understanding of where
negligent misstatement as an enquiry may sit in that taxonomy: is it, as its name
would suggest, an instance of the broader negligence enquiry, to whit an enquiry
into how rights may be infringed by a misstatement? Or is negligent misstatement
actually an instance of an altogether different right (such as, perhaps, a right not
to be lied to, or a positive right to information)? This chapter argues that the
former interpretation is to be preferred. We do not have some pre-existing right to
information or to accurate information per se. This argument will be expounded
by reference to two medical law cases—Chester v Afshar 30 and ABC v St George’s
30[2004] UKHL 41.
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Healthcare NHS Trust & Ors31—both of which concerned the questions of a patient’s
right to be informed and, correspondingly, the doctor’s duty to inform.
The chapter then proceeds to the second element, viz. if there is no pre-existing
right to information, how does the negligent misstatement enquiry relate to our
rights? This question is addressed by analysing an instance of a right that smells
and tastes a lot like negligent misstatement: defamation. It will be seen that the
enquiries are not the same; they exist on different taxonomic levels. Defamation is
an instance of a specific right (or at least interest), whereas misstatement does not
concern itself with any one particular right.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of economic loss, and argues that the
rights-based thesis is not corrupted merely by permitting certain purely economic
claims.
3.4. Chapter 4: The Justification for Liability. In a sense, the previous
three chapters have been laying the groundwork for this chapter. The purpose of
this chapter is twofold: firstly it will deny that an assumption of responsibility is or
can be the touchstone of Hedley Byrne liability. Secondly, it will offer an account of
such liability that remains predicated on the infringement of right. It will be noted
that this right does not arise ex contractu or out of some quasi contract—such is the
realm of the assumption of responsibility thesis. Negligent misstatement is a creature
of negligence, and thus the chapter affirms Christian Witting’s opinion—albeit from
the corrective justice perspective—that the law of negligent misstatement is not to
be regarded as somehow apart from the broader law of negligence. Assumption of
responsibility models essentially collapse into standard proximity models.
31[2017] EWCA Civ 336.
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To reiterate, the purpose of this thesis is to present a conception of negligent
misstatement that is both in accordance with corrective justice and private law more
generally, while also—and logically consistently—denying appeals to assumption of
responsibility. While such an explanation is not necessarily simple in the everyday
sense, it is simple inasmuch as it explains what it needs to explain without being
excessively restrictive or, as we will see in some cases, being excessively broad. That
is to say, it is as simple as possible, but not simpler.

Part 1




In the following two chapters of this part, I will seek to elucidate thelaw of tort, to offer an account of tort that is at once coherent while also re-specting the notion of fault or blameworthiness that is the traditional essence of
negligence. The approach taken will be self-consciously formalist, and—it is hoped—
logical, taking as its main axiom the simple precept that we are free to act with
respect to one another inasmuch as our actions do not infringe another’s rights; con-
duct that is otherwise blameworthy, but absent this infringement, is not the concern
of tort law (though it may well be the concern of public law).
However, the discussion ought not to proceed without fully considering the philo-
sophical context of this axiom and its attendant implications, or the opposing nor-
mative foundations. So although the discussion of negligent misstatement in Part II
will proceed on the basis of tortious liability as already enucleated, it is important to
note that this analysis rests on one of a few approaches to tort law. The importance
is explained thusly: though my submission, of course, is that the corrective justice
approach I shall adopt is to be preferred, those who would object to my argument
may find that they object to the initial axiom, but, on the given axiom, can accept
the line of reasoning that flows therefrom.
This is not intended to be an exhaustive account of the normative foundations
of tort law; the purpose of this thesis could be entirely subsumed by that discussion
21
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alone. Further, eminent scholars such as William Lucy1 and Izhak Englard2 (amongst
others) have written scrupulous analyses on the subject, and there is no need for a
poor imitation to appear here. Hopefully, though, this brief chapter will at least
make clear the architecture of my thoughts. Having addressed corrective justice,
the chapter will address various manifestations of the distributive justice approach,
though it will be seen that corrective justice is nonetheless to be preferred.
The normative landscape
The differing normative approaches to tort law can be placed—with varying levels
of comfort—into two camps: rights-oriented, and goal-oriented. In practice, the
dichotomy is perhaps a false one, for the proponents of the rights-oriented approach
would hardly consider themselves to be outcome-blind, whilst one would be hard-
pushed to find an adherent to the goal-oriented approach advocating that case-by-
case decisions be determined solely according to a set of a priori social goals. Of
course, the question is one of degree, but the principles that determine that degree
do differ fundamentally. The rights-oriented approach, of which corrective justice
theory is the dominant manifestation,3 takes as its axiom the fundamental equality
of individuals: they equally and individually possess—or are equally at legal liberty
(if not practical liberty) to acquire—rights. For example, we are all possessed of
an equal and individual right to bodily integrity (individual inasmuch as my bodily
1W Lucy, Philosophy of Private Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press 2007).
2I Englard, Corrective and Distributive Justice: From Aristotle to Modern Times (OUP 2009).
3Cf, for example, D Campbell, ‘The Curious Incident of the Dog that did Bark in the Night-Time:
What Mischief does Hedley Byrne v Heller Correct?’ in K Barker, R Grantham, and W Swain, The
Law of Misstatements (2015) 122: ‘[. . .]the technicalities of neo-classical economics are expressive of
fundamental moral rights and duties which emerge from acknowledging the autonomy, and therefore
responsibility, of economic actors.’
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integrity is not infringed just because yours is), and we are all equally at liberty to
acquire contractual rights. The private law thus exists as a framework to correct
uninvited infringement of our rights, but also, crucially, is the logical manifestation
of respect for equal rights. It is an end in itself.
However, to approach private law with certain goals in mind is to view rights and
rights-holders as means to an end, rather than an end in themselves. In an entirely
abstract sense, these ends or goals could be anything, including the goal that all
individuals be accorded equal rights (however such a goal would manifest itself).
This (admittedly unusual) example is illuminating; at first glance, it would appear
to be the same as the rights-oriented approach. Except, of course, it approaches the
law from an entirely different perspective. Whereas proponents of the rights-oriented
approach argue that the law exists as a manifestation of these rights, a goal-oriented
approach would be to argue that the law is what it is in order to achieve these rights,
but is not a necessary corollary of a system of equal individual rights. In litigating—
to view it another way—legal persons would be seen as acting functionally, in order to
progress broader social goals. Under such an account, the law is a tool, not a logical
necessity. In practice, of course, the goals tend to be less abstruse: redistribution of
wealth, perhaps, or economic efficiency.
This chapter will consider corrective justice as a manifestation of the rights-
oriented approach, and distributive justice as a manifestation of the goal-oriented
approach.
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1. Corrective Justice
At fundament, corrective justice reflects the relatively simple Aristotelian notion that
people should be viewed as ends in themselves, rather than merely functional actors
in a broader system of justice. That said, Aristotelian though the notion is, Aristotle
did also assert that, to some extent, a human being is a social animal who ‘realises this
life in co-operation with others’ (i.e. that they are, to some extent, functional). Thus,
Aristotle provided an account of distributive justice that he claimed could co-exist
with corrective justice. This careful exposition of both distributive and corrective
justice formed much of book IV of Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics and book V of the
Nicomachean Ethics, and informs a debate between corrective justice and distributive
justice that is still fought today (indeed, it is not even clear that the two are mutually
exclusive, as a notable school of thought subscribes to a co-existence thesis4). We
will return to distributive justice later in this chapter, for the co-existence thesis is
at least questioned, certainly as it relates to private law (as will become clear in the
following).5
Central to Aristotle’s argument on corrective justice was an arithmetic notion of
justice, such that the unjust gain of one party at the expense of another should be
subtracted so to make up the other’s loss. This requirement for ‘gain’ is not to be
taken literally: scholars of unjust enrichment will immediately recognise the formu-
lation, but it has broader application beyond modern unjust enrichment; Aristotle’s
4As noted in W Lucy, The Philosophy of Private Law (OUP 2007), ‘the coexistance thesis seems
to be a fleeting background presence in Coleman’s recent work’. See J L Coleman, The Practice of
Principle (Oxford, Clarendon Press 2001).
5See, for example, E J Weinrib, ‘Corrective Justice’ (1992) 77 Iowa L Rev 403, 420.
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formulation was ‘little more than a skeletal description of the law’s ‘corrective’ func-
tion of rectifying torts’6 and, in any case, Athenian law at the time was not such as
to draw explicit, clear distinctions between, say, unjust enrichment and tort. What
Aristotle was suggesting in this formulation was a system of rectificatory justice,7
in the sense that those responsible for losses should repair them. Indeed, as James
Gordley has noted, the gain can be seen ‘in the sense that he has pursued his own
objectives at another’s expense.’8
The requirement for rectification of wrongs is, on certain views, the essence of
corrective justice: namely, that the party who has suffered wrongful loss is to be made
good by the party responsible for that loss. Jules Coleman9 and Ernest Weinrib10
have, separately, advanced two of the most comprehensive accounts of this essence of
corrective justice. There are important differences in the two authors’ approaches—
for example, as Coleman submits, ‘in [Weinrib’s] account the object of rectification
is the ‘wrong’, whereas in my account it is the wrongful loss’11 The wrongful loss
is predicated on wrongful interference with ‘legitimate interests’, which include—
but are not limited to—rights.12 It should be noted that this author is skeptical of
responses to the challenges of doctrinal consistency that pay much heed to interests.
This is not to deny that there may be some merit in a taxonomy that contains both
6D G Owen, ‘Why Philosophy Matters to Tort Law’ in D G Owen (ed), Philosophical Foundations
of Tort Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1995) 1.
7Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics V.ii 1130b.
8J Gordley, ‘The Aristotelian Tradition’ in Owen (n 6) 157.
9J L Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (OUP 1992).
10E J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (OUP 1995).
11J L Coleman, ‘The Practice of Corrective Justice’, in Owen (n 6) 66.
12Coleman (n 9) 331. Coleman actually describes two distinct types of harm. The first type consists
in wrongs, which are ‘actions contrary to rights’, but this is not synonynous with wrongful action.
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rights and interests, but the taxonomy of rights and interests at present is muddled
indeed.
Consider the right to physical integrity. I say ‘right’, because we are more than
happy to concede that bare interference with our physical integrity will constitute a
trespass. Nothing further is needed. Except, in the face of a negligence claim, all
of a sudden this right is demoted to the status of an interest, infringement of which
needs to be made manifest in contingent harm. The reason, obviously, is because
of the historical development of tort law. However, as Lucy is astute to observe,
‘That this answer carries no or very little moral weight is equally obvious and serves
to highlight one way in which private law’s catalogue of wrongs is and should be
subject to moral[. . .]criticism.’13 It is not at all clear why the presence of intention
in trespass can elevate an interest to a right, or the lack of intention can demote it.
There may be good arguments that we should regard the proximity14 between the
parties as closer where one party actively set out to trespass on another, but this
reasoning does not explain why the notion of harm actually suffered should differ. If
I negligently crash my car into you on one day, and intentionally do so on another,
causing identical injuries on each occasion, your physical pain will feel no different
across the two days. The physical violation of your integrity is identical on each
occasion. If we want to limit the liability of those who commit negligent acts as
against those who act with a more deliberate outcome in mind, then adjusting the
pre-existing rights of the claimant ex post seems to be a very strange way to achieve
it.
13Lucy (n 1) 218.
14Proximity is one of the traditional limbs of the duty of care ‘test’ from Caparo Industries plc
v Dickman [1990] UKHL 2—the others being reasonable foreseeability and the policy limb—that
concerns the potential for harm between the specific claimant and defendant.
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By requiring an element of unreasonableness alongside the infringement of the
legitimate interests, Coleman practically unwinds the tight logic that would have
led to a clearer understanding of the law. To Coleman’s credit, perhaps, he does so
knowingly; it is his view that ‘private law adjudication is a process of weighing the
competing interests ex post’,15 but this is precisely what has troubled tort law for so
long; we need to be clearer about what it is that triggers liability. However, such
clarity in matters of protected interests (inasmuch as they are not rights) is, for the
moment at least, a mere will-o’-the-wisp.
These differences in the theories are important—and this thesis will proceed
largely on the Weinribian view—but what is more important is that there is broad
agreement that any account of corrective justice should view rectification as a core
element. The basis of this agreement can, again, be traced back to Aristotle. Aristo-
tle’s account of corrective justice relied on the two parties being viewed as equals, an
account which echoed many centuries later in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas—
who regarded justice as ‘the steady willingness to give to others what is theirs’16—and
of Immanuel Kant.17 The ‘core of the Kantian-Aristotelian concept of Right or jus-
tice’, so Richard Wright argues, ‘[. . .]is not the meaningless pursuit of aggregate social
welfare[. . .]but rather the promotion of the equal (positive and negative) freedom of
each individual in the community.’18 As Ernest Weinrib summarises this approach,
to view the parties as having equal or reciprocal freedom is to view the parties ‘as
15Lucy (n 1) 312.
16J Finnis, Philosophy of Law: Collected Essays Volume IV (OUP 2013) 116.
17Kant and Aquinas were not the only ones to take up the Aristotelian mantle: Aquinas famously
reawakened Aristotle in the minds of the medieval philosophers—the Platonic tradition having
long trumped Aristotle’s philosophy—followed by the natural law Enlightenment thinkers such as
Grotius (whose theory as it most closely relates to this discussion was expounded in De iure praedae
commentarius) and Pufendorf, both founders of the Northern Natural Law School.
18R Wright, ‘Right, Justice and Tort Law’ in Owen (n 6) 181.
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free beings who interact with each other as holders of rights (to physical integrity,
to property, to contractual performance, and so on) that are the juridical manifesta-
tions of their freedom.’19 This seems logically satisfactory: in a world where A and B
are accorded equal status, an action that benefits B at the expense of A necessitates
rectification, otherwise there is no sense in which A and B actually have equal status.
The requirement for rectification based on equality necessitates a further conclu-
sion: the rectification must be correlative (for a remedy that did not subtract the
gain but remedied loss, or vice-versa, would not be treating the parties as equal).
Coleman regards this as another core element of corrective justice, alongside rectifica-
tion. In simplistic terms, this seems obvious enough: justice simultaneously removes
the defendant’s gain and makes good the claimant’s loss; these are not two discrete
operations, but a single one, that reflects the one wrongdoing. As Coleman conceded
(albeit that he remains more skeptical than Weinrib of the complete explanatory
force of corrective justice20), ‘[a] person does not[. . .]have a claim in corrective justice
to repair in the air, against no one in particular.’21 For Weinrib, especially, correla-
tivity is the very thing that ‘informs the injustice’.22 In other words, the correlativity
has a normative function, ‘[b]ecause the defendant, if liable, has committed the same
injustice that the defendant has suffered’23 and therefore ‘the reason the plaintiff
wins ought to be the same reason the defendant loses.’24 Stephen Perry’s summary
is useful, in that it classifies this aspect of corrective justice as ‘agent-specific’, rather
19E J Weinrib, Corrective Justice (OUP 2012) 7.
20See J L Coleman, ‘Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice’, (1992) 67 Ind L J 349, 379.
21J L Coleman, ’The Practice of Corrective Justice’, in D G Owen (ed), Philosophical Foundations
of Tort Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1995) 67.
22Weinrib (n 19) 17.
23ibid.
24ibid.
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than ‘agent-general’,25 the latter implying a duty that would bind the whole world
as opposed to the specific parties who have come into legal relations because of a
specific occurrence.
For Ernest Weinrib, corrective justice finds its normative, moral foundation in
the respect it accords to the equal freedom of all parties. There is much to be said in
favour of this argument, not least of which is that what we are dealing with here is
private law, the law as between individuals, not some panacea to all problems that
may face a state; the law would be capricious indeed were it to take into account
the status of parties without regard to whether that status pertained to the specific
wrongdoing that was the subject of the complaint. As Charles Fried has argued,
‘[r]edistribution is not a burden to be borne in a random, ad hoc way by those who
happen to cross paths with persons poorer than themselves. Such a conception,
heartwarmingly spontaneous though it may be, would in the end undermine our
ability to plan and to live our lives as we choose.’26
Despite this, many have criticised corrective justice for lacking normative value.
One of the main criticisms is that it makes no attempt to prescribe rights—it is
merely a structured response. It is not clear that corrective justice stands or falls on
the recognition of any particular right; it is simply a logical and necessary response
to a legal system that recognises rights. Corrective justice does not necessitate the
existence of a right to physical integrity (for example), but such a right necessitates
the existence of corrective justice. If rights are to be meaningful and respected, then
surely it goes without saying that we should be at pains to ensure we understand
25S Perry, ‘On the Relationship between Corrective and Distributive Justice’ in J Horder (ed),
Oxford Esays in Jurisprudence: Fourth Series (Oxford, Clarendon Press 2000) 238–239.
26C Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
University Press 1981) 106.
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those rights and how they relate to different rights (whether being similar rights in
third parties or entirely different rights).
2. Distributive Justice
A second criticism is that, in regarding all as equal, it fails to address de facto
inequalities; ‘the filthy rich can appeal to corrective justice if their holdings are
filched by the grinding poor.’27
Theorists of distributive justice suggest that the moral void can be filled by under-
standing that judicial decisions and legal systems more generally ‘contribute to the
establishment of a pattern of distribution of[. . .]resource and burden within society’28
(the indirect argument) and, as those who would propose direct distributive justice
would argue, should contribute to a pattern of distribution. To employ William
Lucy’s example of the most simple formulation of this argument:
[. . .]if it is established that Croesus is wealthy as a King, his immense
wealth incompatible with the accepted principle of distributive justice,
and that Diogenes is so poor he lives like a feral dog, his lack of resources
also contrary to the demands of distributive justice, then surely no duty
to compensate arises.29
Unfortunately there is not opportunity here to give due credit to the multiple the-
ories on distributive justice, many of which tread in waters far beyond private law.
John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice,30 for example, sits like a colossus over the field of
distributive justice (along with Ronald Dworkin, Robert Nozick, and Michael Walzer,
27T Honoré, ‘The Morality of Tort Law’, in D G Owen (ed), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law
(Oxford, Clarendon Press 1995) 84.
28P Cane, ‘Distributive Justice and Tort Law’ (2001) 4 New Zealand Law Review 401, 404.
29W Lucy, Philosophy of Private Law (OUP 2007) 358.
30J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1971).
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among others).31 However, for our purposes, energies may be better expended fo-
cusing on those who concentrate on distributive justice as it applies particularly to
private law. We will take the indirect and direct views in turn.
2.1. Indirect. For Peter Cane, it is an undeniable feature of tort law that it
has redistributive effects, inasmuch as it either maintains or transfers a burden and
a benefit, and thus it is a matter of distributive justice. The nature of this argument
is such that it can co-exist with corrective justice; the effects of applying the law
according to the precepts of corrective justice will have distributive effect. Corrective
justice is therefore not necessarily at odds with distributive justice, providing that
distributive justice has defined ‘the grounds and bounds of tort liability’32 in the
first place (the direct element). Superficially, at least, this argument appears to have
merit. A narrow reading of corrective justice could fairly conclude that it makes no
claim in matters substantive—beyond the fact that it demands parties be treated
correlatively in respect of the single wrong, it does not attempt to define the rights
that, in their breach, define the wrong—and thus there is ample work for distributive
justice in defining the grounds of liability.
However, this argument begins to break down. Though we will look at the direct
element later in this section, for now it suffices to say that corrective justice is more
than a mere tool of law; it has normative value. For example, if substantive laws
were excessively distributive, they could fall foul of corrective justice’s insistence
on treating the parties as equals. The indirect argument is also not without its
31See, for example: R Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Harvard University Press 2000); R Nozick, An-
archy, State and Utopia (Oxford, Basil Blackwell 1974); and M Walzer, Spheres of Justice (Oxford,
Martin Robertson 1983).
32Cane (n 28) 412.
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flaws. William Lucy criticises it on three counts: distributive intent, triviality, and
normative usefulness.33 As to the first, it can easily be seen that, just as a cake
can be divided and distributed, a judgment distributes benefit and burden; this is
not really in dispute. However, as Lucy notes, to divide a cake is, by its nature,
possessed of distributive intent: why else would one divide a cake? The same cannot
be said for judgments, for ‘[w]hile it might be undeniable that both a legal system tout
court and particular liability decisions within such a system have distributive effects,
it could well be maintained that neither are intended to have such effects.’34 My
buying a newspaper has a redistributive function, but it is very difficult to ascribe
any normative value to this transaction (at least on distributive principles) if my
intent was solely to be possessed of a newspaper and not to redistribute wealth in
any way. Similarly, a judgment made on corrective justice principles can claim no
normative significance in matters distributive unless there was some intention to
advance a general pattern of distribution.
Or can it? Intention aside, is it enough that the effect was distributive, even if
the intention was not? The answer, undoubtedly, is that it is not. Firstly, a system
that is deliberately distributive—i.e. it is good if and only if it is distributive—but
without any intended pattern of distribution, would seem haphazard, redistributing
for the sake of redistributing; it would be utterly pointless. Further—and this is
Lucy’s second line of criticism—as a general insight into the nature of distribution
it is entirely trivial. If all human conduct, from buying newspapers to donating to
charity, is essentially distributive, what is the value of an insight that claims judicial
decision-making also happens to be distributive? This is not to say that no feature of
33Lucy (n 29) 340–342.
34ibid 340.
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human conduct is possessed of distributive intent and governed accordingly; rather,
the argument is that it is not impossible to consider that all human conduct is
distributive, whether or not it is possessed of distributive intent. If judicial decision-
making cannot be separated from the rest of the human experience in this sense,
then it is hard to see what a distributive justice analysis can offer in this regard.
Lucy’s third line of criticism—and this was perhaps prefigured in my criticism at
the beginning of the last paragraph—is that it is difficult to know on Cane’s theory
of distributive justice which distributive effects ‘are significant, and should thus fall
within the ambit of distributive justice’,35 and which are not: this ‘is surely not a
question that can be answered by simply noting those effects.’36 Distributive justice
needs its own theory ab initio, for the ‘just distribution of burdens and losses among
the members of a society requires that a criterion be found[. . .]according to which
they may fairly be allocated.’37 This is the realm of the direct analysis.
2.2. Direct. The example offered at the beginning of this section concerning
Croesus and Diogenes is a simple, albeit legitimate, argument that could be made by
direct appeals to distributive justice. However, it is one of a vast array of arguments
that could fall under the general description of distributive justice. Other argu-
ments may appeal to the substantive law itself, rather than the law as adjudicated,
whereas some arguments may similarly appeal to the adjudication, but on a rather
more subtle basis. The late Ronald Dworkin provides one of the most substantive
accounts of distributive justice as it could apply to judicial decision-making in his
35ibid 342.
36ibid.
37Honoré (n 27) 83.
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book Law’s Empire,38 in which he tackles a problem which has particular resonance
in tort claims: that of competing rights (the reader may wish to consult the discus-
sion in chapter 2, specifically the reference to Christian Witting’s argument that, in
practice, wrongdoing is assessed by reference to competing autonomies39). The work
is important to note here, because, as we shall see, it rests on a notion that law does
not exist to further specific social goals but, rather, that it should act in a way that is
coherent and principled towards all of its members. Distributive justice is not merely
bare functionalism furthering goals external to the parties before the court. In this
sense, Dworkin’s argument provides a particularly useful comparison to corrective
justice; if one of the main arguments in favour of corrective justice is that it views
all parties as equal before the law and is concerned with justice between the parties,
why not then accept Dworkin’s argument on distributive justice on the basis that he,
too, founds his theory on conceptions of equality and justice between the parties?
Similar to Weinrib’s model, is there not a sense in which a Dworkinian private law
can exist absent extrinsic considerations? No. We will see that these conceptions of
equality differ significantly and that the distributive model that Dworkin advocates
is neither workable nor particularly representative of our legal system.
Dworkin’s argument requires at least an initial equal distribution of resources,
beyond which human beings are responsible for the decisions they make, and thus
they can choose to make any legitimate transaction.40 Law’s Empire was an attempt
to apply this principle—and the many principles articulated in Sovereign Virtue—to
the question of tort law:
38R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Oxford, Hart Publishing 1998).
39C Witting, ‘The House that Dr Beever Built’ (2008) 71 MLR 621, 628.
40R Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Harvard University Press
2000) 73-83.
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The practical elaboration of equality of resources, for example, requires
compensating for unequal inheritance of wealth and health and talent
through redistribution, but the libertarian conception rejects redistri-
bution as theft in principle.[. . .]Since my main argument is to show the
connection between a conception of equality and accident law, I shall
not argue but only assume that equality of resources is superior to the
libertarian conception: it fits our legal and moral practices no worse and
is better in abstract moral theory.41
In distinguishing between abstract rights (the general rights you and I possess by
virtue of being a citizen within a society) and concrete rights (the rights realisable in
any given situation), Dworkin offers the example of a trumpet player and a student
of algebra, both of whom wish to carry out their activities (and, absent any other
factors, would be at liberty so to do) but, in so doing, would be precluding the other
from fulfilling their liberty. If the two are to be treated as equals, whom is society
to restrict?
The following will be a short paraphrase of Dworkin’s answer at best, and I am
grateful too to William Lucy for his erudite account of Dworkin’s views.42 However,
for our purpose of broadly delineating two competing normative foundations, viz.
corrective and distributive justice, it should suffice. Dworkin’s solution to this sit-
uation, where rights conflict, would be to calculate the relative cost to each party
of inhibiting their freedom. This analysis does not feel particularly foreign to an
English lawyer, especially one with experience of injunctions and the like, but it has
a logical form beyond the mere intuitive: it regards both parties’ rights as equal,
41Dworkin (n 38) 301.
42Lucy (n 29) 364-368.
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because one who ‘abstains from some act on the ground that it would cost his neigh-
bour more than it would benefit him takes his neighbour’s welfare into account on
equal terms with his own’.43 The next stage of Dworkin’s answer captures the essen-
tially distributive nature of the approach: if one assumes that the two parties are of
equal resource (‘you and I have roughly equal wealth, and neither is handicapped or
otherwise has special needs or requirements’44), then the decision-maker must ‘act so
as to minimise the inequality of the distribution[. . .]and that means so that the loser
loses less’.45 The most simple way of determining this is by reference to each party’s
willingness to pay to carry out their activity uninhibited, because (ceteris paribus)
that is the best way of determining the relative value placed on the activity by each
party. As Dworkin notes, this avoids the problem posed when the losses in question
are not obviously financial.46
The logic is enticing. Certainly it accords equal respect to the rights of each
party, and can do so in specific situations: these are, in my submission, the core
benefits of the corrective justice approach, but taken from the opposing normative
foundation. But it has a fatal weakness, at least when it comes to applying it to
society as it exists. Dworkin has produced a rabbit from a hat—an extraordinary
trick, but a trick nonetheless, for the rabbit was in there from the beginning. The
argument requires resource parity—not just as a moral good or social goal, but as a
fundamental precursor to and justification for the model—and if we were to remove
this cornerstone from the argument, then the edifice rather collapses. The point of
the exercise is to measure, in financial terms, ‘the relative importance of the two
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activities to each of us in our overall schemes of what we want to do with our lives.’47
So the parties, in assessing such costs, must either assume wealth parity (which is
sufficiently fictitious as to render the exercise entirely pointless) or must engage in an
assessment of payment relative to wealth (a sort of purchasing power parity) which is
an exercise so cumbersome as to be entirely unworkable in practice. Stephen Perry’s
criticism of Dworkin’s argument echoes this latter point. If Dworkin’s model were
an accurate description of the Anglo-American legal system,
there would be no reason why courts, when required in tort actions to
distribute actual losses ex post, should not make an effort to ascertain
the relative wealth of the litigants[. . .]to try to realize as adequately as
possible the abstract ideal of equality of resources. In fact, the courts
generally consistently refuse, as a matter of principle, to try to do any-
thing like this.48
The point is apt: we know the courts regularly set standards by reference not to the
parties but to the reasonable person, an objective measure that deliberately ignores
a great many of the parties’ specific characteristics.
Even Dworkin can’t meaningfully be advocating ongoing equality of resources—
by his own argument, we should be free to choose (and pay for) our own legitimate
transactions according to what we perceive our interests to be (indeed, morality dic-
tates that we should be responsible for them)—so, in fact, on his own terms it is very
unlikely that there would be persisting equality without state coercion. By removing
the cornerstone of equality, then willingness to pay is clearly an unworkable measure,
47ibid 304.
48S R Perry, ‘On the Relationship between Corrective and Distributive Justice’ in A Kavanagh and
J Oberdiek (eds), Arguing About Law (New York, Routledge 2009) 558.
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for either we would allow it to favour the wealthy—and distributive justice would
have to resemble the rather more extreme, simple version mentioned at the beginning
of this section—or we would have to engage in an wasteful, onerous assessments of
the parties’ characteristics.
Dworkin’s views are interesting to consider because of this focus on the correla-
tivity of the parties—what is one willing to pay to exercise his liberty at the expense
of the rights of the other—but ultimately it requires a profound coercion external to
the parties’ rights or interests in order to foster the equality of resources necessary
to justify the exercise.
Conclusion
The purpose of this thesis is to illuminate the law, to make it more coherent and,
thus, predictable. A theory of justice that seeks to explain the law in terms of
redistribution, where the outcome of any given case will be dependent on the status
of the actors and not on principles that apply equally to all, is capricious. It is not
justice. In the limited purview of this chapter, I have attempted to elaborate the
nature both of corrective justice and distributive justice, and to provide accounts of
each from some of the most influential authors. Corrective justice has an inherent
appeal within the limited role of private law, because it regards actors as equal
and, from that axiom, forms an account of law that provides a genuinely normative
explanation for rectification, regarding the two parties as the doer and sufferer of
the same wrong (or wrongful loss). Dworkin’s argument makes for an interesting
comparison with corrective justice in that it provides an account of distributive
justice that, like corrective justice (and unlike the functionalism that permeates
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much distributive justice thinking), respects the equality of the actors. For the
reasons noted above—the epistemic blindness that is the legal fiction of equality or
the coercion required to make it so, or the onerous task of correcting for inequality
in all transactions—corrective justice is to be preferred even to the least functional




Against that general philosophical background, it is worth con-sidering in further detail the nature of the remedial relationship undercorrective justice. This will obviously be expounded in some detail in re-
lation to negligent misstatement in the second part; for now it is sufficient to consider
what is meant by a ‘remedial relationship’, and how that manifests itself in various
categories of private law. The reason it is worth considering various aspects of private
law is in order that we may better understand the corrective function of the remedy,
because it will differ depending on the nature of the infringement. Upon considering
categories of false statement, for example, it may appear odd that there are different
types; to wit, either a statement is false, or it is not. Except, of course, a false
statement can affect our rights in different ways depending on its manifestation. For
example, false statements in pre-contractual negotiations can impart a fatal vitium
in the resulting contract, as the parties are not ad idem. The remedy will therefore
be one that aims to restore the parties to the pre-contractual position (subject to the
usual bars to rescission). Conversely, where a party has been misled and has chosen
to dispose of their rights in a manner that, but for the misstatement, they would not
have done, the remedy will be one that aims to restore the parties to the position
they were in before their reliance on the misstatement.
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It is important to note at this stage that this chapter is not a mere précis of the
various remedies available for claims in private law; rather, the question to which
this chapter is addressed is where the remedy afforded in law finds its justification
within the legal nexus that exists between the parties. Thus, do we correct for the
false statement, or for the harm caused thereby?
However, this requires us first to consider that legal nexus, and its constituent
elements. That is to say, what is it—as a matter of the relationship (rather than
any specific action)—that makes the claimant the claimant, and the defendant the
defendant? What injustice are we correcting, and why is the defendant liable? This
chapter will therefore begin with three sections concerned with that question, namely:
(i) what are we correcting; (ii) how does this relate to the remedy; and (iii) who should
provide the remedy? The fourth section considers in detail the relationship between
right and duty, and the fifth section will relate these responses to the broader realm
of private law obligations.
1. What are we correcting?
The answer to this question is prefigured in the discussion concerning corrective
justice: the law’s role is to remedy harm to the claimant. The purpose of this section
is to define the limits of the negligence inquiry by arguing that it is an inquiry that
can only follow an a priori recognition of rights, and—in so doing—will argue that
such a proposition is not outwith the course of historical legal analysis, but merely
the logical conclusion of such.
1.1. Pre-existing rights and rights to damages. All elements of private law
are concerned with the creation and the exigibility of rights between parties (be they
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rights in personam or rights in rem). Some may rightly note that private law is more
than this (just as an octopus has eight legs, but that is not its sole feature), and
more so that not all laws concerned with such rights belong to private law (in the
same way that not all creatures with eight legs are octopuses), but neither comment
invalidates our observation. Those laws recognising the creation of rights include the
law of property and the law of contract. These laws recognise a rights-creating event;
by legally recognised means, one can acquire a property right, and one can acquire
a contractual right. The rights do not pre-exist such legally recognised means, and
as such the laws of property and contract have somehow to prescribe those means.
The law of unjust enrichment, by contrast, does not create rights, save rights
which may vindicate the pre-existing rights (the term may be described by many as
a remedy, but this is an imperilled road, down which many an eminent academic has
laid a snare1). It is, to this end, concerned with the exigibility of rights; if you receive
an enrichment at my expense for which there exists no legal explanation, then the law
will recognise my right over whatever lesser right you have subsequently acquired.
Similarly, the law of contract also concerns itself with the exigibility of contractually
acquired rights, in the same way that the law of property concerns itself with the
exigibility of property rights.
A simplistic view might posit that the law of negligence is also concerned with the
creation of rights, inasmuch as a proscribed act—a wrong—that harms another will
generate a right on the part of the harmed party. Except, of course, this is merely
a right to damages, in the same way that breach of contract generates a right to
damages. In and of itself, it provides no real explanation as to why the harm results
1P Birks, ‘Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies’ (2000) 20 OJLS 1.
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in a right to damages. The traditional view would suggest that the negligent act in
part generates the right (for certainly no right to damages lies absent this act), but,
given that negligent conduct that doesn’t result in harm also provides no such right,
it is hard to understand on what basis negligence can be regarded as concerned with
the creation of rights. This is not within the realm of negligence; negligence is an
exercise in exigibility, not creation.
This is quite an important caveat, and lends further light to the purpose of this
analysis. We are concerned, in the first part of this thesis, with the structure of
tort law, not the specific rights that the law may or may not recognise. Though,
of course, some specific rights will be mentioned, this will be done with a view to
elucidating the structure. To ape an oft-quoted example, we would be concerned
with the principle that cars driving in opposing directions should drive on opposite
sides of the road. We are not yet concerned with the question of whether we should
drive on the left or the right.
1.2. The demarcation of rights. But can we not, in the alternative, define
that harm in terms of obligation? That is to say, is my right to sue a product
primarily of your breached obligation, and not of some further harm caused to me?
In many respects, this is the core question underlying this thesis. The proposition, it
shall be noted, does not bear scrutiny. This section will demonstrate that a system
of tort law that even vaguely resembles our own must have, at its core, the correction
of an infringement of the claimant’s right, and that right cannot be the mere reflex
of the defendant’s duty. As we shall see, duty alone cannot inform the remedial
relationship.
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If I breach a duty—a duty not to kick you, say—then on what basis do you have
standing to sue? Is it because my duty was in respect of you (i.e. you were the object
of the duty; I had a duty not to kick you)? Presumably, of course, I owe exactly
the same duty in respect of everyone else: do I therefore owe a theoretically infinite2
number of duties? Prima facie, this proposition does not sound too far-fetched; you
can claim against me because I had a duty to you not to kick you, which I breached
by kicking you.
However, let us further assume that manufacturers owe a private law duty not to
emit certain pollutants. This seems like a sensible duty, and it seems like the sort of
thing for which I should be made liable, were I a polluting manufacturer. Question:
is that one duty, or an infinite number of individual duties? If the former, then it
does not (without more) explain why you, as a stand-alone party, are entitled to
sue me; indeed, it lends no clarity to the question of whom exactly I have wronged,
unless we assume that my duty was owed not to a group of individuals but to an
amorphous people and its norms. Such an assumption would seem to have more in
common with criminal or public law—in which the wrong is against the state—than
it does with private law. If the latter, then it does not explain why you, more than
any other, are entitled to sue me: my duty to you was not to emit pollutants, a
duty I have breached by emitting pollutants. However, in a sense, it does not matter
which of the two interpretations we prefer: the objects of my duty have either been
wronged cumulatively—as one—or individually and equally ; in neither scenario are
you able to claim a unique right to sue. Thus, the existence of a perfectly reasonable
2This is infinite in the sense that it is a duty owed in respect of everyone existing from time to
time; the set is determinate, because we can adequately define its membership—every human is a
member thereof—but that membership is limited by practicality rather than theory.
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duty does not, as a matter of logical necessity, define the claimant. Thus, it cannot
define the private law remedial relationship (certainly not as we understand it).
Perhaps it is not impossible to conceive of a system of tort in which we can sue
for general carelessness, but it is a system that would look entirely different to that
which we have. This is because the claimant would necessarily mandate modes of all
behaviour: if a right to damages arose merely because you happened to be careless,
you would necessarily have to alter your behaviour. Yet in our system of law, we
know that your negligence has to be relative to me and has to interfere with my
rights (by, for example, injury) in order for my right to damages to crystalise. Your
liberty to be negligent ’in the air’ exists only insofar as it is not relative to me and to
my primary rights. As Robert Stevens identifies the conflict (albeit with reference to
the Hohfeldian notion of claim right as a right reflexive of duty), we cannot say both
that ‘A has a claim right that B does not drive his car negligently so as to injure A’
and ‘B is at liberty with respect to A to drive his car in any manner B so chooses[. . .];
either A has the claim right, which excludes B’s liberty, or he does not.’3 The words
‘with respect to A’ are of fundamental importance: we have no right to demand that
B does not drive carelessly. The state may wish to prohibit such behaviour, and does
so through various criminal sanctions, but we as individuals hold no such right. We
do, however, have a right when such carelessness is with respect to us, so as to injure
us. If tort law mandates modes of behaviour at all, it is an indirect benefit, not the
claimant’s primary justification for claiming a remedy.
Perhaps, though, I could argue that the manufacturer’s breach of their general
obligation—howsoever formulated—not to emit pollutants affected me more than
3R Stevens, ‘The Conflict of Rights’, in A Robertson and H W Tang (eds), The Goals of Private
Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2009) 143.
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anyone else. But what are we actually saying when we argue that it ‘affected’ me?
Such a proposition necessitates the existence of rights. Let us assume instead that
you are not a legal person, but a wall. If I demolish you,4 are you able to claim
against me? We can probably agree that demolishing a wall that is not my own
constitutes some sort of legal wrong—in our hypothetical scenario we would argue
that I have a ‘duty’ not to destroy the wall—so why can you, the wall, not sue? The
answer, of course, is because of the very fact that you are not a legal person: we
do not regard walls as possessors of rights. A wall does not acquire an entitlement
to compensation simply because I had an obligation that pertained to it. We know,
then, that the extent of my obligation is limited by the existence of rights. Further,
we know that the extent of the obligation must be limited by the existence of relevant
rights: the local publican or postman are unable to sue, not (unlike the wall) because
they aren’t capable of possessing rights at all, but because they have no rights with
respect to the wall. Were you instead the owner of the wall, then you would have
rights in respect of the wall and it is your rights that I have infringed by destroying
your property. My duty not to destroy the wall is actually, then, a duty not to
infringe your better right to the wall. Thus—and this is the crux of the matter—the
only way we can meaningfully define and limit the duty is by reference to the right
it notionally protects.
This conclusion is not a particularly marked departure from the accepted law on
duties of care. In Caparo v Dickman, Lord Bridge opined that
4For the benefit of the logicians, one ought concede that I have changed your state from a wall of
many bricks to a wall of fewer bricks.
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It is never sufficient to ask simply whether A owes B a duty of care. It
is always necessary to determine the scope of the duty by reference to
the kind of damage from which A must take care to save B harmless.5
Of course, Lord Bridge was not explicitly advocating a rights-based thesis, but it
amounts to the same thing: the duty must be a product of a right, for that is its
function and, by extension, its limit. We will return to the specific question of duty
later in this chapter, for it informs the second question (viz. who shall be liable).
So, the reason you can sue me for kicking you is because I have infringed your
right. Similarly, in our previous example, I am entitled to sue the manufacturer
because they have infringed my right by poisoning me, or causing me a nuisance. I
do not sue them as some instrument of the state, reaping the benefit of a normative
loss borne by the state. I sue because the loss is my own, and because I had a better
right to whatever I lost than the manufacturers did. Right informs duty in a way
that duty cannot inform right.
As Professor Weinrib noted in his seminal work The Idea of Private Law, the
‘wrongfulness of negligence consists not in unsocial conduct at large, but in the
potential violation of another’s right.’6 The wrongfulness element will be a matter
for further analysis later in the chapter, but for now it suffices to say that our right
to claim crystalises only at the point B’s actions cause us injury.
Put another way, I have no prior right in tort to prevent a party from putting
me at risk. Those who create risk ‘negligently’ (inasmuch as their actions are not
reasonable) are liable for nothing unless that risk culminates in injury; until such
5Caparo v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, 627 (HL) (Lord Bridge).
6E Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Harvard University Press 1995) 160
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a time as they cause me loss, they have not infringed my right. The Fairchild7
exception (which the unwary may wish to cite as evidence that negligent creation
of risk can found a claim) is just that—an exception—which owes its existence to
evidential lacunae. Similarly, the House of Lords in Barker v Corus8—in which,
absent clear scientific causation, liability was apportioned between defendants on a
proportional basis (rather than jointly and severally)—justified the apportionment of
liability on the basis that ‘this is a case in which science can deal only in probabilities,
the law should accept that position and[. . .]liability should be divided according to
the probability that one or other caused the harm.’9 The justification lies in the
probability that one party actually caused the harm; it is, in effect, a fiction of
causation where factual causation can neither be confirmed nor negated.10 That is
a very different thing from arguing that causation is not actually a requirement:
we would never allow a court to hear a claim against a negligent party who merely
increased the risk of injury if, all the while, we knew that the injury was actually the
result of the negligence of another.
7Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22
8Barker v Corus (UK) plc [2006] UKHL 20
9[2006] UKHL 20 at [43] (Lord Hoffman)
10It is not, to be clear, a manifestation of the unfortunate and incorrect decision at first instance in
Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] 2 All ER 909, in which damages were reduced
to reflect the balance of probabilities (there was a 75 per cent chance that the claimant would have
suffered the injuries whether or not the hospital had been negligent, and so damages were awarded
at 25 per cent of the full value); this was a profound misunderstanding of the nature of balance of
probabilities: where causation can be confirmed on the balance of probabilities, that is sufficient to
establish absolute causation. The exceptional cases, such as Fairchild and Barker, exist where the
balance of probabilities neither confirms nor negates the causal element.
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Certain authors have, however, sought to challenge this seemingly trite assertion.
Both Judith Thompson11 and Glen Robinson12 have discussed situations analogous to
where A and B both negligently shoot in C’s direction, but only A’s shot actually hits
C. As Ernest Weinrib summarises their argument (albeit that he does not agree with
it), ‘[i]f we hold A liable but not B, we allow the fortuity of causation to distinguish
between morally equivalent wrongdoings.’13 It is an appealing argument; like a lie
which happens not to be believed,14 the shot that misses is cast as morally wrong
regardless of the outcome, and thus—so the argument goes—any loss that occurs is
attributable to the defendant because their action was a priori morally wrong. As
we will see in the next section, the emphasis here is incorrect: the loss is attributable
to the defendant because he was a cause of that loss, and there is a reason to regard
that causal relationship as being legally relevant. For the purposes of this section,
however, it is sufficient that we understand that there must be a reason, beyond
merely moral wrongdoing by the defendant, why the claimant has any claim. As
Weinrib himself argues, ‘[t]ort law is not interested in the defendant’s culpability
aside from the plaintiff’s entitlement to redress’.15 His analysis—using the precepts
of corrective justice—is that to focus tortious liability on the defendant’s culpability
alone is to ignore the claimant’s injury, thus ‘introducing a one-sidedness inconsistent
with the bipolarity of corrective justice.’16 The parties are united because the loss is
attributable to the defendant.
11J J Thompson, Rights, Restitution, and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory (Harvard University Press
1986) 192.
12G O Robinson, ‘Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk’ (1986) 14 Journal
of Legal Studies 779, 789–791.
13Weinrib (n 6) 155.
14R Stevens, Torts and Rights (OUP 2007) 8.
15Weinrib (n 6) 160.
16ibid, 156.
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Equally, to employ Robinson’s moderated probabilistic analysis—whereby the
right to claim flows from the probability that injury will occur—would leave us in
something of a quandary. How can we be possessed of a right (for this right would be
the analytic reflex of Robinson’s conception of liability) that consists in the absence
of the prospect of injury, without a further notion of why injury is itself wrong?17
This highlights the fundamental problem with the defendant-based analyses: they
simply miss a basic logical point. How can we conceive of risk or action as a wrong
without a further notion of why the loss envisaged by the risk or action is itself wrong?
As Weinrib notes, ‘risk is always the risk of something. In corrective justice, that
something encompasses the right that defines the plaintiff’s claim. Risk refers to the
possibility of normative loss. It is not itself the normative loss.’18 Therefore, neither
risk, nor even the unreasonable creation of risk, forms the basis of a rights-creating
event.19
Further, it is worth noting Professor Weinrib’s observation that loss ‘differs from
right because it lacks both the distinct legal content and the correlative significance
that together impose coherent limits on liability’.20 This elegantly summarises the
conceptual problem with loss. Loss, in the sense of diminished wealth, might by
its very nature flow from the infringement of a right (in this sense, the notion is
axiomatic: if you didn’t have a prior right to something, in what sense can that
17ibid, 157.
18ibid, 158.
19It is worth forestalling a superficially appealing criticism of this view. It may be that the state has,
or deems itself to have, some obligation to protect its members against loss in the first place—to
mitigate risk—but such public law considerations are not our concern; we are concerned with those
rights exigible against individuals. Similarly, courts may act for prophylactic purposes [R Stevens
(n3) 150] when they know that, but for such a phylax, rights will be infringed (e.g. defamation or
trespass). That a court may grant an injunction—affirming a right that, but for their order, would
be infringed—is not necessarily evidence that a right has already been infringed.
20E Weinrib, Corrective Justice (OUP 2012) 56.
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thing now be lost to you?). But the loss flowing from an infringement and the
underlying right are conceptually discrete. Thus, we do not need to ask whether we
have a pre-existing right not to be caused loss; the loss is not the right.21
1.3. Limiting and waiving our rights. These rights, however, are not un-
changing, ever-fixed marks. ‘Risk is an unavoidable concomitant of human action’.22
In a world of risks, our rights are qualified by our own expectation that we may occa-
sionally suffer loss as a result of any number of unforeseeable, perhaps even random,
events. We accept—or, in certain circumstances by our actions, ought reasonably to
be deemed as having accepted—that our rights will from time to time be infringed.
In effect, we waive them to this extent. This waiver does not defeat our rights, but
it does qualify them.
I am conscious that ‘waiver’ is a concept external to tort (at least inasmuch as
rights of action can be waived by the rules of contract or deeds), so I employ it here
cautiously. However, it is the most accurate term to describe the concepts which
are at work in the law here. It is a particularly useful term in this sense because it
describes something that is happening to the right; ‘consent’, by contrast, is a term
that is essentially question-begging or at least incomplete: consent to what?
Much time has so far been afforded to the notion of claimant right as a predi-
cate of defendant liability. The traditional negligence enquiry has been excessively
defendant-focussed to the extent that the rights-based analysis has been eschewed.
As will be seen in the following sections, there remain sound reasons to retain much
21This is discussed in further detail in the chapter four. See D Nolan, ‘Rights, Damage and Loss’
(2017) 37(2) OJLS 255, 267; R Stevens, ‘Rights and Other Things’ in D Nolan and A Robertson
(eds), Rights and Private Law (Hart Publishing 2012) 119.
22Weinrib (n 6) 151.
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of the duty enquiry: the breach of duty identifies the defendant as a legally relevant
cause of loss. However, if we are to take rights seriously, then we must also consider
whether and to what extent the claimant’s actions may limit or waive their a priori
rights. This is the claimant-focussed analysis. The analysis will not always be re-
quired: the patient who suffers terrible facial injury at the hands of a drunk dentist
charged only with inspecting their teeth will not have waived their rights in this
respect (beyond the consent allowing the dentist to probe their mouth); discussion
of waiver would, in this case, appear otiose. Where a passenger has knowingly con-
sented to be taken home by a drunk driver, on the other hand, the waiver of rights
in respect of foreseeable injury seems pretty unequivocal.
To this extent, the traditional ‘defence’ of volenti is not a defence at all; it is a
denial. It is a denial because a fundamental element of the cause of action is absent,
to whit the right. The claimant consented to the risk and has therefore waived
or limited his or her right. Edwin Peel and James Goudkamp argue that volenti
should be abandoned as a sui generis doctrine because the analysis does little more
than replicate other elements of the action (albeit that they do not consider the
rights question, and acknowledge that there has been no consensus as to which of
the traditional elements of the cause of action are affected by volenti).23 This view
merits much sympathy, albeit that the argument here is that the element affected is
unequivocal: it is the right.
Consider—admittedly somewhat prosaically—a journey on the London Under-
ground at 8am on a Monday morning. We expect to be subjected to physical—very
23W E Peel and J Goudkamp, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (19th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2014)
26.018.
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occasionally quite forceful—contact with any number of strangers. Such contact the-
oretically amounts to a breach of right, yet this is a reasonable expectation in the
circumstances. To employ the language of negligence, it is foreseeable that our rights
will be infringed. In choosing to undertake the journey regardless, we consent to that
infringement (such that it cannot, in fact, be an infringement); we have waived our
right. Indeed, it may be reasonable for the law to deem you as having waived your
right, for to undertake such a journey without taking significant precaution to protect
your right (which would presumably include notice) would be unreasonable.
This is not to say that we consent to all foreseeable risks. The agreement to those
foreseeable risks must be genuinely voluntary rather than a product of pressure (see,
for example, Burnett v British Waterways Board 24 in which it was held that Mr
Burnett, a lighterman of the River Thames, had not freely and voluntarily agreed to
incur the risk of negligence by the Board on the basis that he was entering the lock
in the course of his employment and so had no meaningful choice about whether to
do so). However, where a risk of infringement of right is foreseeable it must surely
cause us to question whether the claimant had consented to that risk and so waived
their right to an extent.
The other side of this coin is equally true: where the risks are not at all foreseeable,
it would be unreasonable to suppose that you had waived your rights (for you could
not reasonably be expected to have foreseen the risks which may have necessitated
such a waiver).
In assessing the risks concomitant with an action, it is reasonable to suppose that
all other actors are acting reasonably; to do otherwise would be to invite infinite
24[1973] 1 WLR 700.
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speculation. (Unless, of course, you have knowledge that someone is not acting
reasonably, such as the drunk driver in the example above). Therefore, when others
do not act reasonably, it disrupts our expectation of those concomitant risks. Put
another way, it falls outwith our waiver. Indeed, the notion that the waiver is limited
in a number of ways is not alien to us. Consider again the operation. We waive our
rights to bodily integrity as against the doctors and nurses for the purpose of the
operation: in so doing, we do not invite them to interfere with our bodily integrity
for other purposes, nor does that allow the hospital’s chef to help himself to one of
our kidneys.
It may be helpful to think of this in relation to an area of the law where waiver and
consent are commonplace. Suppose you have suffered neurological damage and thus
require surgery to your neck. As your surgeon, I am at pains to point out that you
are under no obligation to subject yourself to the operation—you are perfectly within
your rights to refuse medical treatment—but I make no mention of any associated
risk, nor even of the detail of the procedure; on what basis can you make your
decision? More accurately in this context, on what basis do you decide to waive your
right to bodily integrity? Specifically, which rights do you waive? Many people may
rightly deduce, on the basis of experience or knowledge, that all operations come with
a small risk of infection, so you may factor such general risks into your assessment.
Put another way, it may arguably be reasonable to regard you as having consented
to those obvious risks, albeit that they weren’t specifically mentioned. However,
broadly speaking, you could not be criticised for taking my silence to mean that
there were no other risks (risks not foreseeable to the non-specialist) and thus you
consent to the operation. Unfortunately, however, the operation is not a success;
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rather than fixing the neurological condition, I have left you with partial paralysis.
On examination, it transpires that this was no fault of my own, and was a risk
inherent in the operation (albeit a very small risk, c.1 per cent). On discovering this,
you claim that you would never have consented to the operation had you been aware
of the risk. Would I have been under a duty to make you aware of this risk? Have
your rights been infringed? There has been a tendency to describe the infringed right
as the right to information. This is not the case.
The facts above will be recognised as those of Sidaway v Board of Governors of
the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital and others.25 Lord Scarman’s
powerful dissent in Sidaway emphasised the importance of the patient’s right to
make an informed decision—though, notably, not a right to information per se—and
identified a landmark decision of the United States Court of Appeals, District of
Columbia Circuit, in the case of Canterbury v Spence.26 As cited with approval by
Lord Scarman:
(1) the root premise is the concept that every human being of adult years
and of sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body. (2) the consent is the informed exercise of a choice, and that
entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available
and the risks attendant upon each[. . .](3) the doctor must, therefore,
disclose all “material risks”.27
In defining what was meant by material risks, Lord Scarman used the definition
employed by the court in Spence:
25[1985] AC 871, sub nom Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] 1 All ER 643.
26(1972) 464 F 2d 772.
27Sidaway [1985] AC 871, 887 (Lord Scarman).
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[a] risk is[. . .]material when a reasonable person, in what the physician
knows or should know to be the patient’s position, would be likely to
attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or
not to forego the proposed therapy.28
The doctor’s duty, then, can only be determined by reference to the right of personal
autonomy, inasmuch as the ‘doctor’s duty arises from his patient’s rights’29 (but, of
course, is not a mere reflex thereof). Your consent to an operation is not meaningful—
indeed, it is defective—if it is predicated on misinformation. This is what we mean by
a right to choose what is done with your body as distinct from a right to information.
You have no right to information in the abstract. The focus on the patient’s right
to choose as determining duty has been echoed in later cases: for example, in Pearce
v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust,30 Lord Woolf formulated the test in terms
of what information the reasonable patient (albeit the reasonable patient in the
particular patient’s position) would require in order to determine what course he
or she should adopt.31 It is therefore submitted that, despite being a dissenting
judgment, Lord Scarman’s formulation—with its focus on the right of the patient
and respect for autonomy—has considerable judicial merit.
Indeed, it is not even clear that the majority in Sidaway disagreed with Lord
Scarman holus-bolus. Lord Scarman was attempting to assert a legal, objective test to
establish the scope of the duty to inform. Whilst this was rejected by the majority in
favour of the Bolam test (such that a doctor will not be held negligent if a reasonable
28Spence (1972) 464 F 2d 772, 787 (Robinson J).
29Sidaway [1985] AC 871, 888 (Lord Scarman).
30(1998) 48 BMLR 118 (CA).
31(1998) 48 BMLR 118, 125 (Lord Woolf MR).
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body of medical opinion would regard his actions as reasonable),32 it seems that a
significant factor in this decision—well articulated by Lord Templeman—was the
reluctance to concede that the patient ought to know everything, because ‘some
information might confuse, other information might alarm a particular patient’33.
This was clearly for a doctor to decide. Of course, it doesn’t alter the fact that
the doctor still had to provide enough information to the patient in order that they
could make a reasonable decision. So, despite rejecting Lord Scarman’s specific
proposal—and thus also Canterbury v Spence—it is clear that all of their Lordships
in Sidaway recognised the importance of the patient’s right to decide, and the force
of Lord Scarman’s logic on this particular issue (a point highlighted by Lord Hope
in Chester v Afshar 34).
However, the argument was taken somewhat too far at times in Chester in which
Lord Steyn noted that ‘[i]n modern law medical paternalism no longer rules and a
patient has a prima facie right to be informed by a surgeon of a small, but well
established, risk of serious injury as a result of surgery’.35 This duplication of rights
adds unnecessarily to the analysis: if I have a right to do with my kidney whatsoever
I choose,36 it adds nothing to this analysis to claim that I have a further right to
information; if my decision to allow you access to my kidney was predicated on false
information, then my consent is vitiated. Whether I bear the burden of that vitiated
32Bolam v Friern HMC [1957] 1 WLR 582.
33Sidaway [1985] AC 871, 904 (Lord Templeman). Indeed, this is the ‘paternalism’ noted in Lord
Steyn’s speech in Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 (HL), [2004] 4 All ER 587, [2004] UKHL 41 at
[16].
34ibid at [53] (Lord Hope).
35[2004] UKHL 41 at [16] (Lord Steyn).
36Issues of commodification aside.
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consent or you do will depend very much on the extent to which we each were acting
reasonably. This does not mean I have some legal right to information.
Regardless, as Professor Brazier and José Miola concluded, that ‘[e]ven the cynic
must concede that, whatever the outcome on the facts, the ‘reasonable doctor’ test
received a body blow in Pearce. It survives only if the ‘reasonable doctor’ understands
that he must offer the patient what the ‘reasonable patient’ would be likely to need
to exercise his right to make informed decisions about his care.’37 Certainly, the
law needs explicit clarification,38 but the tide seems very much to have ebbed away
from Bolam and the doctor-focused ‘duty’, and flowed towards a patient-focused
conception of informed consent or, at the most problematic extreme, the right to
information.
In 2015, the Supreme Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board 39 con-
firmed the primacy of the patient’s right to determine what constitutes informed
consent, making it clear that this was not a forum in which the Bolam test was ap-
propriate.40 Lords Kerr and Reed affirmed the approach of Lord Scarman in Sidaway,
that, subject to the therapeutic exception,41 the general rule must be that:
37M Brazier and J Miola, ‘Bye Bye Bolam: A Medical Litigation Revolution?’ (2000) 8 Med Law
Rev 85.
38See A MacLean, ‘From Sidaway to Pearce and Beyond: Is the Legal Regulation of Consent Any
Better Following a Quarter of a Century of Judicial Scrutiny?’ (2012) 20 Med Law Rev 108.
39[2015] UKSC 11.
40ibid [84] (Lord Kerr and Lord Reed).
41ibid [85].
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[t]he doctor is therefore under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure
that the patient is aware of any material risks involved in any recom-
mended treatment[. . .]. The test of materiality is whether, in the cir-
cumstances of that particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s
position would be likely to attach significance to the risk[. . .].42
Where does this leave the discussion of waiver? The Bolam test—take it or leave
it—was always going to struggle to curry favour in the context of informed consent
because, fundamentally, it is a strange articulation of the scope of this duty, in that
it doesn’t explain why the doctor owes a duty at all: the raison d’être of the duty
is grounded in the validity of the patient’s decisions in respect of her own body—
effectively to waive certain of her rights to varying degrees—so the scope of the duty
needs to be grounded more specifically in relation to the rights and waiver. If a
patient has not consented to certain risks—and thus not waived her right in those
respects to bodily privity—then the doctor, in operating, will be liable, because he
will be causing her harm without her consent.43 Perhaps this is taking the point too
far. But the point remains that we find nothing strange in the notion that we can
consent to certain infringements of our rights, and we cannot consent to a risk we
have not foreseen or of which we have not been warned. In the context of medical law,
42ibid [87].
43We are here interested in the effect of such consent on the negligence action. Of course, there is
a different consideration concering battery. A simplisitic analysis might conclude that there clearly
would be: this is intentional touching (indeed, quite a lot more than ‘touching’) absent consent.
However, there is persuasive authority suggesitng that consent is to be determined not as a matter
of fact, but as a matter of the defendant’s reasonable belief—see, e.g. O’Brien v Cunard SS Co 28
NE 266 (Mass. 1891). So if the patient lacks true consent owing to the doctor’s own negligence,
but nonetheless the reasonable person would regard the patient as consenting on the basis of the
patient’s actions, then the doctor may well not be liable for a battery. See also W E Peel and J
Goudkamp, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (19th edn, London, Sweet and Maxwell 2014) 4-013.
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as discussed above, this point is well understood (even if its exact legal manifestation
is not).
As is perhaps clear from the above, the test is not completely shifting to the
claimant: we still require some notion of what renders the defendant’s act unrea-
sonable. However, it is important that we understand that, if we are to take rights
seriously as the predicate for liability, we must take seriously those decisions or ac-
tions that appear to waive or limit rights. This is the claimant-focussed aspect of
the analysis.
1.4. Competing rights. Before we proceed to consider the juridical sequence,
the nexus of right and remedy, it is worth considering for a moment the problem of
competing rights. If we are to take seriously the notion that rights are the predicate
of legal wrongs, we must be astute in asserting that rights are knowable and deter-
minable ex ante.44 There will be situations, of course, where rights conflict. But
we must be wary of framing the argument solely in terms of competing autonomies
or, worse, in terms of ‘determination’ of rights; determination ex post of something
that should be knowable ex ante makes no sense; it is contradictory.45 Further, if
the existence of the right itself cannot be determined ex post by the actions of an-
other, then neither can its breach. If my arm is caused to break, and thus my right
infringed, it is no less broken (and my right no less infringed) merely because the
action breaking it was one thing and not another.46 As Jules Coleman has argued,
44R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London, Duckworth 1977) ch4.
45W Lucy, Philosophy of Private Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press 2007) 313.
46Now, this is clearly not to say that all actions that appear prima facie to infringe my right are so
doing. Consenting to an operation, for example, involves an invasion of my bodily integrity, but no
one except an uninformed observer would suggest that it infringed my right. Clearly, I had waived
that right for that purpose. Equally, that specific consent does not destroy my right to bodily
integrity: consent, even by contract, is merely an agreement that I would not exercise the right.
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our right can be infringed regardless of the justification of the action that infringes
it (though, of course, this is not to say that such would be a legal ‘wrong’).47
Coleman has rightly noted that the principles of tort litigation are rooted in
the relationship between the parties; the chief failure of economic or functionalist
readings of tort law is that they provide no principled reason for requiring one party
to make reparation to another.48 If we lose sight of the rights upon which the claim
is founded, then the justification for remedial obligation becomes diffuse.
In contrast, Professor Witting noted that a theory that sought to define all of tort
law solely in terms of rights ‘ignores the way that courts actually determine the extent
of redress in tort law’.49 Wrongdoing, Witting argues, is concerned with (inter alia)
‘the extent to which the claimant’s autonomy is compromised by that action, and the
infringement upon the defendant’s autonomy that would be represented by an award
of damages’.50 This, Witting argues, is why the courts engage in discussion of the
reasonableness of the defendant’s actions. However, we must be wary of assuming
that discussions pertaining to competing autonomies mean that the foundation of
tort law lies in the same. There is no right to autonomy, to self-government. My
autonomy is inhibited on a daily basis by students sending me questioning emails,
tourists lurking in groups outside my gate, the parking attendant requiring me to
move my car, etc. Absent a right, why is it that awards of damages should be
moderated by appeals to autonomy? Why is it that we should be regarded as having
an intrinsic or derivative interest in autonomy, either at all or at least in preference to
This must be true, because subsequent withdrawal of consent is not a rights-creating event, yet no
one would question that continuation would constitute a battery.
47J Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (OUP 1992) 324.
48ibid 377-80.
49C Witting, ‘The House that Dr Beever Built’ 71 MLR 621, 628.
50ibid. See also Lucy (n 38) 206.
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rights?51 The irony in such an endeavour, it seems, is that we run the risk of creating
a right de novo, having attempted to circumvent the problem of conflicting rights by
appealing to competing autonomies. Competing rights can be weighed, and many
other considerations can be brought to bear in weighing competing rights (including,
for example, the extent of the interference in those rights), but it is not obvious
why rights should be trumped generally by appeals to autonomy as a supervening
determiner.
1.5. A new departure? There is a sense in which this conclusion is nothing
new, albeit that it has not been well-articulated; relatively recently (in the long his-
tory of the law), Cardozo J, in Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co,52 famously stated
that ‘[n]egligence is not actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected
interest’.53 More fundamentally, the ongoing debate surrounding the recognition of
economic losses has been—on the whole—astute to recognise this feature of negli-
gence law. The question of whether one could recover having been prevented from
obtaining something of value was first considered by the natural lawyers of the 16th
century. Long before then, under Roman law, specifically under the lex Aquila,54 it
was generally necessary that harm be incurred in a physically direct way.55 However,
the later actio in factum and actio utilis effectively abolished this necessity,56 and, in
51See G Postema, ‘Risks, Wrongs, and Responsibility: Coleman’s Liberal Theory of Commutative
Justice’ (1993) 103(3) Yale Law Journal 861, 867.
52162 NE 99 (NYCA 1928).
53ibid at 99.
54A law concerned with fault-based injury to property.
55J Gordley, Foundations of Private Law (OUP 2006) 264.
56R Zimmerman, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Cape
Town, Juta & Co 1990) 993-6. In Zimmerman’s words (at 995), they ‘appear to have been two
separate techniques by means of which the praetors were able to supplement, to correct and to
adapt the ius civile.’
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any case, neither the Romans nor later medieval jurists were seeking to discover uni-
fying principles of tort; rather, they were discussing concrete instances of recovery.
The scholastic approach, on the other hand, in attempting to provide a theoretical
basis for recovery, borrowed from Aristotelian principles of commutative justice in
involuntary transactions: ‘commutative justice is violated when one person harms
another without giving back what he took or making compensation’.57
The road was not, however, smooth. At times, the analysis reverted to one based
in fault, not right. As Grotius argued, ‘[f]rom[. . .]fault, if damage is caused, an
obligation arises, namely, that the damage should be made good.’58 However, it was
at least recognised that to have goods in potentia is not the same as to have them.
Aquinas, in describing the type of harm whereby one is prevented from acquiring
goods he was on the way to having—in via—noted that it was less to have a thing
virtually than to have it actually, and thus compensation should be less.59
In England, though the waters of the debate have been muddied over the extent
to which contractual rights are recognised at all in the law of negligence, the debate
has at least largely been focused on rights, as illustrated in Spartan Steel & Alloys
Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd.60 The defendants cut the power supply to the
plaintiffs’ furnace, with the result that the material therein solidified. The plaintiffs
were able to recover for the damage to the material but not for lost profits as a
result of not being able to melt other material. Earlier cases provided the rationale;
57J Gordley, ‘Liability in Tort for Pure Economic Loss’, in Foundations of Private Law (OUP 2006)
267.
58B J A de Kanter-van Hettinga Tromp (ed), De iure belli ac pacis: libri tres (Leiden, Brill 1939)
II.xvii.1–2.
59T Aquinas, Summa theologiae II–II, Q62, a4.
60[1973] 1 QB 27.
1. WHAT ARE WE CORRECTING? 65
citing Cattle v The Stockton Waterworks Co61 and Anglo-Algerian Steamship Co Ltd
v The Houlder Line Ltd,62 Dr Stallybrass stated ‘[h]e who does a wrongful act is
liable only to the person whose rights are violated.’63 This interpretation of the cases
was accepted by Justice Hamilton in La Société Anonyme de Remorquage à Hélice v
Bennets,64 in whose judgment plaintiffs must ‘shew not only an iniuria, namely, the
breach of the defendant‘s obligation, but also a damnum to themselves in the sense of
damage recognised by law’.65 The point was emphasised in Elliott Steam Tug Co Ltd
v Shipping Controller,66 the court stating that ‘the common law rightly or wrongly
does not recognise him as able to sue for such an injury to merely his contractual
rights’. Viscount Simonds, in Attorney-General for New South Wales v Perpetual
Trustee Co Ltd,67 said ‘[i]t is fundamental[. . .]that the mere fact that an injury to
A prevents a third party from getting from A a benefit which he would otherwise
have obtained, does not invest the third party with a right of action against the
wrongdoer[. . .]’.
Much further discussion will be had of the law relating to economic loss in later
chapters, but our focus now is on a slightly broader point, that we understand the
logic which determines this conclusion: the rights with which the law of negligence
is concerned are prior rights, whatever we deem those rights to be. One should be
wary, admittedly, of using qualifiers such as ‘prior’ or, indeed, ‘primary rights’,68 for
61(1875) LR 10 QB 453.
62[1908] 1 KB 659.
63W T S Stallybrass, Salmond on the Law of Torts (8th edn, London, Sweet and Maxwell 1934)
133.
64[1911] 1 KB 243.
65ibid at 248.
66[1922] 1 KB 127, 140.
67[1955] 1 AC 457, 484.
68K Barker, ‘Rescuing Remedialism in Unjust Enrichment Law: Why Remedies are Right’ [1998]
CLJ 301, 319 (‘Primary rights describe a person’s initial legal entitlement’).
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clearly the right is not defeated by its own infringement,69 but here it is meant simply
to mean those rights which pre-exist the wrong.70
In any case, what is becoming clear is that the inquiry of the law of negligence
is actually quite limited in purview. Whereas, for example, the law of contract
concerns itself with the creation of contractual rights (along with their breach or
transgression, inter alia), and—at a higher level of taxonomy—the law of property is
concerned with the creation of rights in rem and ‘the exigibility of that right against
strangers to its creation’,71 the law of negligence is not an inquiry into the creation of
rights (save the ultimate right to damages, but arguably that is nothing more than
a manifestation of the pre-existing right anyway). Of course, the law of negligence
requires the law to have an understanding of the a priori rights, but the inquiry as to
whether or not we have a right to, say, bodily integrity72 is not the primary subject
matter of negligence law. Thus, Professor Harris’ observation that the role of tort
law ‘is to define a number of legally-protected interests’73 is misleading. Negligence
law is concerned with the nexus between the right infringed and liability; it is merely
a necessary corollary of our understanding of loss that we are asking the court to
realise a right. In this respect, it shares much with the law of unjust enrichment;
69‘The right survivies the injustice. . . ’ E Weinrib, Corrective Justice (OUP 2012) 88.
70This being the realm of tort, there is a sense in which the use of the word ‘wrong’ could be viewed
legalistically (as in, rights ex delicto), as if the wrong is somehow separate from the infringement
of the right; such a view is erroneous. The word is used here as shorthand simply to mean the
concatenation of facts leading to the infringement of a right (with apologies to Birks for so doing,
for in spurning such a loose use of the word he is certainly correct: see P Birks, ‘Right, Wrongs and
Remedies’ (2000) 20 OJLS 1, 25).
71W Swadling, ‘Unjust Delivery’ in A Burrows and Lord Roger of Earlsferry (eds), Mapping the
Law: Essays in Memory of Peter Birks (OUP 2006) 280.
72Or, indeed, ‘rights to life and limb, health[. . .]and rights of property, and[. . .]rights under con-
tracts.’ See P Birks, ‘Right, Wrongs and Remedies’ (2000) 20 OJLS 1, 5.
73D Harris, ‘Objectives of the Law’ in D Harris, D Campbell and R Halson (eds), Remedies in
Contract & Tort (CUP 2005) 289.
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when we ask whether an enrichment has an explanation known to the law, or whether
the defendant has an enrichment sine causa, we actually ask whether the defendant
has a right to the enrichment that supersedes the claimant’s right.
But the law of unjust enrichment has a convenience which eludes the law of negli-
gence: there is a clear legal nexus between claimant and defendant that is a product
of the defendant being possessed of an enrichment flowing from the claimant.74 In
negligence, the infringement of a right need not yield a benefit to the defendant for
that defendant to be liable, and so we must locate the nexus elsewhere. This is the
traditional realm of ‘duty’ as an inquiry, and will be considered in the third section
of this chapter.
Now, before turning to the question of the defendant, it is necessary to consider
the nexus between the right and the remedy.
2. From right to remedy: the juridical sequence
In the last chapter, we considered Weinrib’s conception of the articulated unity,
whereby the legal nexus between the parties is established by virtue of the fact that
they are situated as doer and sufferer of the same harm. What this means in practice
will vary according to the exact nature of the right infringed, for it is this infringement
that requires correction. The law, in this sense, is acting minimally, in that
[t]he injustice is not an occasion for a court to do what is best, all things
considered, given the present situation of the parties[. . .]. Because what
is rightfully the plaintiff’s remains constant throughout, the remedy is
merely the continuation of the right; together they make up a single
74E J Weinrib, ‘Correctively Unjust Enrichment’ in R Chambers, C Mitchell and J Penner (eds),
Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment (OUP 2009) 53.
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unbroken juridical sequence. In postulating so intimate a relationship
between right and remedy, corrective justice merely draws out what the
law takes for granted.75
The purpose of the remedy is to afford recognition to the right, a right that pre-
existed its infringement (obviously) and must survive the infringement (necessarily,
for what good is a right that ceases to exist when it is infringed). Thus, the law acts
only insomuch as to return to the equitable status quo, to return the parties to their
free and equal position before the birth of the remedial relationship.76
Such a proposition is not without its critics. Hans Kelsen, in Pure Theory of
Law, denies the normative explanatory force of such an analysis:
[. . .]a definite act or refrainment is a delict because it is connected with
a coercive act, that is, with a sanction as its consequence. No imma-
nent quality, no relation to meta-legal natural or divine norm is a reason
for qualifying a specific human action as a delict; but only and exclu-
sively the fact that the positive legal order has made this behaviour the
condition of a coercive act—of a sanction.77
Of course, there is a sense in which this is true: an act is only wrong inasmuch as
we say it is wrong (just as loss is only loss inasmuch as we recognise some right
from which we can subtract), but this is profoundly unhelpful if used to deny the
quest for internal consistency and logic: while the law need not recognise a particular
75E Weinrib, Corrective Justice (OUP 2012) 84.
76See also E Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (OUP 2012) 132. It is worth also noting that, of
course, the return to the equitable status quo cannot and is not always achieved by simple transfer of
funds. We know that there are manifold responses to wrongs, including restitutionary and equitable
responses.
77H Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law tr M Knight (Berkeley: University of California Press 1967) 111,
as quoted in E Weinrib, Corrective Justice (OUP 2012) 83.
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right, having done so it is required to pay heed to its congeners. For example, if two
parties come before the Bar because one has received a mistaken payment from the
other, a remedy that sought to do anything other than rectify the mistaken payment
(howsoever it sought to do that) would, ceteris paribus, appear entirely arbitrary. To
put it bluntly, it wouldn’t be a remedy at all.
A more profound criticism, advanced by Christian Witting, is that such an inti-
mate, unflinching linear relationship denies the court any normative power.78 In a
sense, the court becomes a mere conduit for the realisation of rights. This is clearly
true in the limited sense that courts, having established that two parties are actually
situated as doer and sufferer of the same harm, are then bound—under Weinrib’s
analysis—to provide a remedy that dignifies the right from which the defendant (or
doer) has subtracted; the right binds the court, in a sense. This is, of course, nothing
new: having successfully made out a claim, damages are the claimant’s by right any-
way. However, it is not difficult to find examples in practice where that tight linear
connection is observed with rather less adherence: punitive damages, for example,
clearly go beyond rectificatory considerations. There may be reasons for the award
of punitive damages—deterrence is an obvious if problematic example—but it is not
at all clear why the claimant’s loss should be vindicated by an award of damages
that is not predicated at all on the claimant’s loss; the claimant is being put in a
better position than the one in which they found themselves prior to the tortious
act. If this is the way in which courts flex their normative muscles, then private
law starts to appear more as a tool of public law, the infringement being not of the
78C Witting, ‘The Relationship Between Negligence and Misstatements’ in K Barker, R Grantham
and W Swain, The Law of Misstatements: 50 Years on from Hedley Byrne v Heller (Oxford, Hart
Publishing 2015) 225.
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claimant’s right so much as an infringement of society’s ‘right’. This moves us a very
long way from corrective justice, and quite a long way from a law that regards public
and private law as distinct.
We needn’t go so far. The normative power of the court is realised in the recog-
nition of the wrong: the court identifies that the claimant suffered harm and that
the defendant or defendants can be regarded as the doer of that harm. As we will
see in the next section, that part of the sequence is a normative evaluation. That
juridical sequence—the continuation of the right—has normative force, and is the
nexus which justifies requiring the defendant to pay damages. If the sole argument
for undertaking a further and different normative analysis at the remedial stage is
that there is no other normative function performed by the court, this argument
would appear to be unfounded.
3. Who is liable to make correction?
This section considers how we can morally particularise the defendant, which is
ultimately a question of causation.79 However, unlike ‘causation’ as delineated in
the traditional negligence analysis, this is not so much a question of whether the
defendant was a cause—of course, as noted above, he or she would have to be a cause,
lest the liability be entirely arbitrary80—but rather why it is that the defendant can
be regarded as a cause such that they are legally culpable and the other causes are
not. Consider this. If I punch you, then the legal nexus is relatively unequivocal: I
have done something that is plainly wrong, and that wrong has caused you harm.
The assertion we make about this causation is uncomplicated; there appear to be
79See S Steel, Proof of Causation in Tort Law (Cambridge University Press 2015) 109.
80Modulo considerations of Fairchild and Barker
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few, if any, factors that interrupt the chain of causation that began with my decision
to act and resulted in your harm. To this end, I am the cause. Except, of course, this
is a fiction (the temptation is actually to describe it as a legal fiction, in the context).
I am not the cause, but one of many, yet the fiction of sole causal responsibility is
one that common sense dictates almost every day: we ignore the questions of brute
fact causation81—viz. those facts ‘not dependent for their existence upon human
beliefs’,82 which would include, for example, a sub-atomic analysis of causation—in
favour of a normative factual evaluation.83 We say the act was an operative cause
because it involved voluntary human agency, and we ascribe responsibility on the
basis of a normative judgement about the exercise of that agency. In identifying
a person as doer rather than merely a blameless participant in a fateful chain of
causation, the court is making a normative judgement.
As Sandy Steel notes, the particularisation of the defendant requires more than
mere factual causation, but further a notion of outcome responsibility such that the
defendant ‘can appropriately be required to explain why [they] brought the outcome
about.’84 Steel is employing Tony Honoré’s concept of outcome responsibility, as
articulated in ‘Responsibility and Luck: The Moral Basis of Strict Liability’,85 the
essence of which is that human interaction in the world carries with it some risk, both
of reward and of failure; if we are to be regarded as authors of our own conduct, such
that we reap the rewards of success, then so too must we accept that our interference
in the world can carry negative consequences. Where we are authors of our own
81W Lucy, Philosophy of Private Law (OUP 2007) 193.
82ibid.
83J Stapleton, ‘Unpacking Causation’ in P Cane and J Gardner (eds), Relating to Responsibility
(Oxford: Hart Publishing 2001) 153.
84Steel (n 43) 110.
85(1988) LQR 104, 537–545.
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conduct, we are responsible for the outcomes thereof. It is this element of Honoré’s
argument that justifies Steel’s assertion that we can be morally responsible for an
outcome to the extent that it was based on actual conduct and was ‘to some extent
avoidable’.86
It is, perhaps, easy to forget that we are not discussing negligence specifically
here: the example was of a battery.87 But the analysis is not altered by this fact. If
I hit you, but have no intention so to do, then I have not been the author of my own
conduct. If, unbeknownst to you, I intend to hit you but miss, then I am the author
of my own conduct, but the outcome for which I am responsible is not an outcome
in which your rights meaningfully feature. Now, in the former scenario I may well be
liable in negligence, were it the case that I intended to do an action the foreseeable
result of which was your being struck; it is important to understand that the outcome
does not have to be the intended outcome for you to have been regarded as the author
of your conduct. As Honoré later argued, ‘though our conduct must have intentional
aspects, what we do includes its unintended aspects or consequences.’88 This is so,
just as Oedipus intended to take the hand of a queen in marriage and with her bear
children, but had not intended that the queen be his mother.
The historical development of tort has done much to obscure this unifying feature.
It is a commonly held view that the law of tort is more accurately termed the law
of torts: it is a collective of individual actionable wrongs,89 none of which finds its
86Steel (n 43) 110.
87Distracting quibbles about harm aside, it is not immediately clear that a battery is not also a
negligent act, sensu stricto, though the question is rarely considered because, so long as the intention
element is easy to establish, the claim in battery is more simple to make out.
88T Honoré, ‘Being Responsible and Being a Victim of Circumstance’ (1998) Proceedings of the
British Academy 97, 176.
89See, for example, Bollinger v Costa Brava Wine Co Ltd [1960] Ch 262, 283 (Danckwerts J).
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‘origin in an any all-embracing general principle of tortious liability.’90 Defamation
and nuisance, for example, would seem to bear little relation to each other, as indeed
would negligence and trespass. Though this is not exactly the position assumed
herein (they exist at different levels of generality), there is a sense in which it is true,
at least as a description of how tort has developed in the courts. For much of the
19th century, broad questions concerning breach of duty or of right had no direct
bearing on whether one could claim against a defendant. Instead, the plaintiff would
have to purchase a writ—to whit, writs of trespass, and trespass on the case—and
establish that the facts of their claim were sufficient to satisfy a recognised form of
action. Though we no longer employ this system, the categories will be less alien to
the modern lawyer than they first appear: trespass concerned direct injuries to land,
person and goods (though, as Professor Rogers notes, ‘ “injuries” must be read in an
extended sense, because the tort was actionable per se’91), whereas trespass on the
case required proof of damage (though the damage need not have been direct). The
labels of battery or of trespass (in the current sense of the word) and of negligence
relate respectively to trespass and trespass on the case, albeit that the classification
is now implicit.
Similarly, there is another subdivision—and it is one that explicitly persists—
between intentional and unintentional torts. Though it is not always clear what the
defendant needs to have intended, a number of actions seem prima facie to require
intention of some kind: trespasses to the person,92 false imprisonment,93 deceit (if it
90Furniss v Fitchett [1958] NZLR 396, 401 (Barrowclough CJ).
91W V H Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (18th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 61.
92See Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172 (cf. Wilson v Pringle [1987] QB 237 concerning the
requirement of hostility).
93Iqbal v Prison Officers Association [2009] EWCA Civ 1310. Smith LJ’s view in Iqbal is the
prevailing view, though it is far from clear that negligence would not suffice.
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still exists in any meaningful sense),94 etc. It is difficult to see how actions concerning
the vindication of some right could be born of the same theoretical family that regards
the defendant’s intention as relevant in determining liability, and thus the tempting
conclusion is that the intentional torts are indeed categorically separate from those
that would require mere negligence.95
The point regarding the separate nature of torts can, perhaps, be taken too far:
it would be to patronise the courts to argue that they have developed categories of
actionable wrongs in ignorance of other categories; the analogous nature of judicial
reasoning is such that there are few (if any) genuinely isolated islands of actionable
wrongdoing. But that is not to say that the courts have identified a feature common
to all ‘torts’: though some may share attributes with certain others, no court has
stated explicitly that all tortious instances share one attribute beyond the nebulous
attribute of being ‘civil wrongs’. The purpose of this part, however, is to demonstrate
a taxonomic method, and it is certainly submitted that many of the different torts
thus far identified are congeners to the core case: that is, that tort is concerned
with the infringement of rights that consists in conduct over which we make negative
normative evaluations.
3.1. Duty: a barren term? Turning to negligence specifically, the moral par-
ticularisation is the function of duty. For the avoidance of doubt, one must not be
tempted to the conclusion that ‘duty’ is merely some analytic reflex of the right,
94Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337 has been rendered largely irrelevant by Hedley Byrne v
Heller [1964] AC 465. See D Howarth, ‘A Future for the Intentional Torts’ in P Birks (ed), A
Classification of Obligations (Clarendon Press 1997) 242–243.
95For what it’s worth, I consider it highly unlikey that ‘intention’ could ever be the defining feature of
a tort if we argue (as I do) that private law finds its coherence through recognising and correcting for
infringements of rights: its role is nonetheless still relevant, but perhaps limited to the mucilaginous
world of legal causation, where it may have some bearing on, say, remoteness.
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that it means no more than an obligation not to infringe whatever that right may
be. The correlation between duty and right to damages is as to duty of care rather
than the bare duty not to cause loss; as we shall see in the following, they exist as
an articulated unity whereby the breached duty of care has caused an infringement
of a right.
As we have seen, the duty analysis allows us to limit the manifold elements of the
causal chain to the legally relevant. To say that your duty is not to infringe my right,
and that you have breached such by infringing my right, is a meaningless sentence: it
presupposes my legal or moral relevance in the chain of causation, dismissing without
explanation the other causes. This is not a comment on multiple causation: the same
criticism would apply to a sentence that read ‘parties X, Y and Z had a duty not to
infringe my right, and breached that duty by infringing my right (albeit, perhaps, in
manifold ways).’ The substance of the criticism is that sentences such as these tell us
nothing of meaning in answering why we have morally particularised the defendant(s)
as part of the chain of causation such that we can say that they infringed our rights
(when we would not say that other elements of the chain of causation did: recall the
distinction above between brute fact causation and normative factual evaluation).
By way of example, James Gobert, in an article on corporate manslaughter, fell
into this trap. He was arguing that the requirement of an extant duty of care in estab-
lishing criminal liability for death was ‘otiose’ on the basis that ‘organisations[. . .]are
already under a duty not to kill in the first place’.96 This is a fallacious statement. It
is not clear how the company can be said to have ‘killed’ without some a priori sense
of why they were a legally relevant—as opposed to a blameless—part of the chain of
96J Gobert, ‘The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007—Thirteen years in
the making but was it worth the wait?’ (2008) 71(3) MLR 413–433, 416.
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causation. In simple terms, we may be able to say that, as a matter of brute fact
causation, D killed V. So, in answering the question ‘did D breach their duty not to
kill V?’, we would have to answer ‘yes, D did kill V and therefore breached their duty
not to kill V.’ Of course, there may be other elements of the chain of causation. Did
the knife kill V? Yes, as a matter of strict causation. But in making a judgement
about legal liability, we wouldn’t say that the knife killed V, just as wouldn’t say
that a person, who happened to be holding a knife when D pushed him into V, killed
V. When we are making judgements about whether D infringed my right, we are
clearly asking more than whether there existed an element of brute fact causation.
Necessarily, part of our answer involves an assessment of their normative blamewor-
thiness. So, on one level, you may very well say that there does exist some duty not
to infringe my right. But, in order to determine what it means to have infringed my
right in any normative sense, there needs to be a further level of analysis. This is
the role of the duty of care.
Of course, we may be tempted to ponder whether they were ‘negligent’ in some
abstract sense of doing something we may regard as unreasonable, but we cannot
conceive of standards of care (i.e. negligence) without also considering the relative
positioning of the parties. The essence of standards of care lies in identifying fore-
seeable risks, and thus necessarily parties who may foreseeably be put at risk. You
can’t be negligent ‘in the air’.97
97C Witting, ‘Physical Damage in Negligence’ (2002) 61 Cambridge Law Journal 189–208, 189.
Notably, Witting was discussing the requirement of physical damage, but the phrase is equally apt
in this context.
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It is easy to fall into this erroneous line of reasoning. This is because, if we
accept our initial lemma—that our right to damages is generated by an infringe-
ment of a prior right—it momentarily seems logical to infer that the corresponding
duty (and therefore the locus of liability) would consist in an obligation not to cause
loss/infringe my prior right; a simple analytic reflex, requiring only a causative rela-
tionship. The use of the word ‘obligation’ is problematic in this sense. The word has
a specific legal meaning and cannot be conflated with duty; negligence law takes its
place among the law of obligations in requiring the liable party to make good the in-
fringement of the right (for negligence is certainly not concerned with the vindication
of rights in rem; by its nature, the vindicatio does not require negligence). Whilst, as
we have seen, negligence does not create a right, the claimant’s right manifests itself
as an obligation on the part of the defendant to make good infringement. Indeed, in
noting that the law of obligations is synonymous with the law of rights in personam,
Peter Birks argued that ‘[i]t is correct, though momentarily shocking, to refer to the
law of obligations as a category of right’.98 So the word is problematic when used in
this context because it can lead one to regard the duty of care either as synonymous
or, at the very least, as redundant.
Why might such a conclusion be reached, given that we know—inasmuch as legal
scholarship overwhelmingly tells us so—that the duty is more than obligation in this
sense in that there is a duty to exercise care?99 This failure to take care is the
98P Birks, ‘Right, Wrongs and Remedies’ (2000) 20 OJLS 1, 21. And there is clearly a level of right
that is something more than the obligation; whilst the obligation may be discharged, this right
does not disappear, for a right cannot be defeated merely because the possessor thereof has been
compensated for its infringement.
99‘[. . .]a legal duty on the part of D towards C to exercise care in such conduct of D as falls within
the scope of the duty.’ W V H Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (18th edn, Sweet & Maxwell
2010) 5-1.
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traditional essence of negligence (as against strict liability). It follows that the duty
so defined can be breached without any corresponding right to damages arising on
the part of the injured party. More specifically, this duty could be breached without
affecting the rights of the claimant at all (for, as any first year law student has been
taught, the breach of duty needs to be causally linked to the loss in order for the
defendant to be liable to the claimant). This is unproblematic if you assume that duty
is simply a means to limit the legally relevant causes. However, if you erroneously
conflate obligation and duty, or somehow describe the duty as an ‘obligation’ not to
infringe rights, then this renders the formulation of duty either:
(a) paradoxical, (for how can a duty—a thing owed—exist without a corre-
sponding right to it?); or
(b) entirely meaningless (for what is the point of a duty that can be breached
without generating some corresponding legal recourse?).
This is a problem. Duty, as an inquiry, is traditionally concerned with the question
of the defendant’s liability for the claimant’s loss (for, as the traditional view stip-
ulates, bare causation alone is an insufficient determiner; unforeseeable loss should
not attract liability in negligence). If you denude duty of this role, then how is the
defendant meaningfully to be identified?
It was initially tempting to consider that maybe our rights are naturally qualified
to the extent that we have a right not to be caused foreseeable losses, but it is difficult
to see how the problem could be avoided by collapsing this inquiry into our conception
of rights. If, for example, we say that our right is not to be caused foreseeable
losses—and our expectation is that ‘foreseeability’, if it is to be of any normative
significance, must relate to the defendant’s perspective—then we circumvent the
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problem that duty and right are not correlative. However, in so doing, we allow the
nature of our right to be determined by the actions of another. We have already
shown that ‘loss’ is merely the manifestation of a pre-existing right infringed. To
ape the example offered earlier, if C were shot by both A and B—one negligent,
the other not—C suffers harm in both instances. In each, C has a just claim to his
own body which supersedes anyone else’s right thereto and, in both instances, that
right was transgressed. And, of course, what the defendant needs to foresee is the
likelihood of harm or loss; as we have already established, loss can only be conceived
vis-à-vis the infringement of a right. We cannot therefore suggest that the right itself
is determined by whether or not one can foresee the infringement of that right; the
argument is circular. This is a clear demonstration of the importance of keeping a
priori rights and rights to damages analytically discrete.
This point is actually broader than at first appears. Professor Weinrib has been
one of the most articulate proponents of the concept of articulated unity, whereby
right and duty both ‘constitute a single normative sequence, in which each assumes
its character from its relationship with the other.’100 This notion of articulated unity
formed the basis of his more recent analysis on duty in his work Corrective Justice,
in which he argued that ‘parties to a negligence action be understood as the doer
and sufferer of a single wrong, and that the wrong must be seen as an integrated
sequence in which prospect of the plaintiff’s injury is seen as a reason for considering
the defendant’s act negligent.’101 It is a singularly powerful work on the subject of
duty.
100E Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Harvard University Press 1995) 125.
101E Weinrib, Corrective Justice (OUP 2012) 79.
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The broader point, then, is this: the wrong consists in more than the breach of the
right and more than identification of the wrongdoer; it is both. The wrong thus forms
the nexus between the two parties; one party can be regarded as a ‘doer’ of the harm
inasmuch as they are normatively causally relevant, and the other suffered a wrong
inasmuch as their rights were infringed as the misfortuned coda to the fateful chain
of causation. Yet it remains one wrong; this is the essence of Weinrib‘s articulated
unity.
It is perhaps worth ending this section by noting that its purpose—indeed, the
purpose of the chapter—is to make a taxonomic point. The identification of doer
is analytically discrete from the enquiry that recognises rights, albeit that both are
necessary for a remedial relationship, the relationship being a constraint on the
remedy. Whether all instances of tortious liability as found throughout legal history
can fall under the negligence analysis remains to be seen; indeed, it would be quite
an achievement of analogous reasoning (or an accident of history) if all of the ‘torts’
so described did actually conform. Alternatively, some areas of liability we think to
be tort may well be spurned in favour of categorical unity. This is not a problem.
Indeed, it is quite the reverse. It is not a failure of taxonomy to fail to describe a
general theory uniting everything we have thus far described as a tort; rather, the
taxonomy is refined by carving out clear boundaries, and discarding those which fall
outside.
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4. Duty and rights
For the sake of clarity, it is worth drawing together and elaborating on the sections
above in order to demonstrate more completely the duty model as envisaged in this
rights-based schema.
Rights in this model are not the reflex of a duty owed to us. We have noted
above that there is a relationship between the duty and the right, but we have also
noted that they are not merely reflexive: it is not mirror-like correlativity. The duty
is therefore something other than a bare duty not to infringe the right, albeit that it
is in some sense defined by the right. What we mean by ‘right’, then, is something
more than a Hohfeldian sense of claim right in which I have a claim right that you
not kick me and therefore you fall under an obligation not to kick me.
Though not the argument presented here, it is not impossible, on one level, to
argue that general rights such as a right to bodily privity (which would seem not to
accord to a simple Hohfeldian relation) are no more than collectives of Hohfeldian
right relationships. This form of reflexive relationship has been described as coercive,
employing Nicholas McBride’s taxonomy,102 or a conclusion to a duty, employing
Charlie Webb’s.103 In the former, I am compelled to act in a certain way, which
means that I have a clear duty and you have an unequivocal right in respect of that
duty. In the latter, I only have a right because you have a duty. The right is a
conclusion because its existence can be explained by virtue of the duty: I have a
right that you don’t kick me because you have a duty not to kick me. However,
on this approach it does not really matter through which end of the telescope we
102N J McBride, ‘Rights and the Basis of Tort Law’ in D Nolan and A Robertson (eds), Rights and
Private Law (Hart Publishing 2014) 342.
103C Webb, ‘Three Concepts of Rights, Two of Property’ (2018) 38(2) OJLS 246, 252.
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look: either way, one could make an argument (albeit not the one advanced here)
that the right to bodily privity only existed because there were a number of specific
Hohfeldian relationships (such as my duty not to kick you, my duty not to drive my
car into you, and so on) that, when taken together, amount to an interest in bodily
privity.
This is the position that McBride adopts (albeit rejecting Hohfeldian language
of ‘claim right’), and it is not accepted. We have already considered earlier in this
chapter (section 1.2) the problem with defining rights as a product of individuated
duties. Yet there are further problems with the reflexive analysis. The first problem
is that a purely reflexive system of rights and duties deprives either of explanatory
force: you have one only because you have the other. As Peter Cane describes the
problem, it deprives the argument
that rights are conceptually basic to tort law of any real bite because
it equally supports the proposition that duties are conceptually basic to
tort law. On the basis of Hohfeldian analysis, it can no more be said
that rights are fundamental to private law than that duties occupy that
place.104
The second problem is that McBride proposes a secondary system of rights that also
lacks explanatory force. McBride distinguishes between coercive rights—which he
regards as ‘fundamental’—and liberty/interest rights, which are ‘secondary’.105 For
McBride, a right such as bodily privity is in the latter category. He argues that ‘we
can only know what liberty/interest rights we enjoy[. . .]once we know what coercive
104P Cane, ‘Rights in Private Law’ in D Nolan and A Robertson (eds), Rights and Private Law
(Hart Publishing 2014) 43.
105N J McBride, ‘Rights and the Basis of Tort Law’ in D Nolan and A Robertson (eds), Rights and
Private Law (Hart Publishing 2014) 344.
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rights we have.’106 Without coercive rights against other people, the interest right
does not exist: it would be ‘a thing written on water.’107
The conclusion follows naturally enough from the taxonomy, and would be con-
vincing if we were willing to accept that all rights are either coercive rights or the
product of coercive rights. It is not clear why we have to accept this. McBride forti-
fies his argument by noting that the freedom of expression (a liberty/interest right)
is nothing more than a product of coercive protections of my freedom of speech.
The example works well enough to demonstrate his taxonomy, but falls into trouble
when presented as a general truth. This is because private interferences in freedom
of expression tend not to be actionable in private law anyway, so it is not particularly
useful to present freedom of expression and bodily privity as taxonomic bed-fellows.
We have law—notably the Human Rights Act 1998 and defamation law—that mean
that interferences by the state or judiciary in freedom of speech require justification
and proportionality, but your shouting over me in a meeting is not ground for a
claim in tort. Contrastingly, interferences in our bodily privity—and, in the case of
intentional torts, even very minor interferences—tend to ground an action in private
law.108
Further, why does it matter that I have a liberty right if that right is merely
derivative? It might be expressive, but expressive of what? The tendency of the law
106ibid.
107ibid.
108To forestall the inevitable criticism, I am not saying that the only reason we can say we have a
right to bodily privity is because the law protects it in specific instances: this would be closer to
McBride’s position. What I am saying is that the frequency with which the law protects bodily
privity is evidence that it is an anterior right, just as the infrequency with which the private law
protects freedom of speech would suggest that it is not (or at least not in the same way). The specific
instances of protection afforded to such rights are evidence of their existence, not the reason for
their existence.
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to recognise certain types of right? This backwards formulation renders it somewhat
pointless. The entire structure of rights lacks direction: unless the liberty right
can guide coercive rights, the emergence of liberty rights is entirely arbitrary—and
so too the coercive right. Citing Stevens’ analysis of the same case, Charlie Webb
identifies this problem in Smith v Bush,109 the outcome of which he noted could be
adequately explained by reference to conclusion rights (which he terms C-rights),
but the conclusion rights themselves lacked rationale.110 He argues that
There are any number of constructions of the form ‘B has a right that
A f’ which the defendants’ conduct infringed: ‘Bush has a right that
Smith take care when producing the survey’, ‘Bush has a right that
Smith take care to ensure that Bush does not end up paying too much
for the house’[. . .] and so on. All of these are fully intelligible and
coherent as statements of C-rights.
Of course, the question for the court was not whether such formula-
tions are possible, but whether it should endorse any of them, whether
it should recognise any of these rights and their corresponding duties.
But this is a question Hohfeld’s scheme cannot answer.111
The mere existence of reflexive rights and duties provides no explanation as to
why those rights and duties exist in the first place. Charlie Webb distinguishes
two concepts of rights: the aforementioned C-rights, on the one hand, and reason
rights or R-rights on the other.112 The R-rights are those rights which provide the
reason for the existence of the duty, and go beyond the simplistic reflexivity of ‘you
109Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831 (HL).
110C Webb, ‘Three Concepts of Rights, Two of Property’ (2018) 38(2) OJLS 246, 257.
111ibid.
112C Webb, ‘Three Concepts of Rights, Two of Property’ (2018) 38(2) OJLS 246, 252.
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have a duty to Y because I have a right that you Y.’ This employs Joseph Raz’s
conception of rights in The Morality of Freedom.113 Raz’s argument is that ‘[a]ny
moral theory which allows for the existence of duties must allow for the existence of
reasons which are not duties.’114 This is the role of the reason right. ‘Right is the
ground of the duty. It is wrong to translate statements of rights into statements of
the corresponding duties.’ 115
Raz explains the existence of duties by relating it to rights—those aspects of your
wellbeing that are of sufficient importance to warrant protection in the form of a duty.
Rights here are justificatory. McBride argues that the language of rights in the Razian
sense is misleading, because these are not strictly enforceable rights.116 Instead,
McBride argues that these are interests giving rise to legal principles. McBride uses
the ECHR as an example of this, and it is actually a very good demonstration of
his argument. In McBride’s taxonomy, these are not rights, sensu stricto, because
their infringement does not, without more, give rise to clear or enforceable duties on
behalf of the states. The language of rights is therefore unnecessarily confusing, so
McBride argues, and would have been better supplemented with ‘vital interest’.117
As will be clear from my comment above, however, we should be slow to jump
to the conclusion that ‘rights’ under the ECHR are the same rights that we are
talking about in tort law (or, at least, not merely by virtue of their inclusion in the
ECHR). Nonetheless, ignoring the ECHR, the problem with this analysis—where
rights are nothing more than justifications for duties—is that it denudes the notion
113J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (OUP 1986).
114J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (OUP 1986) 197.
115J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (OUP 1986) 171.
116N McBride, The Humanity of Private Law: Part I: Explanation (Bloomsbury 2019) ch 2.2.
117ibid.
86 2. THE REMEDIAL RELATIONSHIP
of an ‘infringement’ of any content: that half of the wrong that lies in the infringement
is missing. This structure explains why we have a duty, but does not tell us much
about the point at which the infringement of the right grounds a prima facie claim.
The argument in this thesis, however, is that they are justificatory by virtue of their
being rights, not that they are rights by virtue of being justificatory. The breach
of the right is legally recognised, inasmuch as it causes us to ask who was legally
responsible for the infringement. The legal wrong consists in the breach of the duty
of care and the infringement of the right.
By way of some interim conclusion of these sections, the essence of the articulated
unity lies in identifying both the infringed right and the person (or, indeed, persons)
who can be regarded in some normative sense as the author of that infringement
(recall the discussion of Steel and Honoré in the preceding section). Often the legal
nexus will be unequivocal: we have considered already those instances where my
intentional application of force upon you renders the identification of the doer of
harm fairly straightforward. We do not need to consider matters such as a duty
of care in many torts, because there is a moral particularisation in the definition:
intentional application of unlawful force, for example.
What it means to be the doer of harm in negligence is not always so straightfor-
ward: why are you or your co-defendants normatively relevant in the infringement
of a right when other factors in the chain of causation are not? The duty of care
performs this normative function; through proximity, for example, it allows us to
identify potential pathways to harm between parties prior to the interaction, so al-
lowing us to particularise defendants within a causal chain after the interaction. So
we are asking: how is this defendant legally relevant in the infringement of the right?
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To answer the question, the content of the duty must clearly be more than a reflec-
tion of the right. So the duty of care flows from the right, yet it is not a reflection of
the right: it is grounded by the right (in Raz’s words). The duty does not therefore
create enforceable obligations that go beyond the right—that is not the direction of
travel. The right constrains the duty, but it is not its sole content.
5. The view outwith tort
This section considers aspects of private law remedial relationships beyond tort to
test two principles already mentioned: firstly, that private law acts minimally so as
to correct the infringement of the right; and, secondly, that the law is concerned
with normative evaluation of actions, which, in other areas of private law, finds
its meaning in intent. Our understanding of the relationship between contract and
unjust enrichment, and the remedies available, will be of fundamental importance for
understanding some of the arguments justifying Hedley Byrne liability in the second
part.
What is it that makes tort different from contract or unjust enrichment? It is
all very well saying that contract is a manifestation of consent whereas tort is in
the realm of ‘wrongs’, but in what way are tortious wrongs different from what the
layperson would call wrong (breach of contract, a mistaken payment, etc)? In other
words, what is it that makes a tort qua tort different from a breach of contract,
from an unjust enrichment, or from some other causative event? The answer must
be framed in terms of the parties’ relationship: in contract, one is liable—by virtue
of the voluntary, mutually burdensome promise—either to perform or to make good
non-performance. In unjust enrichment, a party is liable by virtue of their having
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received an enrichment that lacks legal explanation. The legal nexus has been more
difficult to identify in tort, because there is neither a specific contract, nor is liability
established by virtue of a transfer of value.
However, the previous chapter went some way in identifying that legal nexus.
We saw that the focus of tort must be on the infringement of the right if it is to be
logical. Further, we saw that negligence, as an enquiry, is taxonomically different
from asking if those rights may otherwise be recognised in tort. Recognising that we
live in a capricious, chaotic world—where the manifold interactions of humans, and
of humans and nature, will produce consequences that are both entirely unforeseen
and unforeseeable—we must accept that we waive our rights to some extent, that we
cannot claim against a defendant merely because he or she was the last in a fateful
chain of blameless causation. We do not need proactively to act in order to become
subject to the changes and chances of the world, though by volunteering to undertake
an activity we will tacitly waive our right with respect to would-be infringements that
we ought reasonably to foresee as inherent in that activity—assuming that all others
are acting reasonably—and also to those risks and harms that no one could have
foreseen.
This is a proposition based on our understanding of rights and duties, and it
seems to apply well to negligence, but thus far we have not looked extensively at
the other side of the coin—that is to say, at the rights or ‘interests’ recognised
in obligations more generally. Of course, this thesis is directed at an exposition
of negligent misstatement, and thus we need to have an understanding of where
negligent misstatement as an enquiry may sit: is it, as its name would suggest, an
instance of the broader negligence enquiry, to whit an enquiry into how rights may
5. THE VIEW OUTWITH TORT 89
be infringed by a misstatement? Or is negligent misstatement actually an instance
of an altogether different right (such as, perhaps, a right not to be lied to)? The
answer to that question will be developed in the next chapter. But this chapter will
aid our understanding by analysing how intention manifests itself across private law.
It is important for what follows that we appreciate the interaction of intention and
rights generally.
5.1. Minimally corrective remedy.
5.1.1. Contractual expectation. The reason a party would enter into a contract
would be because he or she believed a benefit or, for those of an EAL118 bent, a
‘surplus’ could be realised. This seems uncontroversial; why would you enter into
a contract if you believed ab initio that you were going to be worse-off (or at least
no better-off) as a result? The contract is little more than the mutual promise
of performance between the parties, so where one party does not perform in full,
potentially the benefit cannot be realised in full. Thus, the law regards failure to
hold to a contractual promise as demanding of remedy because one party has been
deprived of an expected benefit or surplus.119 This reasoning is not, I should argue,
based on an economic functionalist reading of contract, or utilitarian principles of
wealth creation, but given that damages based on expectation form the basic measure
of damages in contract—a secondary right behind primary performance, and the only
remedy by right in court—such a proposition seems fair for present purposes.
Of course, the analysis can be refined because, taking this simple argument to
its logical conclusion, we would find ourselves concluding that the law upholds the
118Economic analysis of the law.
119R Halson, ‘The protected contractual interests’ in D Harris, D Campbell and R Halson, Remedies
in Contract and Tort (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2005) 74.
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intended surplus regardless of whether the claimant was ever to realise that surplus
in fact; this cannot be the case. Rather, the law respects the intention of the parties
by ensuring ‘that those whom we induce to rely upon us[. . .]are not left worse-off.’120
This was the logic employed in Robinson v Harman,121 in which it was stated that
the purpose of the contract remedy was ‘to put the aggrieved party in as good a
financial position as that in which he would have been if the contract had been duly
performed.’122 Thus, we can refine Professor Smith’s statement and declare that
the law of contract ensures that those whom we induce to rely upon us are not left
worse-off than they would have been if the contract had been properly performed. This
would therefore include situations where the contract was a losing contract, where
the costs of performance outweighed the expected return from the full performance
of the contract; restricting the language to deprivation of a ‘surplus’ would seem
erroneously to ignore such situations.
Accordingly, this is the first point: the law respects your legitimate, objective
expectation in entering a contract because you have intentionally and voluntarily
burdened yourself to support that expectation. The semantics aside, at fundament
this does not seem a particularly controversial point.
5.1.2. The limits of the legal relationship. It therefore seems axiomatic that the
remedy that ought to be provided is one correcting the lost expectation, i.e. loss-
based damages.123 If you respect a contract because actually you are recognising
120S A Smith, Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract (6th edn, Oxford, Clarendon Press
2005) 2.
121(1848) 1 Exch 850.
122G H Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account (Oxford, Clarendon Press
1988) 82.
123See Attorney General v Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd, third party) [1997] EWCA Civ 3008; [1998] 1
All ER 833, 844c (Lord Woolf MR), and Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd v Panatown Ltd [2001]
1 AC 518; [2000] 3 WLR 946, 987 (Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle).
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that there is a supported expectation, it would be absurd to make good a failed
contract by reference to, say, the defendant’s gain. In respecting the institution
of the contract enough to recognise its breach, the courts must surely respect the
legitimate intentions that created the contract, which cannot be assumed to include
restitution for breach given that the intention was for performance; to do otherwise
would be schizophrenic. This is an important point: it logically follows from the
above analysis that the expectation—whether through performance or loss-based
damages—was the claimant’s by right. What we cannot say is that any benefit
realised by the party in breach would otherwise have rightly inured to the benefit of
the claimant, simply because they weren’t the party in breach.
The force of this logic is ineluctable. The House of Lords tried to avoid it in
AG v Blake124 in order to award restitution for breach of contract (for the claimant’s
losses were completely unquantifiable, and the defendant had profited through the
breach). They did so by attacking it on two fronts. First, they claimed that the
breach (which herein included breach of the Official Secrets Act) was contra bonos
mores. Even though benefiting from a breach that is clearly contra bonos mores but
that has caused no quantifiable loss, such as in City of New Orleans v Fireman’s
Charitable Association,125 appears to be a striking example of injustice,126 it is hard
to see why this necessitates restitution. True, there is a sense in which ‘the ordinary
member of the public would be shocked if the position was that the courts were
powerless to prevent [the defendant] profiting from his[. . .]conduct’,127 but quite why
124Attorney General v Blake and another [2000] UKHL 45.
1259 So 486 (1891). In this case, the party providing fire protection to a city were actually seriously
under-resourced, breaching the terms of the contract, though no complaint was made that this
breach resulted in a failure to extinguish any fires.
126G Jones, ‘The Recovery of Benefits Gained from a Breach of Contract’ (1983) 99 LQR 443, 459.
127AG v Blake [1998] 1 All ER 833, 851 (Lord Woolf MR).
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the law must afford this protection through the laws of contract or restitution is far
from explicable. The motive is not one of protection of a commercial interest, of their
expectation, nor even of a proprietary interest, but rather an entirely punitive one,
and as such should be grasped with the consciousness that it is what it is rather than
shoe-horned into a distortion of private law. To this end, one may have sympathy
with the powerful dissent in Snepp v United States128 that punitive damages, rather
than restitutionary damages, are far preferable if one’s aim is to punish for general
harm caused and to deter similar actions. Question, though, whether the private
law is the appropriate forum for punishment. In any case—and this surely is the
point—it is very hard to see why the claimant should ipso facto be remedied for a
breach contra bonos mores, (especially if, save inasmuch as he is a member of the
shocked public, he has suffered no loss).
The second prong of their Lordships’ attack followed the decision in Wrotham
Park Estate Co v Parkside Homes Ltd,129 in which it was argued that the defen-
dant’s breach of a restrictive covenant had deprived the claimant of the opportunity
to bargain over release of the covenant—to renegotiate—and that the price of release
would have been a 5 per cent share in the defendant’s profits. The court therefore
awarded disgorgement of 5 per cent of the defendant’s profits. This is the ‘hypo-
thetical release’ argument. However, brief consideration of the logic shows this to
be a fallacy. By presuming renegotiation of the contract—and this is undoubtedly
in the claimant’s favour as the discussion wouldn’t be had if the claimant’s losses
were quantifiable and larger than the restitutionary award—the courts are effectively
stating that the claimant would have had a legal right to renegotiate the contract
128444 US 507 (1980) at 523.
129[1974] 1 WLR 798.
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anyway, as if somehow the breach both created and usurped this right. This is a
complete fiction, and it is a fiction that can apparently be brought about simply by
virtue of the fact that the claimant cannot quantify his losses. Of course, as Ian
Jackman points out, Wrotham Park can be explained perfectly simply on the basis
that it wasn’t a pure contract case, because breach of a restrictive covenant consti-
tutes an infringement of a proprietary right: the claim was based on the wrong legal
relationship.130 Still, the reasoning here is our concern and it is clearly inconsistent
with the rationale underlying the law of contract.
And so, passing over Blake as the aberration that it is, we conclude our second
point: the legal relationship between two contracting parties exists because of mutual
obligation and thus expectation, and is therefore limited to that. A remedy that does
not aim to meet that expectation presumes a relationship which did not, in fact, exist.
5.1.3. Preservation of the equitable status quo. There is a crucial caveat, however,
which refines the paradigm: the defendant is only liable for those losses which were a
result of his failure to perform, and not otherwise avoidable losses, hence the award
of damages is not one compensating all losses, but one compensating for a failure to
perform that causes loss.131 The law, in this sense, is acting minimally, i.e., the law
is providing a remedy for a breach (or a wrong, or an unjust enrichment), but it does
not seek to alter the facts that brought about that breach. It may be that prior facts
can and ought to be reinterpreted after a causative event (that is, one giving rise to
rights), but the law, in realising those rights, does not seek to change the basis upon
which those rights arose. For now, it will be sufficient that this point—our third
point—is merely borne in mind; we will return to this later on.
130I M Jackman, ‘Restitution for Wrongs’ (1989) CLJ 302.
131Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] UKHL 2; [1980] AC 827.
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By way of brief summary, then, we have established that the law respects the
intentions and expectations of the parties creating the contract, and that means that
it recognises that the legal relationship is limited by those intentions and expecta-
tions, and interferes only as much as is necessary to preserve the equitable status
quo. To do anything more than the above would be either to presume a fiction or
schizophrenic.
5.2. The value of intent. As an oak cometh of a little spire, so from this simple
proposition—that the law respects the expectations and intentions of the contract-
ing parties—can we make a number of subsequent propositions. The importance
of intention, and specifically of donative intent and contractual will, will become
apparent in the second part. Suffice to say, impairment of will forms the central jus-
tification for Hedley Byrne liability. For now, it is sufficient that the point is broadly
understood.
5.2.1. Restitution and the ineffective contract. The first step is this: if damages
are the only appropriate remedy for breach of contract, then a party seeking resti-
tution will have to base their claim on a causative event other than contract, most
notably (though not exclusively) through unjust enrichment. It is not difficult to
conceive of situations where the restitutionary award would exceed the award in
damages for breach of contract, notably where the claimant would have made a loss
were the contract to have been properly performed, but one must avoid the temp-
tation to suggest that the claimant can simply choose the most beneficial; the legal
relationships and causative events that give rise to each remedy are fundamentally
different, and it is not for the claimant to decide which is applicable. Under the claim
in contract, one’s argument is that a contract is extant and you therefore have to
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make good on the obligations, either in damages or through performance. In order
for the argument in unjust enrichment to work, one has to claim that there is no
contractual obligation at all, and hence the transfer of value lacks legal explanation.
As Friedmann states, recovery cannot be had for ‘benefits conferred in fulfilment of a
valid obligation owed to the recipient’.132 Where a plaintiff has contracted to confer
a benefit on another, he has effectively agreed ‘to forgo his right of restitution from
another’.133 The notion is axiomatic; if one asserts that there remains an obligation,
the ‘recipient’s enrichment is based on a legal right and is not therefore in the legal
sense unjust.’134 The proposition leads inexorably to the conclusion that a claim in
restitution can only succeed if the relevant contract is ineffective.135
5.2.2. Intention and termination. However, this is only half of the story. You
might naturally ask why the claimant seeking restitution, wary of these restrictions,
cannot simply declare the contract to be ineffective. In one sense, he can; where
the defendant has breached the contract sufficiently seriously or fundamentally such
that it amounts to a repudiatory breach, ‘the breaching party will be treated as if
she had intended to repudiate the contract’136 and thus the claimant can accept that
breach. It is a legal fiction, of course, but the presumption seems justifiable. Where
the defendant’s actual performance falls so far short of the required contractual
132D Friedmann, ‘Valid, Voidable, Qualified, and Non-Existing Obligations: An Alternative Per-
spective on the Law of Restitution’ in A S Burrows (ed), Essays on the Law of Restitution (OUP
1993) 247–8.
133R Goff and G Jones, The Law of Restitution (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1998) 48.
134J Beatson, ‘The Temptation of Elegance: Concurrence of Restitutionary and Contactual Claims’
in W Swadling and G Jones, The Search for Principle: Essays in Honour of Lord Goff of Chieveley
(OUP 2000) 149.
135A Burrows, The Law of Restitution (2nd edn, OUP 2002) 320.
136S A Smith, Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract (6th edn, Clarendon Press 2005) 198.
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reciprocation, it may in fact be unreasonable to presume that the defendant did
intend to be bound by the contract.
Notwithstanding, the legal fiction—however justifiable in one sense—is a limited
one. We are here concerned with intention. Treitel’s assertion that this presumption
can include situations where the defendant is unable to render the contractual per-
formance137 is, with respect, specious. Merely denuding the claimant of the benefit of
the contract is clearly not a basis upon which to presume lack of intention.138 Con-
sider, for example, the situation where the defendant has performed to a significant
degree (e.g. in building a ship) but is nevertheless unable to deliver the benefit of
that performance to the claimant (because of, say, insolvency prior to completion).
The presumption, here, would lack any basis.
This distinction is of crucial importance. Whilst a breach may bring a contract
to an end, i.e. contractual termination, in a very real sense the contract is still per-
sisting,139 as the secondary obligations to remedy breach of the primary obligations
subsist.140 But a lack of intention—presumed or otherwise—causes a contract to fail
on a far more fundamental level. It is—in truth as much as effect—akin to stating
that there was no intention to create legal relations, either ab initio or subsequently,
and therefore the contract fails. Here, again, we see that the law is respecting the
status quo; allowing the contract to be rescinded by operation of law simply because
it was impracticable amounts to a fundamental usurpation of the status quo. There
are, of course, also practical reasons to respect it: ‘serious difficulties arise if the law
137G Treitel, The Law of Contract (10th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1999) 977.
138S A Smith, Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract (6th edn, Clarendon Press 2005) 199.
139D Campbell, ‘Self-help’ in D Harris, D Campbell and R Halson (eds), Remedies in Contract and
Tort (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2005) 51.
140Moschi v Lep Air Services [1973] AC 331 (HL).
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seeks to expand the law of restitution to redistribute risks for which provision has
been made under an applicable contract.’141 Indeed, the ‘courts would at a stroke
have accepted the task of regulating the whole business of economic exchange’.142
5.2.3. Intention in unjust enrichment. If this concentration on intention or its
elevation to primacy appears a tendentious reading of the law, consider its application
in the law of unjust enrichment. This is not an arbitrary comparison; both contract
and unjust enrichment are concerned with the transfer of benefit. In many senses,
they are two sides of the same coin, differing by volition.
In the common law approach to unjust enrichment, vitiation of intent has formed
the analytical basis for almost all of the unjust factors, be it mistake of fact or law,
ignorance, undue influence, illegitimate pressure, incapacity, and so on. In all of the
factors, it could be said that the will of the transferor was impaired, either due to a
mistake, ignorance or crippled autonomy, and thus the enrichment was unjust.
To demonstrate the point that intention does, albeit obliquely, form the basis for
the unjust factors, let us consider the common law’s approach to mistake (being, as
it is, the most inclusive of misrepresentation). Over time, tests have been established
to determine whether the mistake was relevant. Historically, the test was narrow,
limiting recognition of the claim to one where there was a mistake of fact, specifically
as to one’s supposed liability, i.e. that the mistake of fact was as to his supposed
legal liability to make the payment and was the cause of that payment. For example,
in Kelly v Solari,143 an insurance company paid out on the mistaken belief that all of
141Pan Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Creditcorp Ltd (The Trident Beauty) [1994] 1 All ER 470; [1994]
1 Lloyd’s Rep 365; [1994] 1 WLR 161, 166 (Goff LJ).
142P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Clarendon 1985) 47.
143(1841) 152 ER 24.
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the premium payments were current. When they subsequently discovered that this
was not the case, they were allowed to recover the money.
However, the mistake must also have caused the payment to be made (Holt v
Markham144). In this case, at the end of World War One, certain categories of officer
were entitled to money, and this officer had been paid under the mistaken belief that
he was in the relevant category when he was not. The court held that, whilst there
had been a mistake, the payment would have been made anyway. Legally speaking,
this transfer was a gift; it was given without care as to whether they were liable
to pay, so was perhaps less gracious than a gift intended as such, but it was a gift
nonetheless. A sort of reckless gift.
It was eventually seen that ‘supposed liability’ was too narrow a test, and so
began a long period of expansion through the courts. Slowly, a number of exceptions
to the supposed liability test were established:
(a) the claimant was under a mistaken belief that he was legally liable to a third
party as opposed to the defendant (RE Jones v Waring & Gillow Ltd145);
(b) the claimant was under the mistaken belief that he was morally liable to the
defendant (Larner v LCC146);
(c) mistake of identity (Morgan v Ashcroft147); or
(d) the mistake was fundamental (Norwich Union v Wm H Price Ltd148).
In this case, the insurance company paid on the basis that they thought the loss
event was an insured event, when it was not. Lord Wright suggested that mistake
144[1923] 1 KB 504.
145[1926] AC 670.
146[1949] 2 KB 683.
147[1938] 1 KB 49.
148[1934] AC 455.
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has nothing to do with supposed liability, but rather if the mistake was fundamental
to the transaction.
It is important to recall that these are exceptions to the supposed liability test;
supposed liability was still the main test. Yet, a few years later, everything changed
again: in Barclays Bank Ltd v WJ Simms Ltd,149 Goff J considered the test for
mistake was a causal one. The starting point was whether the mistake caused the
payment, i.e. but for the mistake, you wouldn’t have made the payment. As with
the other test, though, there were exceptions: (i) where the payer intended that the
payee should have the money in all events; (ii) where the payment was for good
consideration, and, (iii) as suggested in Brennan v Bolt Bros,150 where the mistake
was one of law, it had to be fundamental.
However, the problem with the unjust factors approach is that, despite the fact
that each test and every exception thereto concerned vitiated intent, it has not in
any sense made intent itself the test. In Kelly v Solari,151 Birks’ core case in unjust
enrichment, Parke B noted ‘[if money] is paid under the impression of a fact which is
untrue, it may, generally speaking, be recovered back[. . .]. In such a case, the receiver
was neither entitled to have it, nor intended to have it’.152 This is a statement which
leaves us uncertain as to whether entitlement or intent has primacy. As a result of
this confusion, the common law has restricted itself to these unjust factors, and thus
failed adequately to identify vitiated intent as the unifying factor which itself made
the enrichment unjust.
149[1980] QB 667, 695.
150[2005] QB 303. See also Nurdin & Peacock plc v D B Ramsden & Co Ltd [1999] 1 WLR 1249.
151(1841) 152 ER 24.
152(1841) 152 ER 24, 27.
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The civil law approach, favoured by the late Professor Birks, concerns enrichment
sine causa, or enrichment without basis. Any enrichment, so the argument runs,
must have an explanatory basis known to the law, be it discharging a contractual
obligation, satisfying a debt, making a gift, etc. The number of explanations known
to the law is finite: ‘an enrichment which turns out to have no such explanation is
inexplicable and cannot be retained.’153 This is a more elegant approach than the
common law’s approach, not least because it immediately speaks to the philosophical
foundations of the law of unjust enrichment.
The trenchant observer may at this point note that the sine causa approach does
not actually meet the criticism of the common law approach, i.e. that it failed to
unify under the banner of vitiated intent. Prima facie, this is correct: legal expli-
cability would appear to have nothing to say about the value of intent. However,
as Birks has rightly argued, the bond with intent is actually far stronger. The un-
derlying assumption ‘is that if the claimant consciously made a transfer he must
have intended the enrichment to have one of the finite number of explanatory out-
comes. If he intended none of them, he cannot have intended the enrichment.’154
Similarly, if he did intend the enrichment to have one of the explanatory outcomes,
the enrichment was dependent on that basis following, i.e. every transfer is made
with qualified intent, ‘conditional on the achievement of one of the explanatory out-
comes.’155 Viewed in this way, we can see more clearly the bond between intention




and basis: if I pay money to you under an obligation, and there is in fact no obli-
gation, then the condition for my intention has failed and your enrichment is thus
unjust.
The second criticism may be that advocating the civil law’s approach to unjust
enrichment does little to help unify our own law. Hopefully it will be seen that this
criticism is without basis: the purpose of this section has been to show that they
are, in fact, one-in-the-same approach, but the Birksian approach has successfully
identified the factor that unifies the many tests in the common law.
Therefore, in both approaches to unjust enrichment, support for the transfer or
for its restitution hangs on the very question of intent. This is surely the point:
to argue that intent is only relevant when the condition of a transfer fails—but in
an otherwise persisting contract is irrelevant—is clearly absurd. Put another way,
intention, if it is to have primacy in the law of unjust enrichment, must logically
have primacy in the law of contract.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to explain the remedial relationship, to demonstrate
that the remedy finds its justification and its limit in the right that it serves to dignify.
This is true both in negligence and in private law more generally. Negligence poses
an especial problem in determining the defendant because, unlike the contractual
counter-party or the recipient of an unjust gain, the nexus is more diffuse: as has
been shown, the defendant must have been not only a cause of the infringement
of right, but there must be a further reason why he or she is to be regarded as a
relevant cause for the purposes of providing a remedy for that infringement. Indeed,
102 2. THE REMEDIAL RELATIONSHIP
duty cannot only mean the obligation not to infringe the right—it is more than
the analytic reflex. The focus of our inquiry also shifted towards waiver of right,
i.e. whether the claimant has waived his right with regard to specific action. It is
almost true by definition that the claimant would not waive his right with regard to
actions that were not reasonable (and therefore not foreseeable). Given the primacy
of right, however, we must recognise the agent’s own ability to limit their rights.
Lastly, we considered the importance of intention and donative intent in private law,
the relevance of which will become evident in the next part, for it will form much of






One of the core undertakings in negligent misstatement theory—ifwe suppose that the legal relationship in a claim in negligence constitutesan infringement of a right, on the one part—is to define exactly what rights
we are infringing when we make a negligent misstatement. It will be recalled from
the previous part that a duty per se creates no corresponding right to damages on the
part of the claimant, and its breach is not a rights-generating event in remedial terms
but instead the reason to regard the defendant as causally relevant in the infringement
of the claimant’s right; ‘damage is the gist of negligence[. . .]it can never be enough
to show that the defendant has been negligent.’1Further, the remedy afforded by an
action in private law is, in effect (albeit not strictly a vindicatio), the vindication of
a right, whereby ‘the remedy is merely the continuation of the right; together they
make up a single unbroken juridical sequence.’2 Identifying the infringed right is
thus vital if the remedy is to have any justification; it is the explanatory force. The
wrong, on the other hand, completes the legal nexus between the parties, providing
justification for why it is—why it must be—the defendant who is liable to provide
the remedy; among the manifold causes of an event, which include the defendant’s
act, the wrongness of that act allows us to identify the defendant as being the legal
cause. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to consider the first limb, viz. the
1Gregg v Scott [2005] 2 AC 176, 231–232(HL) (Baroness Hale).
2E Weinrib, Corrective Justice (OUP 2012) 84.
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infringement of right. The elements constituting the wrong will be considered in
more detail in the next.
This chapter will not consider every right that may possibly be infringed by a
misstatement. Though many of these will, of course, be considered through this
part, the purpose of this chapter is to consider this question more generally—that is
to say, where it is in the taxonomy of private law that negligent misstatement sits,
and the questions of liability to which it may be directed. Thus, we are not—for
the moment at least—considering the substantive nature of negligent misstatement,
beyond considering the way in which a negligent misstatement may infringe a right,
and whether those rights are unique to negligent misstatement or find their substance
elsewhere. In order to do this, it will be necessary to turn our attention to certain
questions. The first is to consider whether negligent misstatement actually protects
rights unique unto itself—is it, for example, taxonomically akin to defamation (which
protects reputation)—and, if not, how then it can be used to vindicate certain rights.
Although the first proposition—that the misstatement per se constitutes an in-
fringement of a right, that we are possessed of a right not to be misled, or to make
informed choices—may have intuitive appeal, the argument presented in this chapter
is that such a proposition has little basis in law. It will consider the putative ‘right’ to
be informed in relation to Chester v Afshar 3 and ABC v St George’s Healthcare NHS
Trust & Ors,4 which will demonstrate the difficulties in assuming that the breach of
a notional duty to inform exists in some reflexive relationship with a right to be in-
formed. Having dispatched with the notion that negligent misstatement protects but
3[2004] UKHL 41.
4[2017] EWCA Civ 336.
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one individuated right, the argument proceeds on the basis that negligent misstate-
ment, as with negligence, must somehow sit apart from the rights it protects, that the
misleading nature of the statement only infringes our right indirectly by causing some
other harm, that other harm being the manifestation of the infringement. In doing
so, we shall consider its relationship with defamation as an exemplar—by reference
to Spring v Guardian Assurance—and briefly counter the notion that permitting
claims for pure economic loss may somehow corrupt a rights-oriented thesis.
1. A right to accurate information?
1.1. Chester v Afshar . There can be few fields of endeavour that would seem
to lend themselves more to the suggestion that one has a right to accurate information
than the field of surgery, not least because of the acute potential for even non-
negligently caused harm, and because of the extreme informational imbalance. Thus,
if there exists a right to accurate information at all, this is surely where it is to be
found. The notion, unfortunately, has some judicial pedigree, and cases normally
involve a patient who has not been informed of unavoidable risks attendant to surgery
and, concomitantly (so the argument goes), has effectively been deprived of her ‘right’
to choose.
Under the normal analysis, if:
(a) I fail to warn you of an objectively abstruse, non-trivial risk inherent in
surgery;
(b) you would not have consented to surgery had you been so aware;
(c) in ignorance of that same risk you choose to undergo the surgery; and
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(d) that inherent risk materialises,5
then it is fair to conclude that, but-for your failure to warn, I would not have suffered
the now extant harm.
This was the case in Chester v Afshar.6 The defendant, Fari Afshar, was a
neurosurgeon to whom the claimant, Carole Chester, had been referred. On the
advice of the defendant, the claimant agreed to undergo an operation in order to
alleviate her back pain. Even if expertly performed, there was an innate risk (found
to be c.1p.c. - 2p.c.) that the operation could effect serious adverse consequences (in
this case, cauda equina syndrome, leading to paralysis), and that risk materialised.
The trial judge found that the defendant had failed to warn Miss Chester of the risk,
and that Miss Chester would not have undergone the operation had she been warned
of this risk. Both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords were satisfied (indeed,
such didn’t seem to be in question) that, by failing to warn the claimant of the risk,
Mr Afshar was in breach of his common law duty of care.7 The problem was one
of causation: Miss Chester could not show that, on the balance of probability, she
would not have undergone surgery at a later date (only that, had she been warned,
she would have postponed judgement pending further advice). The question before
the House was, therefore:
‘whether it was sufficient for Miss Chester to prove that, if properly
warned, she would not have consented to the operation which was in fact
5It is actually not at all clear that the law ought to require the failure to warn and the injury to be
united in the same risk. On the one hand, a patient’s claim that they would not have succumbed
to injury X had they been warned of risk Y may be defeated on the basis that they nonetheless
consented to X, but it is similarly tempting to conclude that their consent to the operation was
vitiated by the failure to warn; to what extent is the consent divisible?
6[2004] UKHL 41.
7See, for example, Chester at [48]–[58] (Lord Hope of Craighead). See also Sidaway v Bethlem Royal
Hospital Governors [1985] 1 All ER 643; [1985] AC 871.
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performed and which resulted in the injury, or whether it was necessary
for her to prove also that she would never have had that operation.’8
Their Lordships seemed broadly to agree that orthodox principles of causation would
require the claimant to show that the wrong had increased the risk of injury—that
‘to expose someone to a risk to which that person is exposed anyhow is not to cause
anything’9—but the majority considered that the orthodox principles would leave
‘an honest claimant finding herself without a remedy in circumstances where the
surgeon had failed his professional duty’10, and that, therefore, Miss Chester’s ‘right
of autonomy and dignity can and ought to be vindicated by a narrow and modest
departure from traditional causation principles.’11
Whether their Lordships were correct in departing from the established principles
of causation is, for our purposes at least, inconsequential.12 The interesting question
is whether they needed to debate the issue of causation at all. The analysis was
doomed ab initio because it was assumed that the locus of liability was to be found
in the breach of the duty, a wrong that did not contribute (on normal principles of
causation) to the harm suffered. But what if the locus of liability was to be found
in breach of right? Here, we return to the question posed at the beginning: is that
right a right not to be misled (generally speaking), or a right that is only indirectly
infringed by the misstatement?
8[2004] UKHL 41 at [40] (Lord Hope of Craighead).
9ibid [81] (Lord Hope of Craighead).
10ibid [101] (Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe).
11ibid [24] (Lord Steyn).
12For discussion of the causation issue, see, for example, R Stevens, Torts amd Rights (OUP 2007),
contra J Stapleton ‘Occam’s Razor Reveals an Orthodox Basis for Chester v Afshar’ (2006) 122
LQR 26.
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Their Lordships spoke at some length about the patient’s right to be informed;
this is why the former analysis seems intuitively appealing. Convention weighed
heavy on their thoughts, praxis demanding that such a right be protected through the
recognition of a corresponding duty. Without recognising a duty—so the argument
goes—there can be no legal recourse. We have already discussed at length why the
recognition of the duty is, in a sense, logically subsequent to the recognition of a right;
an unwaived right can be infringed in a practical sense, and this generates a legal
wrong where there was a corresponding breach of duty that caused the infringement.
But the influence of duty-based thought had an impact beyond the recognition of
a duty to protect the right to be informed: the right to be informed is itself the
manifestation of a duty, for such a right is, in effect, affirming no more than my
ability to determine for myself the extent to which I shall waive my rights (the
‘right’ to self-determination). Consider this:
(a) I have various rights, and various types of rights (a proprietary right being
different from, say, the right to bodily integrity);
(b) I am able to waive these rights or limit these rights or, in certain cases,
dispose of these rights by various legally-recognised means;13
(c) I am possessed of the right to bodily integrity;
(d) therefore I am entitled to waive my rights to bodily integrity through legally-
recognised means.
The analysis is coarsely simplistic, perhaps, though at fundament it is nonetheless
true. Now, if I am entitled to waive or uphold my right to bodily integrity—either
my body is inviolable or I am to define in what manner it is violable—then the law
13I am going to avoid discussion of the right to life for these purposes, though that is the only
exception.
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must recognise the autonomy of the self in determining the extent of the waiver.
There could be no sense in which it were my right if it were to be waived at the
whim of another. Put at its most basic, I have to be regarded as having waived
the right myself (even if this is a mixed subjective-objective test), and I cannot be
seen to have waived a right in respect of risks of which I was reasonably and entirely
unaware.
It does not logically follow, however, that I must have a right to be made aware of
those risks. One needn’t deny that such a right could exist, were the state to wish it,
but the effect of such a right would be markedly different from the law that currently
exists. What we are saying, then, is that the burden of notice falls on doctors to
inform us of risks in surgery (or on councils to warn us of high-voltage substations,
or on building contractors to warn us of building works, etc), because, if they don’t,
and those risks were not otherwise reasonably ascertainable, then we cannot be said
to have waived our rights with respect to infringement contingent on those risks.
This conclusion—that the law does not protect some broad right to information
(and, by extension, a general right not to be misled)—means that Chester was cor-
rectly decided, but for the wrong reasons. So long as the risk (i) was not reasonably
foreseeable to Miss Chester; (ii) was one of which the doctor was under a duty to
warn Miss Chester;14 and (iii) did in fact materialise; then Miss Chester could not
be seen to have waived her right to injuries contingent on the development of that
risk and the doctor would be liable to compensate for that violation.
14There may conceivably be instances where the doctor was not under a duty to warn of spe-
cific risks, on the basis of the patient’s best interests—the therapeutic privilege defence, most
recently contemplated in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11—but this is the
defendant-focussed notion of duty, as against the claimant-focussed question of right.
112 3. DELINEATING NEGLIGENT MISSTATEMENT
The interesting converse of this conclusion, however, is that the development of
an altogether unrelated risk would render the claim void. It would not be enough
for Miss Chester to argue that a risk materialised of which she had been warned, but
that she would not have had the operation at all had she been warned of a different
risk that did not, in fact, materialise. The reason for this is that she had waived her
rights with respect to the risk that caused her loss, and, although she had not waived
her right with respect to the unknown risk, that unknown risk did not manifest itself
as an infringement of her right. We saw similar reasoning in the recent Australian
case of Wallace v Kam.15 The question before the court was: if a doctor fails to
inform a patient about two material risks inherent in an operation, is the patient
entitled to compensation if harmed by the materialisation of the risk to which she
would have consented, on the basis that she wouldn’t have consented to the operation
at all had she been informed of the other risk? The High Court of Australia divided
the omissions into two negligent acts, thus concluding that causation could not be
established (because, on the one hand, the patient would have consented to harm,
and on the other, because the risk didn’t materialise).
It is tempting, on the face of it, to frame this alternatively as a more general
vitiation of consent to the operation: the decision to waive her rights with respect to
risk A was vitiated on the basis of insufficient information regarding risk B (i.e. con-
sent is general rather than divisible). However, this reasoning becomes problematic.
There are many factors that may influence our decision-making process, and we may
be unaware of many factors that may render our consent defective in a theoretical
sense, but that should not mean that our consent is vitiated in a legal sense. If I buy
15[2013] HCA 19.
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a bunch of bananas unaware that there is a very real risk that they might contain a
nest of Brazilian wandering spiders—albeit that, in fact, they do not—then it is of
no benefit to any attempts to return the bananas to argue (genuinely) that I would
never have bought them had I been so aware. I can’t return a perfectly acceptable
bunch of bananas that conform entirely with what I had wanted simply because, at
the time that I bought them, I was unaware of the risk that they might not. To put
it another way, I didn’t wish to assume the risk of death, I didn’t knowingly assume
the risk of death, and I am not now in actuality at risk of death.
Even if the shop assistant knew of the risk and negligently failed to warn me,
it is still not clear exactly what right has been infringed given that I have the very
thing I wanted. The case of Bacciottini & Anor v Gotelee & Goldsmith (a firm)16
is illustrative in this respect. The appellants sought to buy a house and so engaged
the services of the respondent firm of solicitors. The solicitors negligently failed
to advise Mr Bacciottini of a planning restriction over the property. Unaware of
the restriction, the appellants purchased the property for £600,000. The following
year, the planning restriction was discovered, and the appellants thus applied to
lift the restriction. The application was granted. The appellants claimed £100,000
to reflect the diminution value (the value paid less the price they would have paid
for the property had they known of the restriction). The argument was that, the
application to lift the planning restriction having been granted, the appellants failed
to realise a capital gain that would otherwise have been made.
In his judgment on the case, Davis LJ cited17 with approval the principle es-
tablished in British Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co Ltd v Underground
16[2016] EWCA Civ 170.
17ibid [60].
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Electric Railways Co of London Ltd18 that, where loss was in fact avoided or miti-
gated, a plaintiff cannot recover for the loss thereby avoided or mitigated. Of course,
such a position sits neatly with our discussion above: it is perhaps easy to argue
that, in hindsight, the consent was vitiated in the sense that it was predicated on a
false statement, but it doesn’t alter the fact that there was no loss in actuality. They
wanted a house absent the relevant planning restriction and that is exactly what
they have. The putative loss, being entirely counterfactual, cannot be regarded as
something over which they had any right.
Importantly, what we have seen is that there is no claim simply on the basis of
misleading or missing information; harm to a specific right is required.
1.2. ABC v St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust & Ors. The general sub-
mission that there is no right to information appeared to receive something of a
body-blow in May 2017 in ABC v St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust & Ors.19 Irwin
LJ allowed an appeal by the appellant that, despite not being in the care of the
respondent NHS Trusts, she was entitled to be informed of the risk that she had
inherited Huntington’s Disease.
The facts, in brief, are these.20 In 2007, the appellant’s father had shot and killed
his wife—the appellant’s mother—and was convicted of manslaughter on the grounds
of diminished responsibility. He was sentenced to a hospital order and a restriction
order under ss37 and 41 of the Mental Health Act 1983 and was, at various times
and for various reasons, under the care of the respondent Trusts.
18[1912] AC 673.
19[2017] EWCA Civ 336.
20ibid [4]–[14] (Irwin LJ).
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By early 2009, the respondents suspected that the father was suffering from Hunt-
ington’s Disease—an incurable, progressive, and fatal disease. This was confirmed
in mid-2009. The chance of inheriting the disease is 50 per cent, thus there was a
risk that the appellant had inherited the disease. The father refused to consent to
the information of his condition being passed to appellant.
The appellant became pregnant and, in 2010, gave birth to a daughter. Later that
year, despite the father’s refusal of consent, the appellant was accidentally informed
of her father’s condition. She underwent testing, and was later confirmed to be
suffering from Huntington’s Disease.
Of course, the appellant had already inherited Huntington’s Disease, and this sit-
uation would not have been altered by the provision of information. Her contention,
however, is that she would not have chosen to have a child had she been aware: she
was a single parent, and would not have wanted to raise a child as a terminally ill
single parent, nor risk passing on a fatal disease to a child. It was accepted that she
would have terminated the pregnancy had her diagnosis been confirmed.21 The ques-
tion before the court was therefore whether the appellant had a right to be informed
and, apparently synonymously, whether the respondents had breached their duty of
care to the appellant. The question over the existence of the right was conflated with
the question of the existence of a duty of care.
21ibid [15] (Irwin LJ). There did not seem to be a question as to whether this works as a matter
of causation: assuming the appellant gave birth at full term, the time limit for termination would
have been c.Dec 2009; the earliest she could have been told of the risk would have been when her
father was told of the risk, being ‘early’ 2009, so less than one year. In the event, it was nearly
two and a half years in between the appellant being informed of the risk (now higher, because her
father’s diagnosis had now been confirmed) and her diagnosis being confirmed. Question, then,
whether the birth would have occured anyway despite timely information of risk. Regardless, this
is of lesser relevance for our purposes.
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It is perhaps not difficult to see how the court conflated the concepts: if one
recognises a positive duty or obligation to inform, then this creates a reflexive right.
The same is true of the alternative formulation: if you can demonstrate a right to
be informed, then it is no great leap of logic to expect positive performance from
those with the information. The problem with this reasoning is that, absent the
birth, there would have been no harm and thus no claim; had the appellant simply
been unaware of her disease—even if the doctors had been aware that there was a
chance she had inherited the disease—she would not have been able to identify harm
flowing from an infringed right. The infringed right inherent in the wrongful birth
claim is not simply that the parent was denied the opportunity to make an informed
choice about whether to conceive, but, further, that there was actually a birth. This
is essentially birth predicated on vitiated consent, and thus the birth is wrongful;
vitiated consent simpliciter is not a stand-alone claim.
It is equally problematic to cast the right as a reflex of some duty to inform: the
obligation of the respondents to patient confidentiality has to be balanced against
any putative obligation to inform, and thus it would be a strange right indeed that
existed only when circumstances were such as to allow a more general obligation to
confidentiality to be rebutted.
Nonetheless, given that there was a birth—and thus we accept the harm element—
the doctors would have been under no general duty to assist. It is important to recall
that they were not the appellant’s doctors, and thus this would appear to be an omis-
sion or failure to rescue. Whilst we may have some moral qualms about the omission
(though, given their positive duty of confidentiality, this is hardly black-and-white),
UK law has made clear that there is no positive duty to rescue ‘simply because one
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party is a doctor and the other has a medical problem which may be of interest to
both.’22 It is necessary that the defendant’s positive actions in such cases have some
negative impact on the claimant, such as causing the claimant to apprehend that help
would be forthcoming such that the claimant ceases to take mitigating action,23 or
where ‘the defendant’s conduct had excluded others from having the opportunity to
assist the plaintiff.’24 Under normal common law principles, then, it is not clear that
the doctor comes under a duty to inform even absent a prior duty of confidentiality.
This must cause us to question why the parties in ABC v St George’s accepted
that proximity under the Caparo v Dickman25 tripartite test would be made out.
The law, in the UK at least, has hitherto been at pains to note that proximity is not
made out.26 Although White v Jones27 was not considered by the Court of Appeal
in this case, it is tempting to conclude that the proximity concession was, in part, a
product of White v Jones reasoning rather than rescuer reasoning.
In White v Jones, it was held that a solicitor owed a duty of care to the intended
beneficiaries of a will in respect of economic loss they suffered as a result of the
solicitor’s failure to carry out the testator’s instructions. Normally, the solicitor
would not have owed such duties to third parties, but the majority held that the
assumption of responsibility principle in Hedley Byrne28 could be extended to those
22Capital & Counties plc v Hampshire County Council [1997] EWCA Civ 3091 [50], [1997] QB 1004,
1035 (Stuart-Smith LJ).
23Kent v Griffiths [2001] 1 QB 36; Densmore v City of Whitehorse (Supreme Court of the Yukon
Territory, 10 July 1986).
24A Robertson and J Wang, ‘The Assumption of Responsibility’ in K Barker, R Grantham and W
Swain (eds) The Law of Misstatements: 50 Years on from Hedley Byrne v Heller (Oxford, Hart
Publishing 2015) 70.
25[1992] AC 605 (HL).
26Robertson and Wang (n 24) 71.
27[1995] UKHL 5, [1995] 2 AC 207.
28Hedley Byrne & Co v Heller & Partners [1964] AC 465 (HL). Not that this author accepts such
a principle is to be found in Hedley Byrne.
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beneficiaries whom the solicitor may reasonably foresee would be affected by his
negligence.29 The problem with such reasoning, as noted in earlier chapters, is that
it makes entirely possible the decision in Dean v Allin & Watts,30 which extended the
duty of care of a firm of solicitors to cover the economic losses of the opposing party
of their client ‘in what ostensibly was an arm’s length business transaction.’31 The
solicitor thus owed a duty not only to his client, but also to a party whose interests
were, as Christian Witting notes, ‘irreconcilably in conflict.’32
If the court had wished, as it claimed, ‘to do practical justice’,33 then the more
elegant solution would almost certainly have been to do practical justice rather than
significantly to expand tortious liability. The problem with the reasoning is that the
facts which the House of Lords assumed madeWhite unique—the fact that the rights-
holder had suffered no loss whereas the losing party had no rights—are nothing of the
sort. We see this problem regularly. As Robert Stevens argues, Caparo v Dickman34
is just such a case:
[. . .]the parties who will suffer loss as a result of a carelessly prepared
auditors’ report prepared on behalf of a company will generally be third
party investors who rely upon it as accurate. The company itself will
usually suffer no loss at all, as it will not invest in itself on the basis of
the report.35
And this is the crucial point:
29White v Jones (n 27) 268 (Lord Goff of Chieveley).
30[2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 249 (CA).
31C Witting, Liability for Negligent Misstatements (OUP 2004) 11.18.
32ibid.
33White v Jones (n 27) 259.
34ibid (n 25).
35R Stevens, Torts and Rights (OUP 2007) 179.
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That the rights-holder suffers no loss whilst a third party does is not a
sufficient reason for giving a third party a claim.36
Stevens thus argues that, rather than employing over-reaching theory, it would have
been better to recognise simply that this was the only remaining vindication of the
testator’s contractual right that would achieve the ‘next-best position to the wrong
not having been committed in the first place.’37 The peculiarity of White was thus
not the disunion of right and loss: it was of pivotal relevance that the testator had
died.
That the right flows from contract and not from extension of tortious liability is
evident when we consider the effect of disclaimer. Let us assume that, in the contract,
the solicitor had somehow disclaimed all liability and that the clause was effective:
the testator would have no claim. It is bizarre to entertain the notion that the death
of the testator could give rise to a third party claim in tort that would have been
unavailable to the testator in life. The existence or otherwise of the third parties’
claim is predicated on and limited by the original contract. Stevens makes a similar
argument in respect of Cancer Research Campaign v Ernest Brown.38 The claimants
(legatee charities) alleged that the defendant firm of solicitors had negligently failed
to advise the testator with respect to the mitigation of inheritance tax liabilities.
The claim failed because the defendant solicitors were not engaged to advise on IHT;
they were simply retained to ensure the bequest. Thus it is evident, Stevens notes,
that ‘the solicitor’s liability to the beneficiary goes no further than the right the




39Stevens (n 35) 180.
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It is thus very difficult to regard ABC v St George’s as anything other than
a significant expansion of liability in the realm of statements, further entrenching
the very problematic rendering of White v Jones as a case generating liability for
foreseeable harm. However, because the issue of proximity was not even considered
judicially, it is questionable how persuasive this decision will be in anything but
similar-fact cases.
What this section has demonstrated is the conceptual problems with basing lia-
bility for misstatements on some right to be informed. Rather, misstatement liability
reflects the general negligence liability described in the first part: the recognition of
rights and the duty to inform are two discrete questions, and not reflexive. This is
an important taxonomic point, one that begins to make clear the role of negligent
misstatement. One must bear it in mind, because later discussion on matters such
as advice from third parties may tempt the unwary into thinking that negligent mis-
statement exists purely to preserve a ‘right’ to accurate information; this is not the
case.
2. Different taxonomic plains: negligent infringement of a right
What we are beginning to see, then, is that specific protected rights and negligent
misstatement are perhaps not taxonomic bedfellows (to reiterate the point that is
being developed throughout this chapter: negligent misstatement does not ipso facto
concern itself with the infringement of any particular right, whereas defamation,
say, arguably does). The relationship between negligent misstatement and a specific
right was discussed at length by the House of Lords in Spring v Guardian Assurance
plc.40 The main issue in the appeal concerned the relationship between negligent
40[1995] 2 AC 296 (HL).
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misstatement and defamation: the claimant was unable to claim in defamation owing
to a defence of qualified privilege, so the matter in appeal was whether the claim
could be brought under the rules pertaining to negligent misstatement (thus avoiding
the qualified privilege obstacle), a claim that can be founded on similar means to
defamation (an untruth that causes ‘loss’, in the broadest sense). This case, and its
specific concern with defamation rather than other instances of protected right, is
particularly useful for our purposes, because it is important therefore to ask: if it
smells like negligent misstatement and tastes like negligent misstatement, on what
basis could it be viewed as being different? Some may disagree that defamation is
assimilable to a particular right but, regardless, it should at least be evident that
defamation is doing something different—taxonomically speaking—from negligent
misstatement. The juxtaposition in the following subsections will make clearer the
role of negligent misstatement.
2.1. Defamation as a creature of right. Before analysing the case in detail,
it is worth considering the taxonomic nature of defamation. The wary may, at this
point, note that defamation is not an instance of a ‘right’ as such, and superficially
they would be correct. However, and even despite the recent change in the law,41 the
legal nexus between claimant and defendant is relatively clear from the name itself
(which cannot be said for all tortious claims). From the Latin verb diffamare—‘to
spread evil report’—defamation is clearly a defendant-centric noun, though crucially
it is one that makes manifest the right that is being infringed: that is to say, the
‘evil report’ implies a subject, for one cannot spread evil report about a nothing.
The report must have subject matter if it is to have meaning. That the right is
41Defamation Act 2013.
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made manifest is not a universal feature of torts, and is the author of their downfall.
Defamation, however, is a description that clearly links the doer and the sufferer of
harm. Just to make the point clear, were it not already, ‘negligence’, by comparison,
does not, in and of itself, make this link clear. All negligence suggests—even under
accepted law—is that the relevant party has fallen below a standard of care.
The view that defamation is an instance of right has rather more to recommend
it than mere linguistic accuracy: under the old common law, it was defined as ‘the
publication of a statement which reflects on a person’s reputation and tends to lower
him in the estimation of right-thinking members of society[. . .]’;42 the law itself there-
fore makes general reference to a right infringed (their reputation) and to the act
infringing the right (the imputation), and thus mirrors the Weinribian view that the
claimant and defendant are united as doer and sufferer of the same harm.
But what, in actuality, is that right? Is it as simple as a right to reputation?
Professor Stevens argues that it is, and that your right to your reputation is ‘good
against the rest of the world and is also [as with bodily safety] acquired at birth.’43
What Stevens presents is a conception of the right to reputation that is somehow
discrete from the subject matter of that reputation (that is to say, we all have
different reputations, and those reputations ‘can be acquired, and lost, throughout
our lives’,44 but that difference does not suggest our rights themselves differ). This
conception does beg a fundamental question, however: if our reputation can be good
or bad, acquired and lost, then in what sense can our right to it be infringed? The
only possible answer, if the subject matter of the reputation is not in issue, would be
42W V H Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (18th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 570.
43R Stevens, Torts and Rights (OUP 2007) 8.
44ibid.
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that you could try to deprive me of my right to have any reputation at all (just as
my bodily privity is either infringed or it is not), but it is very hard to see how this
could manifest itself in reality (or in what sense it has any bearing on defamation).
Even Stevens concedes that ‘it is probably impossible to have no reputation at all.’45
The subject matter, then, rather than being separate from the right, must lie at the
heart of it; reputation is not as tangible as, say, bodily integrity, because it only exists
in the context of a society, and is not attendant to an individual’s mere existence.
Put another way, we cannot own a specific reputation that is somehow distinct from
one as perceived by another. Therefore, to say that we have a right to a particular
reputation, as if that reputation were our property to choose, alter, or dispose of as
we saw fit, would appear to be invoking a fiction (though, of course, in keeping with
the waiver thesis, one would obviously be at liberty to alter their right as they see
fit). As Allan Beever notes, ‘[t]he wrong A does to B is not changing C’s opinion
of B simpliciter. B has no right to that whatsoever.’46 This may seem odd, as the
reputation is undoubtedly ‘ours’ in the loose sense, but this is what we must conclude.
Indeed, when one considers the societal function of reputations, this conclusion is
actually obvious: a corrupt politician is no more able to exercise complete control
over their negative reputation—no matter how much they may want to—than a good
samaritan is able humbly to negate their good reputation.
Thus, we are presented with what appears to be a dilemma: it makes no sense
to conceive of the right to reputation devoid of subject matter, but we also cannot
say that we have a right to a reputation of particular subject matter. Is the subject
matter then arbitrary? Clearly not, for defamation would make no sense, and the
45ibid.
46A Beever, ‘What Does Tort Law Protect?’ (2015) 27 SAcLJ 626 [10].
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right would be pointless, if all the right entailed was the right to a reputation, the
subject matter of which was entirely random. So then, what we want to say is that
we have a right to a reputation that is at least accurate or at least within our control.
Our control of our reputations is limited to what we do in fact, such that the corrupt
politician can avoid a negative reputation by avoiding the negative act. My right is
therefore infringed when these actions47 are misrepresented.
Perhaps, then, as Allan Beever submits, the right lies not in the reputation itself
but in the ‘control’ of that reputation.
[. . .]the wrong involved in defamation is not damaging reputation per se,
but gaining a kind of control over an important area of the plaintiff’s
life (or causing the plaintiff to lose control over that area of her life) by
getting third parties to think ill of that person.[. . .]it is natural to think
of my statement as coercive. The point is not that my statement will
cause loss to you, though it may well do so. The point is rather that in
making the statement I exercise control over you through others.48
A similar line of reasoning, that places the right within notions of control rather than
within a right of specific content, has actually been advanced within the literature on
rape. There are obvious differences, of course, and the author is not suggesting that
defamation is always comparable to rape in terms of harm. Nonetheless, rape law’s
refusal to punish sex-by-deception causes us to question the traditional consensus
that the wrong lies in acting contrary to the consent of the victim: if consent were
the lodestone of rape, then sex-by-deception must be rape, which it isn’t (and nor
ought it to be). Jed Rubenfeld argues that the wrongness of rape does not lie in
47Or beliefs, or intentions, etc.
48A Beever, ‘What Does Tort Law Protect?’ (2015) 27 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 626,
631 [17].
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some right to sexual autonomy per se, but rather in the control or possession taken
over the victim’s body.49 We don’t have to recognise a specific right to ‘smoking
autonomy’ in order to recognise that forcing someone to smoke a cigarette against
their will is wrong.50 The act of control or possession is sufficient. Of course, the
nature of the control is different in defamation: it is not control or possession of the
body but of reputation. The interesting similarity, however, lies in the notion of the
wrongness of the defendant’s act of taking control or appropriation of something over
which we lack perfect control in the first place.
This fits well with our understanding of defamation. Unfortunately it doesn’t fit
nearly so well with the law, either past or current, though brief analysis of each will
reveal the problems to be trivial. There are three points that should be addressed.
The first problem relates to the threshhold in law: under s1(1) Defamation Act 2013,
a statement must have ‘caused or be likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of
the claimant’.51 This is in addition to the common law Jameel principle that required
the tort to have been real and substantial.52 The statute appears to have raised the
bar somewhat, though it is not immediately clear what difference this will have in
practice. Despite the requirement of ‘serious harm’ appearing to abolish a conclusive
presumption of loss, it is submitted that it would be enough for this requirement
to establish that the damage to reputation alone (that is, without tangible loss)
would suffice. Under the old slander laws, the damage to reputation needed to
have caused harm to some other interest, such as an economic interest. As Dr




52Jameel v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2005] EWCA Civ 75.
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Descheemaeker noted about such instances, reputation is not compensated, but only
those secondary injuries that ‘flow from an injury to reputation[. . .]The interest in
reputation still stands in the foreground, but it is transparent.’53 Peter Cane argues
similarly: defamation compensates for the creation of a risk of harm, and is not
compensated directly, per se.54 It cannot be the case that the requirement of serious
harm requires, in all instances of defamation, some secondary harm flowing from
the reputational damage; such would be far too restrictive, and wouldn’t reflect that
reality that private individuals can be seriously defamed without any tangible further
loss.55 The right to an accurate reputation must then be qualified, such that it is a
right at least to a minimally accurate reputation over which we ought to be able to
exercise some control. It is not a balloon that is popped at the first pin-prick, but
rather a jelly that can absorb certain pressure before collapsing (or, casting wantonly
around for another analogy, two countries separated by a demilitarised zone). The
boundary is—unfortunately, it is submitted—blurred, but the rights-oriented thesis
can survive so long as there is a boundary.
The second issue relates to s1(2), which claims that, for the purposes of for-profit
organisations, harm to reputation can only amount to ‘serious harm’ if it has caused
or is likely to cause serious financial loss. This is interesting. At first it is tempting to
observe that, if the reputation can only really be quantified in financial terms, then
to argue that compensation is somehow based on an infringed right to reputation is
tenuous; the right is ultimately based in the financial, not reputation interest, and
thus defamation starts to look more like a wrong act (like breach of duty) that may
53E Descheemaeker, ‘Protecting Reputation: Defamation and Negligence’ (2009) 29 (4) OJLS 603,
617.
54P Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2002) 203.
55See Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd and another [2017] EWCA Civ 1334.
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have many possible outcomes, rather than one protected right. Our first instincts
would be wrong. It would be a mistake to assume that rights apply equally across all
legal persons, be they human or otherwise. For example, the right to bodily integrity
cannot apply—either equally or at all—to companies. Why then would we expect the
right to reputation to apply equally? There may be many reasons that we recognise
the right in humans, including, perhaps, the importance for mental wellbeing of
self-esteem; these concerns do not apply to companies. Further, the reputation of
the company is not automatically transferred to the reputation of its members (and,
where the defamation of the company is transferred to the members, there is nothing
to say that the members or officers would not have a claim as individuals, based on
damage to their own reputation). So all the statute is doing here is making the
point that the only manner in which reputational harm could ever manifest itself in
companies is through financial loss. Any other aspect of harm to reputation would
be a response of humans to that harm, not a response of the company. In this sense,
the statute does nothing new.
The final issue relates to both the old and new laws. In either instance, ‘it is
a defence to an action for defamation for the defendant to show that the imputa-
tion conveyed by the statement complained of is substantially true’.56 Familiarity
obscures the oddity: truth, here, is acting as a defence, just as ex turpi causa is
a defence to an otherwise sound negligence claim. Theoretically, then, there is a
legally sound, good claim in defamation regardless of whether or not the imputation
was even false. However, the corrupting influence of this, too, can be overstated.
Certainly a claimant does not have to prove falsehood, and, in the absence of any
56s2(1) Defamation Act 2013.
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proof as to its verity, he or she has a good claim. What this is not, however, is an ad-
mission by Parliament that any statement that affects our reputation is tantamount
to defamation. Rather, it is a policy decision not to deny claims to those who are
not able to prove the falsehood of an imputation (and, of course, there is a broader
epistemic point that it is often not possible to prove a negative).
2.2. Spring v Guardian Assurance plc. We turn now to Spring, where the
relationship between negligence and defamation was considered directly. The defen-
dant companies, of whom Graham Spring had been a representative, provided refer-
ences concerning Mr Spring to his potential employers, which included an allegation
that he had been dishonest. These allegations, though not found to be malicious,
had been made without a comprehensive investigation into their truth, and thus—so
found the trial judge—they had failed to exercise reasonable care in this respect.
As Lord Keith of Kinkel noted (albeit in an ultimately dissenting judgment), ‘there
might be much to be said for the view that Mr Spring is entitled to succeed in his
claim based on negligence, on the basis that it was reasonably foreseeable that dam-
age to him would result if the reference were prepared without reasonable care and
it thus incorrectly disparaged him[. . .]’57
Were this a simple case of negligence, then no doubt Lord Keith would have
been correct. However, the complication was that this clearly concerned damage to
reputation, and so fell within the ambit of defamation; that being the case, it was
therefore subject to a defence of qualified privilege. The main question was therefore
whether a claim for damage to reputation could be sustained by a form of action
other than defamation (viz. negligence), and, if so, whether the law of negligent
57Spring v Guardian Assurance Plc [1995] 2 AC 296, 307h (Lord Keith of Kinkel).
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misstatement could be used to negative the defence of qualified privilege that would
otherwise apply to the action for defamation.58
Lord Keith’s dissenting judgment was that the two areas of law could not be
merged. He cited with approval59 a series of cases from the New Zealand Court of
Appeal, including Balfour v Attorney-General60—in which Hardie Boys J stated that
the ‘inability in a particular case to bring it within the criteria of a defamation suit
is not to be made good by the formulation of a duty of care not to defame’61—and
Mortensen v Laing62 in which Sir Robin Cooke P said that
Qualified privilege can be defeated by proof of malice, but not by mere
negligence. The suggested cause of action in negligence would therefore
impose a greater restriction on freedom of speech than exists under the
law worked out over many years to cover freedom of speech and its
limitations. By a side-wind the law of defamation would be overthrown.63
Lord Keith’s conclusion, then, was not that the reference wasn’t negligent per se,
but that recognising a claim in negligence would necessarily negative the defence of
qualified privilege (or the traditional limits thereon), and thus it could not be fair,
just, or reasonable to recognise a duty of care in respect of the negligence claim.
With the greatest respect to his Lordship, and though one would stop short of
suggesting that his fears were misplaced, the threat to the law of defamation (as
58I should perhaps note at this point that these questions were not posed explicitly in this order,
but this is fundamentally what the appeal amounted to.
59‘The process of reasoning which [these cases] contain is in my opinion entirely sound and apt to be
followed and applied in the present case.’Spring v Guardian Assurance Plc [1995] 2 AC 296, 313g
(Lord Keith of Kinkel).
60[1991] 1 NZLR 519
61[1991] 1 NZLR 519, 529.
62[1992] 2 NZLR 282.
63ibid 302.
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articulated by Sir Robin) was, perhaps, exaggerated. Firstly, Spring hardly counted
as a side-wind: it was a House of Lords case that addressed the issue of negligence
and qualified privilege head-on. That it wasn’t a pure defamation case could not
be a reason to ignore defamation issues (because, of course, the reason it wasn’t a
defamation case went to the heart of the problem). How else would the ambit of
qualified privilege have been addressed? Certainly not in a case that obviously fell
within it.
Secondly, one struggles wholly to sympathise with Lord Keith’s concerns regard-
ing the continued relevance of qualified privilege were the court to permit a claim
in negligence. Citing Lord Templeman’s speech in Downsview Nominees Ltd v First
City Corporation Ltd,64 Lord Keith concluded that the fear of a claim in negligence
would prevent referees from voicing their suspicions about the subjects of those ref-
erences, a position that clearly ran counter to the public interest. Now, clearly one
requires a certain frankness from referees, and such is certainly in the public inter-
est. It is not, however, at all clear why the requirement that such suspicions be
reasonable—whether or not they are accurate—would so inhibit frank references,
save for where those frank views were not reasonably held, in which case it is hard
to see why it would be in the public interest for them to be expressed.65 There is no
claim in negligence merely because beliefs—otherwise reasonably held—turn out to
be incorrect (as noted by Lord Lowry, reasonable care is not tantamount to a guar-
antee66). Qualified privilege would thus still apply to prevent claims in defamation
64[1993] AC 295, 316.
65Indeed, one can go further, as Lord Woolf did in Spring (at 351h), and argue that it is in the
public interest that expressed views are reasonably held.
66[1995] 2 AC 296, 327c.
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following the expression of reasonably held—but incorrect—views. For policy to neg-
ative an otherwise sound claim in negligence, there would have to be demonstrable
and tangible harm to the public interest, and it is far from obvious that such harm
would result from the requirement that referees act reasonably.
It is worth noting at this point that Lord Woolf dismissed the qualified privilege
problem on an entirely different basis, (albeit that I do not subscribe to his analysis
either): this being a negligence case, it did not concern the same type of damage as
defamation, and thus one can’t transfer a defence from defamation into negligence.67
Specifically, at page 351a, he noted that a claim in negligence ‘will be primarily
interested in and largely limited to [the subject’s] economic loss.’ I confess that I fail
to see why this must be the case. Admittedly, an action for defamation has never
required a negligent act, because (as noted above) a statement is either defamatory
in that it harms someone’s reputation or it is not, so negligence, to that end, is irrele-
vant. Similarly, there has never been an action in negligence for harm to reputation,
because you would simply bring an action in defamation. But it is not clear that
such is theoretically impossible (for one can negligently harm a whole host of other
rights), and arguably Spring provides the example where, actually, negligence does
have a role to play in an action for ‘mere’ reputational damage.
Lord Woolf’s further claim that the case was primarily one of economic loss and
not reputational damage would seem to be invoking a fiction, at least as a means of
trying to separate the torts. Certainly the claimant was deprived of the chance to
secure employment, and thus out of context this appears to be pure economic loss,
but it was contingent on reputational damage, and it would be drastically to limit
67[1995] 2 AC 296, 351a–b.
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the role of defamation to argue that damages could only ever compensate for the
damage to reputation (whetever that even means in the isolated sense), rather than
for contingent damage to, say, career.68
Lords Woolf, Lowry, Slynn, and Goff ultimately based their decision in this matter
on the fact that negligence and defamation are different torts.69 There is a sense in
which this is true, but it is not the sense in which their Lordships intended. The
reality is that defamation and negligence do not exist like colliding continental plates,
where occasionally one is subducted by the other. Rather, they exist at different
levels on the taxonomic plain. Lord Woolf skirted this conclusion when he stated
that ‘there is a fundamental difference between the torts. An action for defamation
is founded upon the inaccurate terms of the reference itself. An action for negligence
is based on the lack of care of the author of the reference.’70 This is almost true, in
that defamation concerns itself with a specific right whereas negligence concerns the
extent to which two parties may be identified as doer and sufferer of a harm, but—as
I have noted at some length previously—there is no action for mere lack of care;
the lack of care must have infringed a right. Similarly, as noted in this chapter at
2.1 above, there is no action for a statement that is merely inaccurate. Defamation
provided the meat of the claim—it identified the right infringed—whereas negligence
established that Mr Spring had not waived his right in respect of the defamation, on
the basis that the expression of the inaccurate views was unreasonable, and could
68See, for example, Cleese v Associated Newspapers [2004] EMLR 3. Lawrence McNamara goes
even further than this and argues that the value of reputation lies solely in the commercial and
social opportunities it affords, rather than in any inherent value; L McNamara, Reputation and
Defamation (OUP 2007) 41.
69[1995] 2 AC 296, 324e (Lord Goff of Chieveley), 325f (Lord Lowry), 334e, g–h (Lord Slynn of
Hadley), 347a, 351a (Lord Woolf).
70[1995] 2 AC 296, 347a.
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foreseeably have caused him loss. Thus, to regard this as a claim in negligence
rather than a claim in defamation is taxonomically unsound. Any claim in negligence
requires careful consideration of the right in question (or, in less accurate but more
traditional terms, the ‘loss’ in question). Christian Witting was astute to note this
point in Liability for Negligent Misstatements, which, aside from containing careful
consideration of the constituent elements of the duty of care question, is organised
by loss. The interaction between the right infringed and negligence is therefore not
to be swept aside by claiming that they are ‘different torts’, but is of paramount
importance in ascribing any meaning to negligence.
Although this chapter concerns the taxonomy of rights in negligent misstatement,
Spring is also interesting to note in respect of duty, because the judgments (especially
Lord Goff’s, which advocates explicitly in favour of the assumption of responsibility
test71) raise important questions as to the interaction of the Caparo three-stage test
and the ‘assumption of responsibility’ test from Hedley Byrne v Heller.72 It is also
worth saying at this stage that these questions of duty are not to be ignored merely
because this thesis is directed at the rights-based conception of negligence; not only
does duty inform causation, but also many of the questions that concern duty of
care will have bearing when considering whether and to what extent a claimant had
waived their rights. However, this discussion is to be had in later chapters. For now,
it suffices to note that the majority were probably right in Spring, but for the wrong
reasons. Consistent taxonomy demands that we regard defamation and negligence
as being different questions, but ones that necessarily—at times—inform the other.
71[1995] 2 AC 296, 316e.
72[1964] AC 465 (HL).
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3. Purely economic losses
In a chapter on rights, it would be remiss indeed to proceed without consideration of
purely economic losses. Indeed, it is necessary to address this area in relation to our
taxonomy argument, which has thus far proceeded on the basis of infringed rights,
and specifically those which we are astute to recognise as legally defensible rights
(such as, for example, defamation, or bodily integrity). One of the most important
impacts of negligent misstatement theory is that it has permitted certain claims
where otherwise the common law would have refused, such as where inadequately
performed services (absent contract) have caused economic loss. The question that
needs to be addressed, therefore, is whether this corrupts the thesis.
3.1. Dismissing the relevance of the floodgates argument. It is at first
necessary to dismiss one of the more commonly-cited reasons for the refusal to permit
claims for pure economic loss, which is what has become known as the floodgates
argument: to whit, dismissing an otherwise sound claim because, were it to be
permitted, the number of equivalent claims would be unmanageable in quantity, or
the value of the claims excessively burdensome. In this form, we can see that it would
challenge the rights thesis, because recognition of the right would depend ab initio
on the consideration of societal impact or on the wealth of the defendant, neither of
which pertain to the recognition of rights which we either all equally possess or are
all, in law, equally capable of possessing (i.e. it looks more like distributive justice
than corrective justice). However, we can dismiss this argument on two grounds: (i)
the argument itself, if used to prevent recognition of claims de iure or in posse, is
unsound and poorly articulated; and (ii) if used merely to limit recovery, then it is
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a policy that relates to remedy, and does not impact on the rights of the party that,
being infringed, generate remedies.
The first point requires some consideration. If this ‘opened floodgates’ effect was
all that could be said in favour of such arguments, then it would not be going too far
to suggest they were born of intellectual inadequacy or intellectual cowardice; one
must sympathise with Professor Cane in dismissing the argument as wholly unjust,
for it is surely a greater injustice to inhibit many sound claims rather than merely
one.73
The reality, of course, is that the argument is not founded purely on the floodgates
effect. Rather, the floodgates effect is often cited to mean that the large number
of resulting claims ipso facto suggest that there perhaps isn’t a sound claim ab
initio, that this doesn’t feel like a right infringed. Consider Ultramares Corporation
v Touche,74 in which Cardozo CJ refused to permit a claim in negligent misstatement
against the negligent auditors (Touche Niven) of a company (Fred Stern) to whom
Ultramares had lent (and subsequently lost) money. Cardozo CJ’s argument was
that permitting the claim ‘may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class’.75 Behind this statement
of what he perceived as the effect of a favourable judgment was a general fear that
the law had, for some time, been pursuing ‘an assault upon the citadel of privity’.
Unable to define clearly the basis upon which the auditors had assumed liability (e.g.
some sort of warranty), and the purview of that liability, Cardozo CJ concluded that
a favourable judgment would therefore allow claims against accountants from anyone
73P Cane, Tort Law and Economic Interests (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1996) 456.
74174 NE 441 (1932).
75ibid 444.
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who happened to have lost money through reliance on any aspect of their report. The
inadequacy of the judgment, framed in these terms, becomes immediately apparent:
it behoves the court to discover the basis and purview of liability, for otherwise
unjustified claims would certainly be permitted. To argue that we can’t allow a
seemingly justifiable claim because we are unable to distinguish it from claims that
may be less justifiable is a meagre argument indeed.
Of course, the courts have been astute in dealing with this problem, and negli-
gent misstatement theory has moved on apace in order to determine the bases and
bounds of liability, but this discussion has largely proceeded upon duty/assumption
of responsibility bases, so some consideration needs to be committed to the ques-
tion of whether resulting economic loss, absent a clear legal right to those monies,
can fit within the rights-oriented thesis. The traditional approach, in which claims
were limited to those who could demonstrate economic loss flowing from damage to
property which they owned or had in their possession, falls to be considered first,
following which it will be necessary to consider those instances where such has not
been a requirement.
3.2. The traditional view: property rights. The traditional view of the law,
articulated with little ambiguity by Lord Brandon of Oakbrook in Leigh and Sillavan
Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Ltd, The Aliakmon,76 is that:
[. . .]in order to enable a person to claim in negligence for loss caused to
him by reason of loss of or damage to property, he must have had either
the legal ownership of or a possessory title to the property concerned at
the time when the loss or damage occurred, and it is not enough for him
76[1986] 1 AC 785 (HL).
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to have only had contractual rights in relation to such property which
have been adversely affected by the loss of or damage to it.77
Of course, such a conclusion does not fall outwith the long line of English judicial
reasoning. Recall the discussion in chapter 2: in Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin
& Co (Contractors) Ltd,78 the plaintiffs were able to recover for the damage to
material in their furnaces, but not for profits lost as a result of not being able to
melt other material.79 The point had been discussed previously by the Court of
Appeal in Elliott Steam Tug Co Ltd v Shipping Controller,80 in which Scrutton LJ
noted that ‘in case of a wrong done to a chattel the common law does not recognise
a person whose only rights are a contractual right to have the use or services of the
chattel for purposes of making profits or gains without possession of or property in
the chattel.’81 Scrutton LJ was actually delivering a dissenting judgment, but it is
important to note that the majority (Bankes and Warrington LLJ) only found in
favour of recognising a claim for the loss on the basis of s2 Indemnity Act 1920,
both conceding that the loss would not otherwise be recoverable. Neither is this
a purely English rationale: Viscount Simonds, in Attorney-General for New South
Wales v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd,82 said ‘[i]t is fundamental[. . .]that the mere fact
that an injury to A prevents a third party from getting from A a benefit which he
would otherwise have obtained, does not invest the third party with a right of action
against the wrongdoer[. . .]’.
77[1986] 1 AC 785, 809e–f (Lord Brandon of Oakbrook).
78[1973] 1 QB 27 (CA).
79see also Cattle v The Stockton Waterworks Co (1875) LR 10 QB 453; Anglo-Algerian Steamship
Co Ltd v The Houlder Line Ltd [1908] 1 KB 659; La Société Anonyme de Remorquage à Hélice v
Bennets [1911] 1 KB 243.
80[1922] 1 KB 127 (CA).
81[1922] 1 KB 127, 139 (Scrutton LJ).
82[1955] 1 AC 457, 484 (HCA).
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This, in effect, would be the conclusion based on a simple reading of the current
thesis: to whit, there is no legally actionable loss if there is not otherwise a right to
the subject matter of that loss. And, of course, what is really meant by right here is
some kind of property right—that is to say, damage to or loss of something we own,
rather than something we are owed, two concepts ‘located on opposite sides of a very
deep divide.’83
3.3. Hedley Byrne liability. The situation in Hedley Byrne & Co v Heller &
Partners84 appeared quite different—a step away from the rights-oriented discourse.
The facts are well known but bear repetition. Hedley Byrne was a firm of advertis-
ing agents who had purchased advertising space on behalf of a company, Easipower
Ltd. Hedley Byrne engaged its bankers (National Provincial Bank, Ltd) to make
inquiries of Easipower’s bank—Heller & Partners—as to Easipower’s creditworthi-
ness (specifically as to whether the Easipower was trustworthy to the extent of a
£100,000pa advertising contract). The answering bank, Heller, opined that Eas-
ipower was ‘considered good for its ordinary business engagements’, albeit that the
‘figures are larger than we are accustomed to see.’85 Easipower ultimately became
insolvent, and was thus unable to fund the £17,661 of advertising space that Hedley
Byrne had purchased. At trial, McNair J held that the bank’s reference was negligent
in that it created a false impression of creditworthiness and that Mr Heller ought to
have realised this.86 The question before the House of Lords was whether there was
83P Cane, Tort Law and Economic Interests (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1996) 106.
84[1964] AC 465; [1963] 2 All ER 575 (HL).
85[1963] 2 All ER 575, 579f.
86Having decided that the apeal would fail regardless of Heller’s negligence, their Lordships invited
no further comment on this specific question. Without the evidence it is difficult to question the
trial judge’s findings, though I would submit that, on the facts presented, the judgment is surprising:
the statement was true, and hardly a glowing endorsement of the proposed transaction (admittedly
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a relationship between the advertising agents and the answering bank such that the
answering bank would be liable for the losses. Put another way, per Lord Hodson,
‘the underlying question is whether the respondent bankers[. . .]ever assumed any
duty at all.’87
3.3.1. What was the infringed right? Interestingly, the question of whether the
type of loss suffered was recoverable at all was never really considered.88 Why is
this interesting? Well, for a start, the loss was purely economic, in that it was
not contingent on any damage to property, so one would have assumed that the
judiciary’s knee-jerk scepticism in matters of economic loss would have warranted
direct discussion. One of the reasons for this may well have been that the nature of
the facts (viz. misinformation occasioning economic loss) more naturally precipitated
discussion of fraud, under Derry v Peek,89 and fiduciary duty or contract, rather
than negligence. Negligent misstatement was seen as a novel alternative to these
traditional relationships, and thus was considered in relation to them, rather than in
relation to traditional negligence.
When we talk of recovery for pure economic loss, what is meant in this thesis is
recovery for those losses flowing from an infringed right where those losses happen
to be economic in nature. It is not a separate category of right: there is no ‘right’
not to suffer economic loss, in the same sense that there is no right not to suffer
loss generally. As both Robert Stevens and Donal Nolan have argued, a right not
they do not condemn the transaction outright, but the formulation [(a) they are good for their
ordinary business engagements; (b) this engagement is not ordinary] does at least invite conclusion
(c), namely, we cannot confirm that they are good for this business engagement).
87[1963] 2 All ER 575, 595f.
88C Witting, Liability for Negligent Misstatements (OUP 2004) 8.29.
89(1889) 1 App Cas 337 (HL).
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to be caused loss is a conceptual impossibility.90 There is a distinction to be drawn
between the damage or injury to the right, at which point the wrong is conceptually
complete, and the loss (in the sense of being factually worse off) flowing therefrom.
You cannot point to loss in the abstract and claim that you have a right not to be
caused that loss without a preceding concept of the right from which the defendant
had subtracted. As both Nolan and Stevens argue, the legal wrong of damage or
injury to right occurs at a moment in time: loss does not. You can pinpoint the
moment that an action arises when you focus on right, whereas you cannot pinpoint
the moment an action arises if you focus on losses. Loss is an important factor
when determining quantum, but not when determining the existence of a claim.
The example Nolan offers is that of a nineteenth-century landscape painting that is
daubed with paint by a graffiti artist. To elide the concept of damage to the right
with the concept of loss means that we cannot definitively say at any point that the
owner’s rights have been infringed. The damage to value is latent and may, indeed,
fluctuate. If the graffiti artist were sufficiently famous, the value may even increase.
However, even in such cases it must surely be beyond dispute that the owner’s right
to the painting has been damaged, regardless of the future fluctuations in value.
Thus, in considering a claim for ‘pure economic loss’, we need to identify the
underlying right. Absent an underlying right, there is no claim. However, we know,
as discussed previously, that pure economic loss has not traditionally been recoverable
in negligence. The rule is predicated on a fear that the scope of liability in such
cases would generally be too great (recall Cardozo J’s famous dictum in Ultramares
above). So whereas physical damage flowing from a single negligent act is unlikely to
90D Nolan, ‘Rights, Damage and Loss’ (2017) 37(2) OJLS 255, 267; R Stevens, ‘Rights and Other
Things’ in D Nolan and A Robertson (eds), Rights and Private Law (Hart Publishing 2012) 119.
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be wide-ranging—so the argument proceeds—an act of negligence ‘can easily cause
pure economic loss of great magnitude to many people’.91
Two difficulties may be observed in this analysis. The first, as Peel and Goudkamp
are astute to note, is that the rule applies regardless of the actual possibility or
causation of wide-ranging damage92: in Spartan Steel itself, the only power supply
that appeared to be interrupted was that to the factory, which hardly seems to carry
with it the potential for wide-ranging damage. This is to be contrasted with the
interruption of the power supply to more than a million homes in Johnson Tiles
Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd.93 Indeed, the converse is also true: the rule does
not seem to apply—at least not automatically—in cases of physical damage where
damage is widespread, such as The Grandcamp where an explosion on board the
ship spread to adjacent industrial areas, further destroying thousands of homes and
causing over 500 deaths and a further 3,000 personal injuries.94
The second difficulty, not wholly unconnected to the first, is that a general rule
has been imposed concerning the scope of responsibility or liability by reference
solely to the category of right or harm. On first inspection, this does not appear
so troubling: we have seen in cases such as Alcock v Chief Constable of South York-
shire Police95—concerning pure psychiatric harm (psychiatric harm not contingent
on physical injury)—that, in determining the existence or scope of a duty, special




94The Grandcamp [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 504.
95[1991] UKHL 5; [1991] 1 AC 310.
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consideration must be paid to certain factors in order to establish sufficient prox-
imity between the claimant and defendant.96 However, these cases stop far short of
denying liability based purely on the nature of the harm (i.e. the underlying right, in
this case a right to psychological privity). What Alcock recognises is that it will be
more difficult to establish proximity where the potential for harm prior to the failure
to take care is more diffuse; a scene may be witnessed—and indeed was witnessed in
Alcock—by a great many people at various stages of remove. This is not the same
as saying that proximity can never be established in respect of psychiatric harm,
but only that it is more difficult to establish those persons so closely connected to
our act that we ought reasonably to have had them in our contemplation.97 Lord
Denning MR, in arguing against a blanket ban on recovery for pure economic loss in
Spartan Steel, called upon similar reasoning: in some cases where recovery for pure
economic loss has been refused it is because of a want of duty, in other it is because
there was a duty but the economic loss was too remote.98 In other cases, such as
Morrison Steamship Co Ltd v Steamship Greystoke Castle (Owners of cargo lately
laden on)99—and, indeed, in Hedley Byrne—it will be clear that there was both a
duty of care in respect of pure economic loss, and that the loss was not too remote.
Therefore, if our reasons for denying liability in cases of pure economic loss relate
to the potential for wide-ranging liability, then there is no reason for a universal
ban rather than framing the attribution of responsibility in terms of proximity, i.e.
96‘I am of the opinion that in addition to reasonable foreseeability liability for injury in the particular
form of psychiatric illness must depend in addition upon a requisite relationship of proximity’, ibid
396h (Lord Keith of Kinkel).
97The reader will recognise the paraphrase of Lord Atkin’s dictum in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932]
AC 562, 580.
98Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1972] 3 All ER 556 (CA), 561–562
(Lord Denning MR).
99[1946] 2 All ER 696, [1947] AC 265.
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recognise the interference in an underlying right (e.g. a chose in action) and ask
if there exists a negligent party in a sufficiently proximate relationship with the
claimant that the injury to the claimant’s right falls within the scope of that party’s
responsibility. The questions of right and of duty are two separate questions. This
was the foundational principle upon which their Lordships based their decision in
Hedley Byrne. The respondents’ argument was that there could be no liability for
performance of a service where that service had been performed gratuitously. What
this argument amounts to is an assertion that the only relevant right with respect
to the performance of a service is a contractual right and, absent contract, no action
can lie. The House of Lords rejected this proposition by focussing their analysis on
the types of relationship beyond contract in which a duty to take care can arise.100
This is not a question of underlying right, but one of proximity: in what type of
social or professional relationship can I claim for loss? As Lord Goff of Chievely
stated in his speech in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd, ‘[i]n subsequent cases
concerned with liability under the Hedley Byrne principle in respect of negligent
misstatements, the question has frequently arisen whether the plaintiff falls within
the category of persons to whom the maker of the statement owes a duty of care.’101
Crucially, Lord Goff separates in his analysis the question of the duty of care (which
he frames in terms of an assumption of responsibility, but this matter is considered
in the following chapter) and of the underlying economic loss: having recognised the
economic loss and having then established a duty of care owed by the defendant to
100See, for example, Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465, 528–529 (Lord
Devlin).
101[1994] 2 AC 145, 180h.
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the claimant, ‘there is no reason why he should not be liable in damages[. . .]in respect
of economic loss which flows from the negligent performance of those services.’102
It being the case that liability for pure economic loss following misstatements
can be established in much the same way as negligence generally (at least in general
terms, viz. what right of mine has been infringed and whom are we to hold liable for
that infringement?), it is necessary to consider these underlying rights in some detail.
The standard Hedley Byrne actions will normally involve the transfer of money from
a bank account. This section will consider this first, general scenario (and those
similar thereto): what rights of mine have been infringed if I pay money pursuant to
a negligent misstatement? The second scenario, which will be considered in detail
in the following chapter, concerns what right of mine is infringed if I have entered
into a contract pursuant to a negligent misstatement but have yet to pay out money
under that contract, i.e. I have yet to make good on the financial obligation.
By way of brief summary of the second scenario, before we consider the first, the
complication is immediately apparent: any loss at the moment is latent, dependent
on various choses in action (my right against the bank, and the third party’s right
against me). We are faced with a choice. If the argument is that I entered into a
contract with a third party on the basis of a negligent misstatement upon which I
reasonably relied, then one legally coherent outcome might be that the contract is
voidable: I entered into the contract on the basis of defective consent. Alternatively
we say that I am owed money by the defendant to reflect the diminution in value
of my contractual right against my bank (the diminution in value being the further
legal obligation to which it is now subject). In chapter 4, it is submitted that it is
102ibid 181c.
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entirely fair that we recognise the predicate right as being the diminution in value
of my chose in action against my bank, rather than cause an innocent third party
to become the victim of negligence that is necessarily at some remove from their
contractual dealings with me.103
As to the first scenario, money that we hold in a bank is part of our personal
property—albeit not tangible property—that exists as a personal right of action. In
the course of his judgment in Torkington v Magee,104 Channell J noted that the term
chose in action ‘is a known legal expression used to describe all personal rights of
property which can only be claimed or enforced by action.’105 The chose in action,
then, is part of our personal property; physical money, once paid into the bank, is not.
The relationship between the bank and the customer thus exists as debtor–creditor106
since, rather than the bank owing the customer specific, corporeal property, the
customer has an enforceable action against the bank.107 Thus, money in a bank
account is one of many choses in action that the law recognises and protects as a
form of proprietary right. This is equally true of an agreed overdraft facility within
a bank: being an obligation from the bank allowing the customer to draw funds,
it is a personal right that can be secured through the courts. As held by Sir John
Donaldson P in Eckman v Midland Bank Ltd 108:
103See chapter 4, section 2, ‘The Justification for Hedley Byrne Liability’.
104[1902] 2 KB 427 (DC).
105ibid 430.
106Foley v Hill (1848) 2 HLC 28, 36 (HL). ‘Money, when paid into a bank, ceases altogether to be
the money of the customer; it is then the money of the banker, who is bound to return an equivalent
by paying a simlar sum to that deposited with him when he is asked for it[. . .][T]he banker is not
an agent or factor, but he is a debtor.’ (Lord Cottenham LC).
107Miller v Race (1978) 1 Burr 452.
108[1973] QB 519.
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If, however, a bank has contracted with the contemnor in terms which
entitle him to draw on the bank up to a limit, and that limit has not been
reached, this facility is part of the property of the contemnor[. . .].109
Similarly, Geoffrey Lane LJ in R v Kohn110 (in confirming that an overdraft facility
was property which could be the subject of a charge of theft):
If the account is in credit, there is an obligation to honour the cheque.
If the account is within the agreed limits of the overdraft facilities, there
is an obligation to meet the cheque. In either case it is an obligation
which can only be enforced by action[. . .][I]f they have agreed to give an
overdraft they cannot refuse to honour cheques or drafts[. . .]which have
been drawn or put into circulation[. . .].111
The same is true for loan agreements generally. In reaching his conclusion that a right
to draw down funds under a loan agreement amounted to an asset for the purposes
of an extended freezing order, Lord Clarke noted that ‘there is no real doubt that a
right to draw down moneys under a loan agreement could be construed as an asset.’112
Lord Clarke held further that, absent the bank cancelling the loan agreement (even
if it were at the bank’s discretion so to do), the borrower ‘has his rights as borrower
under the agreement, which[. . .]expressly constitute legal obligations binding on the
109ibid 529.
110R v David James Kohn (1979) 69 Cr App R 395.
111ibid 407.
112JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov [2016] 1 All ER 608 (HL); [2015] UKSC 64 at [37] (Lord Clarke).
The question for the court was essentially one of definition: though choses in action were regarded
as property within the law, could a loan agreement be classed as an ‘asset’ for the purposes of a
freezing order? On the wording of the freezing order in question, it was held that they could, but
the word ‘asset’ is context-dependent.
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lender’113 such that ‘an instruction to the lender to pay the lender’s money[. . .]to a
third party is dealing with the lender’s assets as if they were his own.’114
This last sentence is interesting, revealing something about the nature of moneys
held in a bank account (whether by credit or loan). For choses in action though they
may be, and thus intangible personal property, bank accounts share some aspects
of tangible property. We exercise significant control over this property and, for the
most part, can do with it what we wish, when we wish. We deal with these assets as
if they were our own tangible property. Our decision in a shop to pay with card or
with cash is unlikely to be informed by reference to categories of personal property.
Nevertheless, such an observation is not necessary for the purposes of explaining
Hedley Byrne.
What is necessary for explaining Hedley Byrne liability is to understand that,
when I pay out money in reliance on a negligent misstatement, I have divested myself
of a right over property. In the case of the bank account, the value of my chose in
action against the bank will have been diminished, so synonymously my personal
property has been diminished. This is so just as it was in Kohn when the defendant
drew cheques on his employer’s bank account, so diminishing the employer’s chose
in action against their bank. Hedley Byrne & Co purchased advertising space in
reliance on the reference provided by Heller & Partners, and Heller were aware that
this was the purpose for which the reference was sought. Being so aware, and having
provided the reference specifically to Hedley Byrne, there was both foreseeability with
respect to the harm and sufficient proximity between the parties, i.e. a clear pathway
to harm. The infringed right, in the form of a diminution in personal property,
113ibid [42].
114ibid [40].
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grounded the scope of Heller & Partners’ responsibility. Heller would not have been
liable for, say, a subsequent breach of the contract between Hedley Byrne and those
with whom the advertising space was booked; this is a breach of Hedley Byrne’s
contractual right, to be sure, but it is of no relevance to Heller. As emphasised by
Lord Bridge of Harwich in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman, the scope of the duty
is to be determined by reference to the kind of damage.115
To demonstrate what is meant by the latter point, it is worth considering Swing-
castle Ltd v Alastair Gibson (a firm).116 A bank sought a valuation of a property
which was to form the security for a mortgage. The surveyor negligently overvalued
the property (by some 50 per cent). Soon after the loan was drawn down, the bor-
rowers fell into arrears. The lenders were forced to take possession of the property
and it sold at a value significantly below the recent valuation. The bank tried to
claim from the negligent surveyor both the moneys they had lent—on the basis that
they would have made no loan at all had the true value been known—and the mon-
eys they were owed by the borrowers in missed interest payments (which was at a
significantly higher rate than statutory interest). The lenders were able to claim the
shortfall of the money they had lent on the basis this was their property of which,
but for the negligent misstatement, they would not have divested themselves. How-
ever, they were not able to claim from the surveyor the borrower’s missed interest
payments. As per Lord Lowry:
The security for the loan was the property but the lenders did not have
a further security consisting of a guarantee by the valuer that the bor-
rowers would pay everything, or indeed anything, that was due to the
115[1990] 2 AC 605, 627.
116[1991] 2 All ER 353; [1991] 2 AC 223.
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lenders[. . .]. The fallacy of the lenders’ case is that they have been trying
to obtain from the valuer compensation for the borrowers’ failure and
not the proper damages for the valuer’s negligence.117
The right that the valuer infringed was their right in the money which they lent on
the purchase of the property: there was no interference in the different, contractual
right of the lenders to be paid interest by the borrowers. Right grounds the liability.
As I note in section 1.2 of the following chapter, the damages exist to correct the
effect of the wrong, the effect being that the lenders entered a transaction that they
would not otherwise have entered. Making good on the failure of that transaction
to afford further profit is not consistent with the conceit that they would not have
entered the transaction.
However, had they framed the argument differently, and had the evidence been
favourable, the House of Lords (and the Court of Appeal before them) considered
that they might have been able to recover interest at their lending rate rather than
the statutory rate on the basis that the money of which they had divested them-
selves would have been put to an alternative use (e.g. a non-defaulting loan). This
was a possibility considered by Lord Lowry118 and echoed by Behrens J in Mortgage
Express v Countrywide Surveyors Limited.119 However, both were clear that specific
evidence would need to be adduced confirming that the money paid out would have
been put to an alternative use, chiefly by demonstrating that there was a funding
shortfall such that the lenders were unable to meet a demand for loans (which neither
of the claimants in the two cases demonstrated). This is a subtly different argument.
117ibid 365.
118ibid 230c–231a.
119[2016] EWHC 1830 (Ch) at [53].
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It is entirely foreseeable that money may be put to various uses and, if your negli-
gence prevents me from putting my money to a use which would have earned profit,
that negligence has caused me loss (an expectation loss, in contract terms). So, as
Swingcastle might have argued, Gibson’s negligence not only caused them to part
with their property when, but for his negligence, they would not have done, but also
prevented them from investing that money in such a way as would earn interest.
With all due respect to Lord Lowry, this is a more problematic argument than
even he envisaged. Unless it is clear that the lender withdrew from a very specific
transaction (so giving up their chose in action against a third party) that would
have been a successful transaction, this argument has much the same effect as the
‘guarantee’ argument, in that it passes to the negligent valuer all of the risks of the
transaction. All commercial transactions carry risk, which includes (in the case of
lending) the risk of the borrower defaulting on interest payments. To award damages
reflecting the lost expectation of a hypothetical (even if highly likely) alternative
transaction converts into risk-free reality a profit that was otherwise speculative. This
observation goes beyond mere policy concerns, however: if we are to take seriously
the axiom that right grounds the duty, then we must be careful to recognise the
implication of Lord Bridge’s dictum in Caparo. What right of the lender was infringed
as a consequence of the incorrect valuation? Was the right to interest on the extant
loan infringed by the surveyor? No. That was a breach by the borrowers, and their
ability to meet the interest payments or otherwise is not by necessity anything to
do with the value of the security: these are two largely discrete calculations, and
the negligence of the surveyor does not make more likely the subsequent breach of
contract. Was the right to interest on an alternative loan infringed by the surveyor?
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Again, not necessarily. It of course remains open to the lender to prove the point,
but recognising hypothetical infringements of rights rather than real places a very
high burden on a surveyor who is contracted to do but one job, advising a complex
lending decision in but one capacity. The surveyor is liable only for those kinds of
loss that were the foreseeable consequence of an incorrect valuation (given that the
provision of a valuation is the basis—and sole basis—of proximity).
This latter point was emphasised by Lord Hoffman in South Australia Asset
Management Corporation v York Montague Ltd (the SAAMCo litigation)120 and
subsequently by Lord Nicholls in the related appeal in Nykredit Mortgage Bank plc
v Edward Erdman Group Ltd.121 This approach was confirmed by Lord Sumption
(who had acted as counsel for York Montague Ltd), with whom all other justices
agreed, in BPE Solicitors v Hughes-Holland : the question posed by SAAMCo is
‘whether the loss flowed from the right thing, ie from the particular feature of the
defendant’s conduct which made it wrongful.’122 And this makes sense from a rights-
based perspective. If we start by asking whether D is liable and then, only afterwards,
ask for what damage he is liable, the result would be a negligence system where
liability was based primarily on act and not on consequence: liability in the air.123
So we start by identifying the relevant right that is the subject-matter of the loss
and then ask within whose scope of responsibility and liability that loss falls. If the
justification for a finding of proximity is that there was a clear purpose for which a
statement was provided (e.g. providing a valuation for a loan security), then only
120[1996] UKHL 10; [1997] AC 191 at [23] and [40], inter alia.
121[1997] 1 WLR 1627, 1631.
122BPE Solicitors and anor v Hughes-Holland (in substitution for Gabriel) [2017] UKSC 21.
123Overseas Tankership (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound) [1961]
AC 388, 425 (Viscount Simonds).
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that part of the infringed right that was the consequence of that particular wrongful
conduct can be recovered. This echoes the argument in relation to Chester v Afshar 124
in the first section of this chapter: the mere fact of Mr Afshar having been negligent
does not allow us to attribute all losses to him, but only those that have a sufficient
connection with the subject matter of the breach of duty. In that case, the risk of
which Afshar failed to warn was not a risk that materialised, and other risks had
been assumed by Miss Chester.
3.3.2. Procuring or inducing breach of contract. It shall be noted that this is not
the same as procuring or inducing breach of contract. To this extent, the defendant
has not interfered with a contractual relationship. The argument instead is that a
genuine right (albeit perhaps a chose in action) has been diminished or dispossessed
as a result of entering into a contract that, but for the negligent misstatement,
the claimant would not have entered. OBG Ltd v Allan,125 concerned as it is with
instances where there has been a breach of contract to which D has intentionally
been an accessory, is not authoritative on matters of misstatement and defective
contracts. To the extent that the discussion of conversion in OBG is relevant here—
which, for the same reasons as the unlawful interference point—it isn’t, sympathy
must be had with Lord Nicholls’ dictum that the time has come ‘to recognise that
the tort of conversion applies to contractual rights irrespective of whether they are
embodied or recorded in writing.’126 The limitation of conversion to conversion of
chattels is a ghost of the old forms of action—ghosts of apparently sufficient authority
that the majority considered that an extension of liability ‘would involve too drastic
124[2004] UKHL 41.
125[2007] UKHL 21.
126ibid [233] (Lord Nicholls).
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a reshaping of this area of the law of tort.’127 But the reality is that English law
already provides a remedy for the conversion of some intangible rights, and that ‘the
rights protected in this way are contractual rights. No principled reason is apparent
for attempting[. . .]to distinguish between different kinds of contractual rights.’128
In any case, the mere fact that the underlying right in an action in negligence is
merely a chose in action rather than a tangible property right should not, ipso facto,
preclude recovery for negligent misstatements. It is clear that a chose in action is a
property right that can be worthy of protection under negligence.
3.3.3. Duty remains important. Any fears that recognising pure economic rights
or choses in action may constitute a significant expansion of liability should be tem-
pered by the understanding that the defendant still needs to exist in a proximate
relationship with the claimant if we are to regard the defendant as a legally relevant
cause of the infringement of the claimant’s right. It may well be that a claimant
can identify an underlying right, even if it is a chose in action, but it is important
to recall that there may still be good reasons to deny that the claimant is under a
legal liability to remedy that right. It may be initially tempting to question the pre-
ceding analysis by reference to Caparo Industries plc v Dickman129 on the basis that
recovery was denied in respect of the shares purchased in reliance on the negligent
misstatement. However, the decision was not made on the basis of a rights-based
analysis. In any case, it is not clear that a rights-based analysis would have changed
the outcome: the auditors simply didn’t owe a duty in respect of these new shares.
Whilst an argument is tenable, at least in theory, that a duty of care might be owed
127ibid [271] (Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe).
128ibid [232] (Lord Nicholls).
129[1990] 2 AC 605 (HL).
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by the auditors to shareholders in respect of their existing shareholding, the purchase
of additional shares is a wholly independent transaction and, as such, beyond the
scope of the auditor’s duty to existing shareholders. It is never enough simply to ask
whether A owes B a duty of care; one must also ask about the scope of the duty. ‘As
a purchaser of additional shares in reliance on the auditor’s report, Caparo stands
in no different position from any other investing member of the public to whom the
auditor owes no duty’.130
The Court of Appeal in Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel & Co Ltd 131
considered that the defendant may well have owed a duty of care in respect of pure
economic loss suffered by the claimant (the claimant had entered into a contract for
the purchase of shares on the basis of inaccurate profit forecasts). What distinguishes
Morgan from Caparo is the proximity: in Morgan it was clear that the documents
had been prepared in full cognisance of the claimant’s intention to rely on those
documents in making the bid.132
The emphasis on proximity in the above—somewhat lacking in specificity though
the test may be—is of value, certainly when compared with ‘policy’ considerations. It
is in the nature of corrective justice that complete deference to community concerns
over and above the equal freedom to interact with each other as holders of right is to
be avoided. No serious author proposes such indifference to individual freedoms, of
course, but the tendency among some authors133 to regard the duty inquiry as being
at least primarily normative or policy-based risks undermining the equal application
130ibid 626–627 (Lord Bridge).
131[1991] Ch 295 (CA).
132ibid 319–320 (Slade LJ).
133See, for example, J Stapleton, ‘Duty of Care Factors: A Selection from the Judicial Menus’ in P
Cane and J Stapleton (eds), The Law of Obligations: Essays in Honour of John Fleming (Oxford,
Clarendon Press 1998) ch4.
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of the law. Further, for so long as the policy limb is community-focussed rather than
focussed on justice between the parties where rights conflict,134 the less obvious is
the link between the right infringed and the remedy—and the infringed right is the
reason for, the justification for, the parties appearing before the court. Proximity
asks how one party was situated with respect to the other, and as such respects that
articulated unity of infringed right and breached duty.
Nonetheless, we view the liability relationship and the right infringed as related
but distinct inquiries. That is to say, the question of how the negligent party can be
normatively causally linked to the infringement of a right (for this is, in effect, the
liability relationship) is not directly concerned with the nature of the right infringed.
The fears over erosion of the privity principle concern the recognition of liability as
between two parties absent contract. But it is not a ‘breach’ of this relationship, like
breach of contract, which generates the right to recovery. It is the infringement of
right; that is to say, because of the proximity and nature of our relationship, I have
brought about a series of events whereby you parted with your money (in which you
had a possessory interest) in circumstances where, but for my assertions, you would
not have parted from your money.
To summarise the point, the traditional limits on recovery for pure economic
loss do not corrupt the rights-oriented thesis, because it is not the relationship that
defines the loss, but the infringement of a right. Negligent misstatement differs
from the broader field of negligence only inasmuch the chain of causation between
misstatement and loss is not as clear as that between bullet and death.
134See Andrew Robertson on the different categories of policy consideration under Caparo, being,
first, justice between the parties and, secondly, wider systemic concerns: A Robertson, ‘Justice,
Community Welfare and the Duty of Care’ (2011) 127 LQR 370.
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4. Further protected rights
What this thesis presents, inter alia, is a framework for understanding negligence:
for understanding the implications of recognising and taking seriously rights as an a
priori structure. The specific rights that we recognise may—indeed probably will—
change with time. The developing law in relation to personal data, for example, may
mean that we recognise such a right that exists—beyond the traditional taxonomy
of private law—that is compensable in damages. Indeed, legislation introduces new
rights all the time (albeit perhaps not to the extent of new categories of private law).
The Consumer Rights Act 2015, for example, implies terms into contracts such that
purchasers who rely on pre-sale statements to their detriment are afforded protection.
Now, of course, this is not really a new category of right: one could argue that it is
still at fundament a contractual right—but it is a contractual right born of statute,
not of agreement, and to that extent it is a different sort of right. The category of
rights is never closed.
We have, in this section and in others, considered the protection afforded to pure
economic loss inasmuch as it relates to a right (albeit perhaps a chose in action). We
have also considered defamation as a creature of right. We have already dismissed the
notion that there is right to accurate information per se, and the following chapter
will make clear that no right arises out of a quasi-contract based on an assumption of
responsibility. Before we move on to the fourth chapter, however, it is worth taking
further stock of some of the other rights that feature in negligent misstatement.
4.1. Physical injury. We have considered at some length the protection that
the law affords to our own bodies and the right generally to determine what shall
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be done with our bodies.135 We need not develop the point in much more detail.
However, discussion of this right has so far been generally limited to instances of
physical interference. The statement-maker does not by necessity also have to be
the knife-wielder in order to have infringed the right. Two cases illustrate the point
well. The claimant in Clay v AJ Crump and Sons Ltd 136 was injured by a wall
that collapsed onto a workers’ hut. This was a result of negligent advice from the
architect that the wall could be left standing. Perrett v Collins137 concerned the
negligent approval of airworthiness that resulted in the relevant aircraft crashing,
injuring the claimant. The defendant’s interference with the right is a question of
duty, and the proximity was established by the extent of the control exercised over
the construction of the aircraft, inter alia.138 What is interesting for our purposes,
beyond the recognition of the underlying right to physical integrity (which was never
really in doubt), is that the court recognised that the statement-maker could, by
virtue of a negligent statement alone, be liable for ‘direct physical damage.’139
4.2. Psychiatric injury. There is some case law to support the assertion that
negligent misstatement protects purely psychiatric rights. The difficulty in these
cases has always been the determination of duty. The courts have been reluctant
to permit that the mere fact of communicating accurate information, howsoever
carelessly and distressingly, should prompt liability.
135And the right is hardly restricted to English law. See Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital
105 NE 92 (NYCA 1914) at [93] (Cardozo CJ): ‘[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.’
136[1964] 1 QB 533 (CA).
137[1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 255 (CA).
138ibid 261–262 (Hobhouse LJ).
139ibid 274 (Buxton LJ).
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It seems from W v Essex County Council 140 that the courts are at least willing
to recognise claims for pure psychiatric harm predicated on misstatements. In the
instant case, the defendant council had provided assurances to foster parents that
the foster child they were taking into their home had no history of sexually abusing
others. This was not so: the child did have a history of abusing others. The parents
already had three foster children, who suffered sexual abuse and psychiatric harm
as a result. The court held that the psychiatric harm of the children fell within the
scope of the duty owed by the council. The Court of Appeal struck out the parents’
claim for psychiatric harm, though this decision was overturned on appeal by the
House of Lords.141 Christian Witting is astute to note, however, that the difficulty
with relying exclusively on this case as authority for misstatement and psychiatric
injury is that there are other reasons beyond the statement for finding a duty by
the council: the council ‘had arranged a fostering agreement and had introduced an
abusive child into the family home.’142
Similarly, claims have been permitted where distressing and inaccurate informa-
tion has been communicated causing psychiatric harm. Bursell J permitted a claim
for psychiatric harm in Farrell v Avon Health Authority143 on the basis that a father,
who had been negligently and incorrectly told that his newborn child had died, was
a primary victim. Having been handed the corpse of a child (though not, of course,
his child), he had been ‘physically involved in the incident.’144 It is, perhaps, unfor-
tunate, that the judge chose to pursue a slightly strained analysis based on primary
140[1998] 3 WLR 534 (CA).
141W v Essex County Council [2001] 2 AC 592 (HL).
142C Witting, Liability for Negligent Misstatements (Oxford, OUP 2004) 6.16.
143[2001] Lloyd’s Rep Med 458.
144ibid 471 (Bursell J).
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victims: the father was never at risk of physical injury himself. What is more unfor-
tunate, however, is that it is not clear to what extent the touchstone of liability lay
in the inaccuracy of the communication.
Interestingly, on this point, it is not so clear that the careless communication
of otherwise accurate information would ground a claim. Windeyer J stated in the
Australian case ofMount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey145 (cited by Witting146) that ‘nervous
shock resulting simply from hearing distressing news does not sound in damages in
the same way as does witnessing distressing events.’147 Of course, this fits well
with our understanding of the Alcock control mechanisms for secondary victims.148
Generally no action lies against someone who merely informs a party of distressing
news, even if negligently.149
So it seems that a claim in misstatement can proceed on the basis of purely
psychiatric rights, but only to the extent that the statement-maker was negligent as
to content rather than merely delivery.
4.3. Consequential economic loss. To the extent that rights in respect of
physical injury are recognised in misstatement, so too are the losses flowing from
those infringements. Of course, those losses too need to be identified as rights (or
an infringement thereof)—see chapter 2, 1.2 above. The complication caused by
the choses in action that we see in pure economic loss is not present here: contrac-
tual rights and other choses in action are recognised where they are contingent on
145(1971) 125 CLR 383 (HCA).
146Witting (n 142) 6.18.
147Mount Isa Mines 407 (Windeyer J). See also Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002) 211
CLR 317, 395 (HCA): ‘There can be no legal duty to break news gently.’
148Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310 (HL).
149ibid 398 (Lord Keith).
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physical damage. For example, in McFarlane v Tayside Health Board 150 a father
was negligently and incorrectly informed that, following his vasectomy procedure,
his sperm count was negative. The mother subsequently gave birth to a healthy
child, albeit a child the parents had not wanted. The first question to address is
whether this constituted physical ‘damage’. Their Lordships seemed content that it
was physical damage, though were at pains to note that it wasn’t normal ‘harm’ or
‘injury’.151 Such reservations were probably underserved: the severe effects of preg-
nancy and childbirth clearly engage the right over our own bodies and, while ‘injury’
or ‘harm’ may often be a neat shorthand for cases where our rights over our bod-
ies are infringed, this was a case where such phrases were misleading. Nonetheless,
the physical damage having been accepted, the parents were also awarded damages
for their loss of earnings (interference with a third party contract), and expenses
(diminution value of chose of action against bank) covering medial bills and clothes.
The court did not consider that the cost of raising the child was recoverable because
it was outwith the scope of the doctor’s duty.152 There is nothing about such costs
which render them irrecoverable per se; if, on the facts, there is sufficient proximity
between the parties, there would appear to be no reason why these costs should be
denuded of their status as a product of infringed rights.
Conclusion
This chapter has been concerned with locating negligent misstatement within our
concept of rights. At the core of this chapter is the assertion that misstatement—
and negligence more generally—concerns the infringement of a right (and not merely
150[2000] 2 AC 59 (HL).
151ibid 74 (Lord Slynn).
152ibid 76 (Lord Slynn).
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the right to be informed), cannot exist without recognition of that specific right,
and thus exists at a different level of taxonomy. Following Hedley Byrne, negligent
misstatement theory, in its preoccupation with defining the ‘duty’ relationship, ap-
pears to have elevated that relationship to the status of quasi-contractual right, a
thing which can be breached in and of itself (albeit that it’s not actionable per se).
This way of thinking was seen in Chester and ABC v St George’s and associated
cases (recognising, for example a duty to inform or a right to be informed). Instead,
rather than recognising a duty to inform or to be informed, we need to start with the
question of whether we possess a right to the subject matter of the loss, and whether
we waived that right to some extent. The example employed in this chapter, Spring
v Guardian Assurance, showed that protected rights and negligence exist at different
levels of generality: in that case, defamation and negligence were not simply differ-
ent torts on the same taxonomic plain, but fundamentally different. Finally, this
chapter has shown that the economic loss discourse still, at fundament, concerns the
breach of legally recognisable rights, even in matters of negligent misstatement. This
chapter has surveyed a range of rights that can and should be afforded protection
under negligent misstatement, and this includes purely economic rights and choses
in action.
The following two chapters will deal in detail with crucial elements that have
been touched upon in this chapter: firstly, the assumption of responsibility thesis—
the quasi-contractual model of misstatement—is categorically denied in favour of a
negligence model; secondly, the justification for Hedley Byrne liability, as considered
briefly at the end of this chapter, is clarified.

CHAPTER 4
The Justification for Liability
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: firstly it will deny that anassumption of responsibility is or can be the touchstone of Hedley Byrneliability. Secondly, it will offer an account of such liability that remains
predicated on the infringement of right. It will be noted that this right does not arise
ex contractu or out of some quasi contract—such is the realm of the assumption of
responsibility thesis.1 Negligent misstatement is thus a creature of negligence; whilst
we may not agree on the merits or demerits of the corrective justice model, Christian
Witting and I are here in agreement: ‘it would be a mistake to treat misstatement
liability as different and apart from the law of negligence’.2
1. Assumption of Responsibility
Responsibility for loss that is assumed before the fact may sound rather more like the
law of contract than it does the law of negligence, but this has done little to prevent
assumption of responsibility becoming a dominant theory underpinning Hedley Byrne
liability.3 The foremost advocate of the assumption of responsibility thesis (hereafter
1Allan Beever notes ‘[. . .]the clear superiority of the contract model over its rival.’ A Beever, ‘The
Basis of the Hedley Byrne Action’ in K Barker, R Grantham and W Swain (eds), The Law of
Misstatements: 50 Years on from Hedley Byrne v Heller (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2015) 84.
2C Witting, ‘What are We Doing Here? The Relationship Between Negligence in General and
Misstatements in English Law’ in Barker, Grantham and Swain (n 1) 224.
3See, for example, Playboy Club London Limited & Ors v Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA [2016]
EWCA Civ 457 at [17]–[18], in which Longmore LJ seems to adopt unquestioningly the assumption
of responsibility thesis (and without challenge from Laws and David Richards LLJ). This approach
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the contract model) is Allan Beever. He argues that the right to rely on information
provided by the defendant is afforded by the defendant’s assumption of responsibility
to the claimant.4 Thus, modulo issues of consideration, Beever reasons that Hedley
Byrne liability is contract-like, rather than negligence-like.
There are significant problems with such a model. Firstly, it is not at all clear that
the ‘assumption’ is analytically discrete from normal negligence analysis: numerous
cases have shown that liability for negligent misstatement rarely arises from volun-
tarily assumed obligations.5 To argue that the legal liability is voluntary requires an
argument that voluntary consent to an act carries with it an implicit consent to be
liable for resultant losses. We know that this is not the case (we are not so liable
in everything that we do), so the legal liability, if not explicity assumed, must be
imposed. Secondly, the contract model does not necessitate a particular realm of re-
sponsibility. If the assumption of responsibility is predicated—as it must be—on an
implicitly assumed legal obligation, why is it that the responsibility must be as to the
reasonable care and skill in the presentation of information (as Beever argues is the
case6) rather than, say, an obligation to perform the task? As I have noted before,
to ‘imply terms of reasonable care and skill into implied contracts is a multiplication
of implications, which is surely the very thing consensual internal ordering of the
law seeks to avoid.’7 Even if one accepts that the former implication is a necessary
corollary of the latter (which, as regards legal liability, is denied), it does not change
was confirmed by Lord Sumption when the case was appealed the Supreme Court: Banca Nazionale
del Lavoro SpA v Playboy Club London Limited and others [2018] UKSC 43 at [7].
4A Beever, ‘The Basis of the Hedley Byrne Action’ in Barker, Grantham and Swain (n 1) 110.
5See A Robertson and J Wang, ‘The Assumption of Responsibility’ in Barker, Grantham and Swain
(n 1).
6Beever (n 1) 104–105.
7N Hoggard, Book Review (2016) 32(2) JPN 178, 181.
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the fact that the result of an implied term of reasonable care and skill is that the
analysis collapses into one of negligence.
1.1. Assumptions and impositions. At the heart of the contract model lies
the assertion that legal obligations can be assumed absent consideration, and that
Hedley Byrne liability arises as a result of such consent, rather than by imposition
of law.
In order to understand the implications of this argument, we need first to un-
derstand what is meant by the assumption–imposition dichotomy. Despite resting
his contract model thesis on the assertion that Hedley Byrne liability is assumed,
Beever nonetheless contends that ‘a great deal of liability in tort results from obliga-
tions that are assumed’, and that ‘[t]here is nothing to be gained from insisting that
obligations in tort are imposed rather than assumed.’8 Discussion of the potential
contradiction in this reasoning—why is tort not the appropriate category for negli-
gent misstatement if tortious obligations are rarely imposed—can be saved for the
following section; for now, it suffices that we can follow Beever’s argument.
The argument is this. There are numerous instances of liability—including nor-
mal negligence liability—in which obligations arise solely as a result of voluntary
actions. In the same way that contractual liability arises as a result of consent, so
too can tortious liability.9 In order to substantiate this point, Beever considers two
cases: Depue v Flatau10 from the Supreme Court of Minnesota, and obiter remarks
from Horsley v MacLaren11 from the Supreme Court of Canada. In the former, the
8Beever (n 1) 98.
9Beever (n 1) 96.
10Depue v Flatau 111 NW 1 (MN Minn SC 1907).
11Horsley v MacLaren [1972] SCR 441.
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defendant became liable for the wellbeing of his guest by virtue of having invited
him into his house; though he would have been entitled to turn the plaintiff away,
having accepted him into his house, the law demanded that he not then be ‘exposed
in his helpless condition to the merciless elements.’12 As Beever notes, the ‘defen-
dant in Depue v Flateau [sic.][. . .]became responsible for him in a way he was not
previously responsible[. . .]The obligation arose because of the defendant’s invitation
to the plaintiff. It did not exist before that invitation.’13
In the latter, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the defendant boat owner
owed a duty of care in respect of invited passengers (‘albeit as social or gratuitous
passengers’14), notwithstanding that he did not, on the facts, fall below the standard
of care required of that duty.
Beever’s contention, then, is that the legal liability arises purely as a function of
a voluntary act—in these cases, by inviting people onto your property. Neither was
under any antecedent obligation to do so, and to describe the resultant obligations
flowing from the voluntary acts as imposed would be tautological: we do not regard
contractual obligations as a manifestation of a legal imposition separate to but flow-
ing from a consensual act. Rather, the consent and the obligation are relfexive: if
we are happy to accept this in contract law (so the argument runs), why can we not
accept it in tort?15
This does beg the question, viz. what legal obligations Beever considers to be
imposed. It is not a matter he addresses directly. If voluntary action is the touchstone
of assumed liability, then are we to assume that imposed liability exists solely within
12Depue (n 10) 3.
13Beever (n 1) 96.
14Horsley (n 11) 461.
15Beever (n 1) fn 35.
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the realm of involuntary actions? If that is true, then one may struggle to recall any
instance of liability that has arisen out of genuinely involuntary action. But this must
be the conclusion that we draw from Beever’s reasoning: I was under no obligation
to invite someone into my house, but I did so, and so I came under a voluntarily
assumed obligation. I was under no obligation to drive my car, but I did so, and so
I came under a voluntarily assumed obligation. I was under no obligation to employ
a clerk, but I did so, and so I came under a voluntarily assumed obligation. The
potential examples are almost infinite. So in what instances of the human experience
do we place imposed obligations?
Perhaps one could argue that, as a primary school teacher, one is bound to
exercise a duty of care over your pupils (whom, of course, you are bound by law
to accept). However, you are not bound to be a teacher; this is a responbility you
assumed when you voluntarily became a teacher. This is in the same way that one
would not become an airline pilot if you did not want to assume responsibility for
passengers. If duty is assumed by virtue of the voluntary nature of the act, then
there is no reason to suppose that all duties attendent to that act are not assumed.
Thus, it is genuinely hard to see what role remains for imposed liability if the simple
act of a voluntary undertaking is sufficient to define contract-like assumption of
responsibility.
These examples differ from Beever’s to the extent that the liability arises at some
remove from the voluntary act: there are numerous obligations that are assumed
upon becoming a teacher or a pilot—some contractual, some tortious, etc—so per-
haps it is too much to consider that they voluntarily assumed any particular one of
those obligations. However, there is nothing about Beever’s reasoning that should
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prevent us so considering: inviting someone into my house also seems at some remove
from my duty not to expose them to the cold (surely I would have many prior duties,
such as ensuring my property would not unreasonably expose them to harm etc).
More fundamentally, however, such a hypothetical criticism of my argument does
not follow as a matter of logical necessity from Beever’s actual argument: why can
we permit the assumption of one voluntarily assumed duty but no more than one?
So long as the act was voluntary, then Beever invites us to consider that the atten-
dant obligations should be regarded as voluntary. That there were many obligations
rather than one obligation does not seem to present an obstacle to the argument.
Conversely, one may choose to argue that, while my being a teacher or pilot is
generally voluntary, aspects of the professions are not voluntary. This withstands a
sort of common sense scrutiny, but this is a truism applicable to almost everything
we do: I choose to fly, but I must subject myself to tedious airport security; a friend
accepts an invitation to dinner at my house, but must subject himself to tedious
conversation; I choose to live in the UK, but accept that I am subject to a capricious
and generally damp climate. . .there are countless examples. At what point can we
so disentangle these (unwelcome) obligations from the voluntary undertaking that
they can be regarded as imposed rather than a corollary of the undertaking and thus
assumed? It is very far from clear.
Thus, we must again conclude that Beever’s argument necessarily causes us to
abandon a private law category of imposed obligation. This may or may not present a
fundamental jurisprudential problem—though, as noted above, Beever seems happy
to accept a moderated version of it as a possibility—but it does rather beg the
question: why, if all legal obligations can be regarded as voluntarily assumed, is
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negligent misstatement necessarily a creature of the contract model rather than the
tort model? This is, of course, a contradiction in Beever’s own reasoning; the argu-
ment presented in this chapter remains that Hedley Byrne liability is not predicated
on assumed legal responsibility. Indeed, as Peter Cane notes, the fact that non-
contractual disclaimers of legal liability are subject to the Unfair Contract Terms
Act 1977—such that even explicit unwillingness to assume legal responsibility can
fail to limit such resposibility—is surely demonstrative of the problems with bas-
ing Hedley Byrne liability on assumption-based models.16 Assumed legal liability
requires explicit assumption of liability, rather than deemed assumption based on
voluntary action. This will be considered in later sections.
1.2. Absence of consideration. The next element of Beever’s analysis requires
him to abandon consideration as the touchstone of contract-like liability (because,
evidently, Hedley Byrne liability arises absent a relevant contract). This he does by
arguing that consideration is no more than a defective proxy for what really mat-
ters, namely intention.17 Sensibly, Beever is at pains to note that not all gratuitous
promises should be enforced. But, he maintains, the supposition that promises can
only be enforceable if they are supported by consideration—no matter how trivial—
is ‘silly.’18 Thus, Beever suggests that the doctrine of consideration be replaced with
something more akin to civil law systems’ requirements for formalities (in the case
of gratuitous promises) or a bilateral reciprocal undertaking.
16P Cane, Tort Law and Economic Interests (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1996) 177. See also Smith v
Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831.
17Beever (n 1) 100.
18ibid 99.
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Mindy Chen-Wishart submits that the civil law requirements are ‘simply a mirror
image of the common law proposition that an enforceable promise must be supported
by consideration unless it is accompanied by the requisite formality.’19 It is easy to
have sympathy with this view. Consideration is no more than the requirement for
reciprocity. That it can take the form of a peppercorn or other such trivial matter
is no more than a product of the courts’ understandable refusal to be drawn into
potentially irrelevant questions of value (especially given that the parties ostensi-
bly agreed to the exchange), lest they suddenly find themselves the arbiters of all
economic exchange.
Beever does not support this view. He argues that the civil law ‘insists on for-
mality requirements because it means to ensure that promises made where there was
no intention for them to be enforceable do not rise to the level of contracts.’20
To be fair, Beever’s contribution to The Law of Misstatements was not, nor
intended to be, a treatise on consideration. However, it does not adequately propose
an alternative for determining those promises that are to be enforced and those that
are not, unless we are to suppose either that the civil law ‘alternative’ is actually a
categorically distinct alternative—which is denied—or that intention is to be the sole
determining factor, howsoever evidenced. If the latter is true, then we must allow
for the possibility that any undertaking can become legally enforceable provided
that the obligor intended to be bound and the obligee intended that the obligor be
so bound (and absent the formalities required of deeds). There are two things to
be noted about this proposition: (a) this really is not contract law as we know it,
19M Chen-Wishart, ‘In Defence of Consideration’ (2013) 13 Oxford University Commonwealth Law
Journal 209.
20Beever (n 1) 101.
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and thus Beever has equated Heldey Byrne liability with contract only by arguing
(insufficiently, given the magnitude of the claim) that contract is actually not like
contract; and, (b) more fundamentally, it fails to distinguish at all between intention
giving rise to contract-like liability, in which you can be made liable for failure to
perform, and negligence-like liability, in which you can only be liable for losses caused
by failure to adhere to a standard of care.
To demonstrate the latter point, it is worth considering one of Beever’s own
examples. Let us assume that
you tell me that you are considering investing in a company. In response,
I agree to find out what I can about the company and to provide you with
a report. In this report, I tell you that I guarantee that I have accurate
information regarding the company’s financial position and that in my
view you ought to invest. Imagine that I am so confident that I say ‘if you
invest, I guarantee you will double your money in five years.’ But[. . .]the
company is in fact in poor shape and[. . .]you suffer significant loss as a
result of your subsequent decision to invest.21
Beever insists that there would be a Hedley Byrne action in this case in respect of
my guarantee that the investment ‘was a good one.’22 If by this Beever means that
Hedley Byrne could be used to claim lost profit—i.e. not just loss of the original
investment, but failure to double the investment over five years—then he is almost
certainly incorrect. Such a guarantee does not exist (and, even if that were the case,
it is unlikely that these ‘Hedley Byrne’ actions would be permitted to side-step the
Statute of Frauds 1677). If, instead, we suppose that it is an indemnity against lost
21Beever (n 1) 104–105.
22ibid.
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profits, then this bears almost no relation to Hedley Byrne liability. Rather than the
claim being the loss consequent on entering a financial transaction that, but for the
negligent misrepresentation, you would not have entered,23 we are instead claiming
that we intended that I should be liable for my freely-assumed guarantee that you
would make money. Does Beever really mean to suggest that such liability can arise
absent reciprocal undertakings or formalities? This would be an extreme departure
from the understood law on either tort or contract.
In the alternative—and this is perhaps the more likely interpretation—we could
take Beever’s assertion to mean that I have, by my ostensible guarantee, consented to
indemnify you for actual loss (negative return on investment), rather than failure to
realise expected profits.24 The reasoning, however, is difficult to follow and, inasmuch
as it can be followed, is somewhat circular. Beever argues that there must be liability
only for the guarantee, because the guarantee manifests the consent. But the liability
does not match the explicit terms of the consent—already, then, there must surely
be some element of legal imposition here. If I am being made liable for something
other than that to which I expressly consented, then it is self-evident that consent
does not define the liability.
Further, Beever argues that the obligation extends only to a standard of care in
preparing the report, but not to the provision of the report. This, we are left to
assume, is because such is the nature of Hedley Byrne liability (which, of course,
23Thus, the damages exist to correct the effect of the wrong, the effect being that you entered
a transaction that you would not otherwise have entered. Making good on the failures of that
transaction to afford further profit is not consistent with the conceit that you would not have
entered the transaction.
24I say ‘the more likely interpretation’ in part because it requires a somewhat less extreme reading
of contract law, and also because Beever’s example states that you did actually suffer a loss—albeit,
of course, that such a fact does not preclude the former intepretation.
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it is). The problem here is that Beever seeks to differentiate Hedley Byrne liability
from contractual liability by little more than an unsubstantiated appeal to Hedley
Byrne. It is not clear on what basis we are to differentiate the consent to perform an
act, which does not found an obligation, from the consent to perform that act with
due care and skill, which does.
I should be clear at this point that I have no objection to the argument that
one may not be obliged to undertake a task but, having done so, may then fall
under an obligation to perform it well. The argument is that it is not obvious how
the existence of an obligation in one instance and the non-existence of the same in
another can be explained by appeals to consent, when consent operates equally in
each case. Unless, of course, you argue that the difference is down to the operation
of Hedley Byrne—except you cannot define Hedley Byrne liability by using itself as
the definition, just as I cannot provide a defintion of a cat by using the word ‘cat’.
The argument is circular.
Further evidence of the flaw in the reasoning is provided by Beever’s own example
of the babysitter:
[. . .]imagine that I agree to babysit your children while you have an
evening out. Coming home, you are astonished to see your sons drunk
having helped themselves to a large portion of your liquor cabinet and
even more shocked to find me playing strip poker and smoking crack
with your daughter. I respond to your amazed expressions by saying
‘What’s the problem? You asked me to babysit your kids. None of us
ever said anything about drinking, smoking or playing strip poker. I’ve
kept my promise’. My response is ridiculous.25
25Beever (n 1) 106.
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And, of course, the response is ridiculous. Except, absent harm, it does not actu-
ally generate private law liability (we need not consider the very obvious criminal
liability). There is no mention of consideration, here, so we can assume there was no
contractual liability (in the accepted sense of contract). And, of course, if there was
harm, in no sense could it be described as purely economic. One may assume that
it was psychiatric harm or physical harm, instead. Thus, any private law liability
that arises can be explained on the basis of normal negligence/duty of care princi-
ples, and certainly does not arise merely because I consented to babysit; I would
be equally liable had I met the son or daughter in another place and conducted the
same activities. To describe my liability as arising by consent in this latter scenario
would be tendentious in the extreme. Thus, Beever’s example is either of a scenario
in which liability does not arise, which hardly assists his cause, or it is of a scenario
in which consent cannot be said to occasion liability (and here we echo much of the
discussion in the previous subsection concerning the relationship between consent to
act and consent to specific liability).
1.3. A more limited liability? We have so far argued that Beever’s contract
model fails on its own terms to distinguish Hedley Byrne liability from traditional
negligence in that the argument necessitates a conclusion that all liability is assumed.
We have further argued that it is not clear from Beever’s logic why economic loss
should be recoverable for a gratuitous promise that a statement was accurate, but
not for all other types of gratuitous promise. Further, Hedley Byrne liability—for
which you can be made liable for failing to take reasonable care but not for failure
to perform at all—cannot be explained by Beever’s argument except by reference to
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Hedley Byrne itself, an approach that seeks to explain the result simply by saying
that it was the result.
An alternative argument for basing liability on an assumption of responsibility
was advanced by Robert Stevens in Torts and Rights.26 The argument is that an
assumption of responsibility is a rights-creating event, but need not exist within a
contractual analysis. Unlike Beever, Stevens is quick to deny that liability can arise
by deemed assumption of responsibility, for a ‘fictional assumption of responsibility
is of no practical utility.’27 Somewhat confusingly, Stevens does also argue that rights
can be triggered by an ‘objective manifestation of consent’,28 which leads us perilously
close to deemed assumption of responsibility. This is especially true if, by ‘objective’,
Stevens means to imply that it ‘is not so much that responsibility is assumed as that
it is recognised or imposed by the law.’29 However, if we take Stevens’ argument in
its most favourable light, in the sense that the objective manifestation of consent
requires no more than sufficient evidence to satisfy the court that the defendant
did actually consent to the duty of care (and this would seem to accord with his
denial of deemed assumption), then this certainly avoids the first of the problems
identified in Beever’s model. Stevens argues, for example, that cases such as White v
Jones30 cannot be explained on the basis of an assumption of responsibility, because
the defendant can ‘only be said to be assuming responsibility to take care to the
immediate beneficiary’ which, in the case of a solicitor’s contractual promise to his
client, is ‘to his client for the client’s benefit, not for the benefit of the beneficiaries.’31
26R Stevens, Torts and Rights (OUP 2007).
27ibid 35–36.
28ibid 10–11.
29Phelps v Hillingdon LBC [2001] 2 AC 619, 654 (HL) (Lord Slynn).
30[1995] 2 AC 207 (HL).
31Stevens (n 26) 178.
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This moderated version of assumed responsibility does appear, prima facie, to
define a unique head of liability: here we have a category of cases in which an
obligation to take care has been explicitly assumed absent consideration. Such cases
would be outwith the set of contract, and outwith the set of negligence, inter alia.
Stevens also notes that contract is not—and has never been—the only category of
promise having legal effect.32 To this argument he brings, amongst others, Coggs v
Bernard33 concerning gratuitous bailment, and Wilkinson v Coverdale34 concerning
a claim in economic loss on the basis of a negligently effected promise to arrange
a fire insurance policy. Michael Bridge has similarly identified these categories of
undertaking as those risidual categories that were unable to fit within the emerging
economic conception of contract in the 19th century.35
As a way of explaining the decision in Hedley Byrne, this—like Beever’s analysis—
is of limited utility. As Andrew Robertson and Julia Wang describe Stevens’ argu-
ment, ‘undertakings create rights and correlative obligations that do not and cannot
otherwise exist’.36 This does not explain or justify Hedley Byrne; what it does is
establish a framework of rights in which it is possible for liability for economic loss
to exist. On this analysis, their Lordships in Hedley Byrne simply created an entirely
new right or rights-creating event—which, of course, would render the decision far
more controversial than perhaps Stevens recognised. If consistent internal ordering
of the law is our objective, then we should be wary of analyses predicated on the
creation of entirely new rights to justify a single decision.
32ibid 33.
33(1703) 2 Ld Raym 909, 92 ER 107 (QB).
34(1793) 1 Esp 75, 170 ER 284.
35M Bridge, ‘The Overlap of Tort and Contract’ (1982) 27 McGill LJ 872, 881–884.
36Robertson and Wang (n 5) 56.
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David Campbell similarly recognises that the House of Lords created what was
in essence a new right, as the claimant has obtained the benefit of a new duty, whilst
‘nothing is said about anything the claimant has to do to obtain the benefit of that
duty.’37 Campbell argues—not entirely unconvincingly—that there is no reason to
suppose that the law of contract had failed in Hedley Byrne: ‘it would be prepos-
terous to maintain that the claimants in[. . .]the typical Hedley Byrne case are ‘vul-
nerable’ or anything other than contractually competent.’38 Indemnification should
be borne of contract—that is to say, it should form part of the bargain—because
reliance by the claimant creates a risk; if the claimant wishes to be indemnified for
their reliance, to pass on the risk to the statement-maker, then the claimant should
pay for it. To receive such a benefit without having to bargain for it, so Campbell
argues, is ‘economically irrational and, what is the same thing, morally unjust’.39
This is not, it shall be noted, the position assumed in this thesis. Campbell’s
argument is certainly important: the moral justification for contract law lies in the
respect it affords to free and knowing consent40 (and, as Campbell himself notes
in denying the merits of the ‘objective’ assumption of responsibility theses, ‘if one
decouples “voluntary” and “assumption”, one decouples “assumption” from its legiti-
mate meaning in a way of which only Humpty Dumpty could approve’41). However,
the argument supposes that there are no instances wherein it would be reasonable
to rely unquestioningly on the representations of another. For example, it is one
37D Campbell, ‘What Mischief does Hedley Byrne v Heller Correct?’ in K Barker, R Grantham
and W Swain (eds), The Law of Misstatements: 50 Years on from Hedley Byrne v Heller (Oxford,
Hart Publishing 2015) 117.
38ibid 125.
39ibid 123.
40A matter that shall be addressed in greater detail in the following chapter.
41ibid 119.
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thing to request contractual arrangements where you are aware that there is a risk
the representation may be incorrect, or where you are aware that the losses result-
ing from incorrect information would be significant. It would be quite another if
you were reasonably and completely unaware of the risk or the extent of possible
losses. If the statement on which you were relying was silence (non-statement) as to
the existence of a risk—such as may be the case between a negligent surgeon and
a patient—then on what basis would you decide to contract? Even if you did, how
much would you pay for the indemnity? Remember, in this context you don’t know
what the risks are, and you can’t be expected to know what the risks are.42 What if,
to take another example, the statement has already been made? If it were reasonable
to rely on such a statement—and I concede it may not always be—then are we to
agree an indemnity after the fact? Who would assume such liability if they didn’t
have to, or if it didn’t form part of a broader set of negotiations (in which case it
is inconceivable that the representation would not become a term of the resulting
contract)?
It is sufficient to conclude the first part of this chapter by noting that the as-
sumption of responsibility model is of no practical utility, and the inquiry essentially
collapses into one of negligence. The argument that we voluntarily assume liability
for tasks simply by virtue of voluntarily undertaking those tasks is meaningless: as
to liability for what and to whom, it tells us nothing. As to standard of care, it tells
us nothing.
42We know, of course, that silence does not constitute a misrepresentation (see Keates v Lord
Cadogan (1851) 10 CB 591), but there is no reason to suppose that it cannot and should not
constitute a negligent misstatement.
2. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR HEDLEY BYRNE LIABILITY 179
2. The Justification for Hedley Byrne Liability
The previous chapters have considered the value of a corrective justice analysis of
private law, and considered a framework of rights in relation to negligence. It has
also been argued that, whilst a rights-based analysis necessitates the identification
of a specific right or realm of rights that are affected by negligent misstatements, the
right on which the claimant must rely is not one that arises quasi ex contractu by an
assumed responsibility. We turn, now, to the right upon which the claimant must
rely, and in turn provide a justification for the Hedley Byrne claim.
Rather than tackling negligent misstatement directly, it is necessary to turn first
to unjust enrichment. Of course, unjust enrichment, being concerned with the ad-
justment of gains, cannot explain liability for consequential loss.43 However, unjust
enrichment scholarship necessarily considers in detail the basis for transactions (or
the lack thereof), and it will become apparent that the rights-based analysis in tort
has failed to consider sufficiently or at all the effect of misstatements upon the subse-
quent transactions, and this is largely the result of our tendency to focus the analysis
on blameworthy action, or wrongs, rather than on rights simpliciter.
This chapter will thus follow the schema of negligence as outlined in the previous
part: first we must recognise in what way a right has been infringed, and secondly
there must be a reason why the defendant can be particularised as a legally relevant
cause of that infringement.
2.1. The dispossession of the right.
2.1.1. Deficient consent and the fatal vitium. The central proposition of unjust
enrichment scholarship is that enrichments that lack legal basis must be given up;
43P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 178.
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either an enrichment can be explained in legal terms (by contract, deed, gift, etc), or
it cannot.44 A restitutionary right to the unjust gain immediately follows the latter
scenario.45
This, of course, is the explanatory basis for the legal effect of misrepresentation.
A misrepresentation is not a wrong, in the sense that negligence or intentional wrong-
doing by the defendant generates a right that the claimant may claim for subsequent
loss; rather, the effect of a misrepresentation is that it renders a contract voidable
because the intention or consent—upon which the contractual negotiations (and al-
locations of risk etc) were based—was defective. The claimant, assuming he or she
does not acquiesce (and instead sue for breach of contract), is arguing in essence that
the misrepresentation had imparted a fatal vitium in the contract, undermining its
very existence.46 Contract is the ultimate manifestation of consent, so it is axiomatic
that defective or deficient consent cannot found a contract. Thus, enrichments de-
pendant on the existence of a contract for their explanation are rendered unjust in
the face of non-existence. The claimant, on the other hand, acquires an immediate
right to the value of the enrichment at the point of the defendant’s receipt.47 And
it is an immediate right: the fact that the contract is voidable should not disguise
this fact, for it is voidable ab initio. It is this very voidability ‘which shows that
44It is interesting to note that the French contractual element of cause—a particularly broad version
of consideration—includes ‘donative intent’: where such intent is lacking, then, as with English
law, a gift will fail. See eg, C Valcke, ‘Contractual Interpretation at Common and Civil Law:
An Exercise in Comparative Legal Rhetoric’ in J W Neyers, R Bronaugh and S G A Pitel (eds),
Exploring Contract Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2009) 84.
45Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln CC [1999] 2 AC 349, 408 (HL) (Lord Hope of Craighead).
46Such an interpretation of the effect of misrepresentation is widely accepted in the common law:
Jeffcoat v United States (1998) 551 A2d 1301, 1304 (DC), ‘To be valid, consent must be informed and
not the product of trickery, fraud, or misrepresentation’; United States v Sheard (1972) 473 F2d 139,
152 (DC Cir), ‘Moreover, under elementary principles of law consent obtained by misrepresentation
is no consent at all.’
47Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln CC [1999] 2 AC 349, 386, 409 (HL).
2. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR HEDLEY BYRNE LIABILITY 181
the basis of the enrichment has failed.’48 In this sense, to describe the contract as
voidable is perhaps misleading: the contract can be affirmed by the claimant, but in
the absence of such affirmation it lacks legal basis, and does so ab initio.49
For the avoidance of doubt, this is not the same as subsequent failure of con-
sideration. The argument is not that a valid contract existed but that the agreed
consideration was not forthcoming—that is the realm of contractual right and rem-
edy. Instead, the conceit is that a contract cannot have come into existence, because
it was predicated on consent that turned out to have been illusory, predicated as it
was on false information. The adjustment of gains following a claim in misrepresen-
tation is a creature of unjust enrichment, not contract.
The reasoning is not limited to misrepresentation. Courts will refuse to recognise
contracts brought about through duress, for example, on the basis that the assent or
undertaking was not truly voluntary.50 Even statute will strike out terms of certain
contracts if they cannot reasonably be said to be voluntary: schedule 2 of UCTA
1977 contains guidelines to determine when an exclusion clause in a contract will be
reasonable, and includes, among others:
(a) the strength of the bargaining positions of the parties relative to
each other[. . .];
48Birks (n 1) 126.
49On a given set of facts, it may of course be the case that restitution is not possible, or there may
exist a bar to rescission (although if a bar such as affirmation is relevant, then the entire basis of
the alleged nullifying effect of the misrepresentation is negated anyway). Nonetheless, this is the
starting point—the ‘pure’ position, for want of a better term.
50C Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
University Press 1981) 93.
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(b) whether the customer received an inducement to agree to the term,
or[. . .]had the opportunity of entering into a similar contract with
other persons, but without having a similar term;
(c) whether the customer knew, or ought reasonably to have known, of
the existence and extent of the term[. . .].
Each of the above relates directly to the validity of the consent and the extent to
which consent can be viewed as freely given. (It is perhaps worth noting, in passing,
that the evident privilege afforded to free and knowing consent in contract further
undermines Beever’s contract model of misstatement, which states that certain obli-
gations may be deemed to have been assumed).
Similarly, doctrinal consistency would seem to demand that unilateral mistakes,
as with misrepresentations, ‘can operate to prevent the consensus of the parties’.51
If we are happy to concede that consent can be vitiated where the consent was
induced by false information from the contracting party, then there is little reason to
suppose that consent is not similarly vitiated by false information from other sources.
Consider this example:
I buy from you a kumquat, supposing it to be a tiny satsuma. In scenario
A, my supposition was formed because that is what you told me it was
and, absent reasonable means of testing it without either destroying the
fruit or engaging the services of a scientist, I believe you. In scenario B, I
am a jejune simpleton who, being ignorant of such exotica as kumquats,
merely gave myself to the unquestioned supposition that the fruit was a
satsuma.
51C MacMillan, Mistakes in Contract Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2010) 207 (albeit that MacMil-
lan proceeds to explain why unilateral mistake rarely founds a claim).
2. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR HEDLEY BYRNE LIABILITY 183
Now, we have already said that misrepresentation is not a wrong: we cannot differ-
entiate the two scenarios on the basis that you have done something vaguely repre-
hensible in A and nothing at all wrong in B. Indeed, as to the existence of a contract,
the two scenarios—misrepresentation on the one hand, and unilateral mistake on the
other—should be indistinguishable. A pure manifestation of Pothier-esque will the-
ory would almost certainly recognise in each case that there is no consensus, and thus
no contract: ‘the agreement will be void, because my error destroys my consent’.52
And, whilst they may not bear out the ideal in practice, even modern French jurists
cling to the notion that such subjective intent—l’autonomie de la volonté—fosters
‘the consecrating purpose of contract law.’53
2.1.2. Equality between the parties. However, it will be recalled from the first
chapter that one of the fundamental tenets of corrective justice theory is that the
parties be viewed as equals. In scenario B above, you would be entitled to assume
that the contract was complete and not voidable. You may indeed rely on this fact,
and use the profit to purchase further fruit. Whilst we may accept that my consent
was not pure, and thus be tempted to regard the transaction as void, such a strict
doctrinal interpretation privileges the consent of the careless over the genuine reliance
of the innocent.
Some may argue that we have moved away from corrective justice entirely in
punishing wrongdoing rather than respecting rights. This would be incorrect. It is
not so much that I am being punished for some wrong, but rather that the effect
of rescission would be to punish you despite your having acted entirely properly
52R J Pothier, A Treatise on the Law of Obligations or Contracts, trs W D Evans (London, A
Strahan 1806) pt I, ch I, s I, Art III, §1, para 18. Similarly, at para 17, ‘agreements can only be
formed by the consent of the parties, and there can be no consent where the parties are in error’.
53Valcke (n 44) 87.
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(or at least not unreasonably). There is clearly a point in the purchase process at
which I satisfy myself that the item I am considering purchasing is what I think it is.
Beyond that, and absent any duty on your part or misrepresentations, I implicitly
assume the risk that the item may not be what I think it is.54 The law does not exist
to provide a remedy for carelessness in the face of otherwise reasonable behaviour;
if it did, it would be protecting my essentially waived right over and above your
right, and thus we could not regard each other as equally situated before the law.
The balance of the relationship only begins to shift when your behaviour can be
regarded as somehow unacceptable when compared with my carelessness (hence the
lower causative standard in fraudulent misrepresentation and duress than in innocent
misrepresentation and economic duress).55 To demonstrate the point, the same is true
in the converse situation: the claimant’s contributory negligence is irrelevant in the
face of the defendant’s deceit.56
2.1.3. Application in Hedley Byrne liability. How, then, does this relate to Hedley
Byrne liability? In situations where we have entered into contracts with third parties
into which, absent reliance on a second party’s negligently inaccurate statement, we
would not have entered, we find ourselves bound to a contract despite our not having
truly consented to it. This is a violation of our right, at the very least our right to the
money with which we will have to part. As discussed above, this is a transfer that,
had we not enforced the contract, would lack a legal explanation (for the explanation
of consent is not available). The only way we can explain it is by the enforcement of a
54J Beatson, A Burrows and J Cartwright, Anson’s Law of Contract (29th edn, OUP 2010) 256.
55See G Spark, Vitiation of Contracts: International Contractual Principles and English Law (Cam-
bridge University Press 2013) 20–21.
56Alliance & Leicester Building Society Ltd v Edgestop Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 1462, 1477e (Mummery
J).
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contract that protects the contractual rights of the more innocent party. We should,
of course, be wary of employing vague terms such as ‘more innocent’: the logic of the
section above was that I should not be able to disadvantage your reasonable reliance
on my promise by holding myself to a lower standard. However, where my decision
to purchase was reasonable on the basis of information upon which I reasonably
relied—that is to say, I had not knowingly assumed the risk that the relevant third
party information was incorrect—it is not so obvious that I am being held to a lower
standard than you. So, if I had been told by a scientist that the fruit was a satsuma
(albeit that it wasn’t) and I purchased the fruit on that basis, then it is less clear
at which point I assumed a risk that I was purchasing something other than I had
intended. However, despite this fact, the contract and its congeners will be enforced.
And so we must conclude that I have been forced to transfer property otherwise than
in accordance with my true consent.
There is, then, nothing particularly troublesome about regarding this situation
as an interference with my right. Neither our contrived satsuma scenario nor Hedley
Byrne present particular difficulty in this respect because the argument is essentially
binary: had the correct information been presented, the claimant would not have
entered into a contract with a third party; it was not, so they did. The claim is
therefore losses that arise as a result of that reliance.
It is worth considering briefly the position on reliance assumed by Lord Steyn in
Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd and another.57 His Lordship is correct to
note that the claimant’s reliance needs to have been reasonable (of course, reliance in
fact does establish causation: as noted above, if I rely on your statement in no way
57[1998] 2 All ER 577, 584b (Lord Steyn).
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at all, then my consent has not been vitiated by your actions). However, inasmuch as
this part of his speech deals with causation, by asserting that causation is established
through reasonable reliance, His Lordship presents a misleadingly incomplete picture.
As noted above, the question of reasonableness relates to equality between the parties,
and less directly to causation.
That being said, Lord Steyn did articulate (albeit tacitly) an important truth
about the relationship between reasonable reliance and the element of wrongdoing
(albeit that he argued wrongdoing was predicated on an assumption of responsibility—
which is, of course, refuted). It is difficult to imagine a relationship of sufficient
proximity such that we can regard the defendant to have been under a duty of care
where reliance was nonetheless unreasonable. Thus, the reasonableness of the re-
liance relates a fundamental element of the duty of care. Lord Steyn does not say
this directly, of course—the language of assumption of responsibility muddies such
clarity—but, as we shall see, the reasoning is not dissimilar.
At 583g, Lord Steyn cites with approval a case from the Canadian Supreme
Court—Edgeworth Construction Ltd v M D Lea & Associates Ltd58—in which La
Forest J argued that
[The respondents] would expect that the appellant would place reliance
on their firm’s pocketbook and not theirs for indemnification[. . .]. Looked
at the other way, the appellant could not reasonably rely for indemnifi-
cation on the individual engineers[. . .]. It would seem quite unrealistic,
as my colleague observes, to hold that the mere presence of an individual
58[1993] 3 SCR 206.
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engineer’s seal was sufficient indication of personal reliance (or for that
matter voluntary assumption of risk).59
The reliance and the assumption here seem to be closely related. The respondent
engineers reasonably assumed that the appellant’s reliance would be as to the respon-
dents’ employer, and, further, not as to the respondents themselves in their personal
capacity. It is presented as reflexively true that, both beliefs being reasonable, any
reliance on the respondents would therefore not be reasonable. Therefore—and this
is the crucial point—there is an important symbiosis between what we say about
duty/proximity and what we say about reasonable reliance, and this goes beyond
dispossession of the right. Where reliance is not reasonable, it becomes more diffi-
cult to say with any confidence that there is a clear pathway to harm ex ante.
Conclusion
What has been shown is that corrective justice can survive the repudiation of the
assumption of responsibility test. The analysis is still grounded in rights. As with
normal negligence claims, the claim in negligent misstatement can be explained on
the basis of an infringed right whereby the doer of harm was causally relevant by being
in a proximate relationship with the claimant and being negligent in the provision
of information. The assumption of responsibility analysis adds nothing to this. To
be of any practical utility, it would have to permit implied assumptions (rather than
actual, quasi-contractual assumptions), and these implied assumptions can only be
determined by reference to the same considerations as for the proximity test. In
any case, the contractual analysis necessarily collapses back into one of negligence:
absent clear terms, we must imply terms of reasonable care and skill, and ask what
59ibid 212.
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those terms might be. And we don’t really lose anything by repudiating assumption
language: we have seen that recovery for economic loss can largely be explained by
reference to rights—and not rights that arose by an assumption. One of the most
important arguments that has featured in different guises in this thesis is that there is
no right to information: we corrupt the clear and reasonable understanding of rights
if we denude them of their potency by pretending that they need protection by some
further ‘right’ to information (and let us not forget that any such right, even if it did
exist, is not actionable in any meaningful sense until we suffer some other loss). Our
conclusion, then, is that we have stepped over party lines: the rights-based analyses
must eschew assumption of responsibility and recognise that negligent misstatement,
despite its causal complexities, is not fundamentally at odds with normal negligence
analysis.
Conclusion
The unifying theme in this thesis has been a search for doctrinal con-sistency and simplicity. In defining liability—in describing what makes oneperson liable to another—we need to find a definition that encompasses
that we wish to encompass and eschews that which is beyond those bounds. We
should be wary of explaining difficult cases with analyses predicated on the creation
of a new right created solely to justify that single decision. One of the great triumphs
of corrective justice theory is that it locates the claim in an infringed right—rather
than by reference to abstract duties—and vindicates that right through a remedy
that acts as a continuation of that right. There is no right to information—we know
we cannot claim for missing or misleading information absent some other harm (such
as loss or breach of contract)—and, further, there is no need to locate a further right
to information: such is the importance of consent or intention in determining the ex-
tent to which we waive our rights, the missing or misleading information means that
we have not waived our rights, because our consent was vitiated, and thus cannot be
said to have permitted whatever injury befalls us. Not all failures to provide infor-
mation are negligent, of course, and the burden of the injury must not be allowed to
fall on blameless parties lest we fall again into the trap of regarding the parties as
something other than equal. Framing the liability in terms of rights to information
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or quasi-contractual rights to information through an assumption of responsibility
does nothing more than duplicate the hypothesis or, worse, defeat it.
It is hoped that, far from being a mere paean to logical consistency, this thesis and
some of the cases highlighted herein demonstrate the importance of careful taxonomy.
We have seen some of the problems that arise from attempts to do justice that do
not consider broader taxonomic implication: in Dean v Allin & Watts,60 we saw that
the result of the White v Jones61 reasoning was that a solicitor must owe a duty of
care in respect of a party with whose interests he was irreconcilably in conflict. In
ABC v St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust & Ors,62 the court appeared to sanction
a patient’s right to be informed of potential risks by doctors with whom she was
in no (other) legal relationship, despite going against (without due consideration) a
considerable amount of case law that would seem to suggest that such a duty did
not exist; where will this leave the duty of rescuers? So there are real-life problems
that can arise from careless expansion of liability, no matter how laudable the desire
for practical justice.
But this thesis is about more than careful taxonomy. There is a considerable
amount of judicial work that needs to be done in increasing our understanding of the
proximity requirement as it relates to negligent misstatement. Witting has written at
length on the proximity requirement, and this thesis did not challenge his finding that
the relative positioning of the parties—the pathway to harm—is the foremost test in
establishing a duty of care. However, for so long as the courts focus on assumption
of responsibility reasoning, the ability to add detail and refinement to this reasoning
602 Lloyd’s Rep 249 (CA).
61[1995] UKHL 5; [1995] 2 AC 207.
62[2017] EWCA Civ 336.
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is severely curtailed. Many of the arguments about implied assumptions amount
to much the same thing as those relating to proximity (revealing, of course, the
pointlessness of the endeavour), but inevitably they will do so with less focus and
with less consistency. Assumption of responsibility arguments add nothing to our
understanding—indeed, they obfuscate the reasoning—and so must be eschewed.
Rights-based theorists have, for the most part, been at pains to fit negligent
misstatement theories within a framework of rights, but their argument that this
necessitates quasi-contractual models outwith normal negligence is simply not true.
If we are willing to accept that normal negligence can be predicated on the wrongful
infringement of a right (recall the necessity that the defendant be morally partic-
ularised amongst the many causal elements), then it makes little sense to pretend
that such an analysis cannot work for misstatement. Equally—and this thesis did
not develop this argument particularly—it may hence be the case that Hedley Byrne
reasoning is used to provide remedies for losses that were entirely nominal and not
based in a right (be it proprietary or otherwise) at all. In such a situation, correc-
tive justice theorists are best placed to argue against the expansion of liability by
focussing the argument on a prior right rather than pretending that some agreement
or duty on the part of the defendant has created a reflexive right on the part of the
claimant.
The purpose of this thesis was to demonstrate, inter alia, that corrective justice
necessitated a reading of negligent misstatement absent the assumption of responsi-
bility thesis. It may be a limited aim, but if it can help to move the discussion beyond
the confines of the proximity/assumption debate, then we permit ourselves the op-
portunity to begin to understand liability for misstatements. Both the academy and
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the judiciary need to define the proximity relationship, which will inevitably happen
over time as cases emerge and are analysed under proximity. But in order to do this,
to do this well, we must be wary of theories that rely on multiple implications. We
must be wary of remedies that do not rectify the right infringed. Indeed, we must
be wary of denuding the rights discourse of its potency by talking of such things as
‘rights to information’ when it is clear that no claim lies for its infringement. We
must be wary of poor taxonomy.
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